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ORDER IN MULTIPLICITY:* ARISTOTLE ON
TEXT, CONTEXT, AND THE RULE OF LAW
MAUREEN B. CAVANAUGH*
Justice Scalia has made the question of textual interpretation
tantamount to a referendum on whether we are a government
characterized by the "rule of law" or the "rule of men." Aristotle
is frequently quoted in support of statements about the rule of law
and methods of statutory interpretation. While frequent, quotation
of and reliance on Aristotle has been selective. The dichotomy
between methods of interpretation and the rule of law turns out to
be a false one. This Article examines Aristotle's theories of
interpretation, especially his analysis of homonymy, non-univocal
uses of the same word, to show that not all homonyms are
random. Aristotle's contribution, that associated homonyms allow
us to understand related ideas, along with his principles of
language and logic, permit us to address the central question of
how to interpret a text. Following an explication of Aristotelian
methodology, this Article then considers Gregory v. Helvering, an
early tax case articulating a non-literal statutory interpretation of
* The title of this Article references CHRISTOPHER SHIELDS, ORDER IN MULTIPLICITY:
HOMONYMY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE (1999), whose explication of homonymy
in Aristotle's philosophy is crucial to my application of Aristotelian methodology.
Shields's concern is with the significance of homonymy to Aristotle's central philosophical
concepts; whereas, my concern is to apply not only Aristotle's understanding of
homonymy, but also other Aristotelian principles of interpretation, language, and logic,
such as definition, priority, and the law of non-contrariety, to modern statutory
interpretation. Aristotle recognized that homonymy ("words spoken in many ways")
creates the possibility of confusion because seemingly identical words lack identical
accounts. Aristotle's contribution is to identify significant philosophical terms (justice,
good) as core-dependent homonyms. Lacking univocal accounts but nevertheless related
around an identifiable core, such homonyms by their complexity do not inhibit but rather
improve philosophical analysis. Aristotle's analysis now provides similar benefits when
applied to statutory interpretation by allowing ordering of complexity created by words
with associated multiple accounts.
** Assistant Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law. The assistance of
the Francis Lewis Law Center at Washington and Lee University is gratefully
acknowledged. I would like to thank all of my readers for their helpful comments,
especially Karen C. Burke, Lewis H. LaRue, and Grayson M.P. McCouch, who discussed
multiple drafts, as well as Dan Farber, David Millon, Joan M. Shaughnessy, and Scott
Sundby for their discussions of various topics. This Article has benefited enormously from
their, and others', including the editors of the North Carolina Law Review, comments. All
remaining errors are mine.
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"reorganization" as a paradigm. This Article demonstrates that
Aristotle, by helping us avoid unwarranted assumptions of
univocity, provides a positive mechanism for finding order in
multiplicity. Only by recognizing and ordering language
complexity through interpretation and application of Aristotelian
principles is it possible to give full effect to the rule of law.
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INTRODUCTION
[I]t is preferable for the law to rule rather than any one of
the citizens, and according to this same principle, even if it
be better for certain men to govern, they must be appointed
as guardians of the laws and in subordination to them .... I
The appeal of plain meaning statutory interpretation is obvious
when the rule of law is seen as preferable to the rule of men. Justice
Scalia, the most prominent supporter of plain meaning statutory
interpretation, argues for his method by articulating its democratic
pedigree and linking the "rule of law" directly with textualism. 2 By
framing the debate to advance his position, and by selectively quoting
Aristotle's rule of law statement without regard to the passage or
context,3 Justice Scalia has left the issue of what method of
interpretation can most fully give effect to the "rule of law" at a
stalemate.
Legal realists and postmodernists have undercut the theoretical
foundation of plain meaning-that language is both objective and
determinate.4 Legal realists, who examine the reality of the political
1. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1287a20-29 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard University Press
1990) (1944); see infra note 3 (reprinting the translation quoted by Justice Scalia); infra
note 294 (quoting and discussing the passage in its entirety). For the course of
transmission of Aristotle's "rule of law" into American jurisprudence, see JEROME
FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS: SOME ASPECTS OF GOvERNmENT IN A DEMOCRACY
190-211 (1942).
2. See William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1165-66 (1992) (examining Justice
Scalia's justification for and method of statutory interpretation and noting that "[b]y
linking injustice with judicial discretion, Justice Scalia puts his critics at a rhetorical
disadvantage").
3. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1176 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rule of Law] (selectively quoting Aristotle from a
translation by Ernest Barker (1946)).
Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign; and personal rule, whether
it be exercised by a single person or a body of persons, should be sovereign only
in those matters on which law is unable, owing to the difficulty of framing general
rules for all contingencies to make an exact pronouncement.
Id at 1176. The entire passage, including its context, in which Aristotle discusses the rule
of law and the interpretation required by magistrates in applying the rule is quoted and
discussed below. See infra note 294.
4. Postmodernists include both those who work in the discipline of philosophical
hermeneutics, including HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Garett
Barden & John Cumming trans., 1975) (advancing the hermeneutic approach viewing
interpretation as a conversation between the interpreter and the textual or historical
perspective of text), and those described as deconstructionists, such as JACQUES
DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spival trans., 1976) (arguing that
meaning is nothing but signs; signified refers always to other concepts). Legal realists
include Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 407
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process, and post-modernists, who explore the contextual nature of
language and the process of interpretation, conclude that one
determinate answer is not possible. A middle ground has been
advanced by other scholars5 who argue for a dynamic approach to
statutory interpretation, an approach based on practical reasoning
that seeks to mediate between a text created in the past by a previous
legislature and as applied to a current problem by the judiciary
charged with its interpretation. The difficulty with each of these
positions is that none has established a completely coherent and
systematic approach that assures us of the maximum level of
determinacy that our society, with its preference for the rule of law,
expects.6  This Article proposes to do just that by considering
Aristotle's approach to interpretation-an approach recognizing not
only the primacy of the text and the necessarily contextual nature of
interpretation, but also the basically determinate nature of language
and legal concepts.7  Aristotle's "rule of law" passage, when
(1950) and Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1930). For an
overview of the subject, see Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern
Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 166 (1996) (stating that postmodern interpretivism is our
"being-in-the-world"); Mark Poster, Interpreting Texts: Some New Directions, 58 S. CAL.
L. REv. 15 (1985) (noting the rejection of traditional Aristotelian analysis, defined as
interpreting text to determine its meaning because it represents a reasoned position).
5. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text (discussing dynamic or practical
reason models of statutory interpretation proposed by William Eskridge, Daniel Farber,
and Philip Frickey).
6. Our daily experience as competent speakers (i.e., people who use and understand
language with reasonably predictable results) suggests that it should be possible to arrive
at more, rather than less, determinate answers for the meaning of most statutes, despite
the frequency with which we tackle issues of ambiguity.
7. Aristotle has historically provided common inspiration for quite disparate
approaches to statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some
Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLuM. L. RaV. 1259, 1259 (1947) [hereinafter
Frank, Words and Music] (noting Aristotle's discussions of problems of statutory
interpretation and concluding that most modem expositions are "but restatements, with
here and there a bit of embroidery, of what Aristotle said"); Scalia, Rule of Law, supra
note 3, at 1176 (quoting Aristotle to support the rule of law as a law of rules); see also
FRANK, supra note 1, at 190-211 (discussing Aristotle, "rule of law" vis-A-vis relative
functions of legislature and judiciary, and cautioning against "using [Aristotelian] phrases
torn from their context").
Aristotle is also recognized as providing the inspiration for some modem theories
of interpretation, including practical reason. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 323 (1990)
[hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning] (crediting Aristotle's theory of
practical reason (phronesis) as inspiration); see also GADAMER, supra note 4, at 278-89
(1975) (examining the importance of distinction in Aristotle's Ethics between phronesis
and episteme (moral and technical knowledge) to a hermeneutical problem, the
relationship between the universal and the particular). Gadamer's focus is on Aristotle's
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considered in its entirety, will show that the dichotomy articulated by
the textualists is false. Principled interpretation is not antithetical,
but is indeed essential to the rule of law. While various problems of
interpretation have been raised by all quarters, Aristotle will be seen
to provide help in addressing problems of interpretation generally.
Ultimately, Aristotle will provide guidance to the question of what
method of textual interpretation those charged with both interpreting
and giving effect to the law can be best reconciled with the principle
of the "rule of law."
Difficulties occasioned by ambiguity within the context of
statutory interpretation often result in modern legal scholars
assuming away ambiguity8 or accepting it as inevitable.9 Reference to
Aristotle will demonstrate that recognition of non-univocity does not,
however, result in only indeterminacy and incoherence. On the
contrary, when properly applied, Aristotelian analysis reduces
incoherence and provides a theory of interpretation superior to the
methods of statutory interpretation currently in use. While
frequently criticized (and certainly not all of his ideas have withstood
the test of time), Aristotle remains a figure of unparalleled
importance in the history of philosophy, including political
philosophy, logic, and rhetoric. 0 The wealth of ideas contained in his
corpus continues to be the subject of fruitful research with much to
offer those willing to consider carefully his arguments and apply them
beyond the domain of traditional Aristotelian scholarship."
Ethics; he does not apply Aristotle's contributions in logic, language, or politics to the
problem of interpretation.
8. See infra note 55 (discussing textualists assuming away ambiguity).
9. See infra notes 74-75 (discussing the failure of other methods of interpretation to
respond to textualist and formalist concerns).
10. Aristotle is accepted as the founder of logic, a field in which he occupied an
unparalleled position of importance until the twentieth century. Even now Aristotelian
methods inform modern logical theory. See, e.g., Robin Smith, Logic, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE 27 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1995) [hereinafter COMPANION]
(stating that Aristotle was the first to conceive of a "systematic treatment of correct
inference"); J.L. ACKRiLL, ARISTOTLE THE PHILOSOPHER 80-81 (1981) (noting
Aristotle's reputation for founding formal logic and quoting Kant for the view that logic
has not advanced since Aristotle). Ackrill provides the salutary reminder that "there can
be a great difference between Aristotle and his own words on the one hand, and
Aristotelianism and the long tradition on the other." Id. at 81.
11. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE (1995); MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999) (discussing authors who use aspects of
Aristotle's work in looking at a variety of legal problems); Ernest J. Weinrib, Aristotle's
Forms of Justice, in 2 RATIO JuRis 211 (1989); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Intelligibility of the
Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW, IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 59 (Allan C. Hutchinson &
Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
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This Article begins with a review of the major theories of
statutory interpretation, beginning historically with the early
prominence of intentionalism, which we might equally term
purposivism because of its focus on the legislative purpose of the
enacting legislature. Part I then discusses textualism, whose exclusive
focus on the statutory text can be seen as intentionalism's opposite.
Finally, Part I discusses dynamic or practical interpretation, which
contains elements of both intentionalism and textualism. In Part II,
this Article then considers Gregory v. Helvering,2 an early tax case
articulating a non-literal statutory interpretation of "reorganization"
with its statement of the business purpose doctrine. 3 Part IlI
examines major reactions to the judicially articulated business
purpose doctrine, reactions representative of the major schools of
statutory interpretation. 4 Part IV sets out various ideas explored by
Aristotle as he addressed issues of crafting and interpreting language
and argumentation. Specifically, this Article concentrates on
Aristotle's understanding of homonymy, synonymy, priority within
homonymy and between levels of definition.'5 The importance of
homonymy as a complex theory has only recently been fully
explicated in the compendious literature devoted to Aristotle. 6
12. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
13. The business purpose doctrine is of far-reaching and long-lasting importance in
interpretation of tax statutes. See infra note 93 (discussing the business purpose doctrine
and describing its variants). It and other doctrines, deemed variants of business purpose,
are now offered as a bulwark against corporate tax shelters, not just in their judicially
articulated form, but more importantly in current proposals to codify the economic
substance doctrine. For a summary explanation of the principles at work in tax shelters,
see Kenneth W. Gideon, Mrs. Gregory's Grandchildren: Judicial Restriction of Tax
Shelters, 5 VA. TAX REV. 825, 849-50 (1986) (describing common aspects of tax shelters
that rely on deferral, conversion and leverage for taxpayer advantage). For the current
proposal to codify the economic substance doctrine, see DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS
AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, 1999 TAx NOTES TODAY 127-12, July 2, 1999, at LEXIS,
LEXSTAT, 1999 TNT 127-12 [hereinafter TREASURY, WHITE PAPER] (ascribing to
Gregory the origin of most judicial doctrines, including business purpose, substance over
form, step transaction, and economic substance, that override purely literal interpretations
of tax statutes to disallow transactions deemed to fall outside the scope of the provisions).
14. See infra notes 106-66 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 173-74 (discussing importance of homonymy ("words spoken in
many ways") for Aristotle and noting modem denomination by "vague" or "ambiguous");
infra notes 176-77 (discussing Aristotle's definition of homonymy and synonymy in
contrast to later scholars); infra notes 182-92 (discussing homonymy and synonymy); infra
notes 193-217 (discussing definitions); infra notes 201-05 (discussing priority); infra notes
198, 257 (discussing law of non-contrariety).
16. The significance Aristotle attaches to understanding core-dependent homonymy
has not been fully understood until recently. Even those twentieth-century scholars, such
as H.L.A. Hart, who understood the significance of homonymy, recognized no distinction
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Ultimately, the methodology Aristotle develops for considering the
relationship of words and their definitions allows a determinate, yet
open-ended method for understanding language that corresponds
well with our experience in reality, but is supported by sophisticated
logical and philosophical underpinnings. Aristotle reveals order in
multiplicity, providing a method for principled analysis, the true base
requirement in a society that values the rule of law, as well as a
method that allows for resolution of some hard and interesting cases.
Finally, this Article examines how Aristotle's theories of
interpretation may contribute specifically to an understanding of
"reorganization" and the business purpose doctrine. More generally,
Aristotle's theories of interpretation offer a resolution of some
current problems inherent in standards of statutory interpretation. 17
Specifically, the long tradition of some judicial interpretations
requiring satisfaction of implied requirements, including business
purpose in the Internal Revenue Code, despite the absence of any
express statutory statement, can now be justified where the statutory
language is shown to be homonymous and the homonyms are ones
whose core definition contains requirements essential to the very
statutory language.
This Article thus demonstrates that Aristotle provides a positive
mechanism for finding order in multiplicity and sets forth a
methodology that is based on a conceptual and logical framework
familiar to those employing a judicial language frequently conceived
in similar logical and philosophical terms. 8 Above all, Aristotle's
between discrete homonymy and synonymy. See H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in
Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REv. 37 (1954). Most importantly, the distinction between
discrete and core-dependent homonymy and the distinction between core-dependent
homonymy and synonymy has only recently been explicated within Aristotelian
scholarship and thus its significance for interpreting statutes has yet to be understood. See
infra notes 218-27 and accompanying text (discussing core-dependent homonymy); infra
note 177 (discussing Hart's understanding of homonymy).
17. This method will provide insight for cases involving ambiguity in word meaning,
including National Organization for Women [NOW] v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994)
("enterprise"), and Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) ("representative"). For
linguistic analysis applied to these cases, see LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
JUDGES (1993) (offering critique of judicial attempts at linguistic analysis ranging from use
of antecedents and pronouns to ambiguous "clear" language in a variety of situations,
including RICO); Clark D. Cunningham et. al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE
L.J. 1561, 1588-1613 (1994) (reviewing SOLAN, supra, and offering empirical linguistic
analysis of the term "enterprise" in NOW).
18. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) (describing legal
interpretation in philosophical terms and urging judges to determine interpretive
questions by integrating decisions into a community of principles). While Solan's
linguistic approach has great utility, a conceptually-based approach may ultimately be
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analysis has the potential for improving our comprehension of
language with special applicability to theories of statutory
interpretation seeking more determinate answers satisfying "rule of
law" concerns while acknowledging language's complexity.
I. THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This Article does not describe every theory advanced for how
statutes may best be interpreted nor does it seek to give a complete
history of statutory interpretation. 9 Rather, this Article sets forth the
leading theories of statutory interpretation, shows the advantages of
each, and demonstrates that none offers a principled methodology for
negotiating between text and context.20 The leading theories can be
described as textualism, purposivism (intentionalism), and dynamic
interpretation (practical reasoning)' While text-based formalism
endures as a method of interpretation because of its appeal to those
who value the rule of law, its proponents generally assume away
difficult cases by declaring ipse dixit a single "ordinary meaning."'  In
more useful for application by lawyers not trained in linguistics. See SOLAN, supra note
17, at 175-78. A system of analysis such as that provided by Aristotle in philosophical
terms, already familiar to lawyers trained in methods of legal argumentation and
persuasion (including rhetoric) may provide a more accessible common ground. See
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 39 (1989) (arguing that
philosophically conceptual terms are what the legal community expects to hear).
19. For a comprehensive overview of the subject of statutory interpretation, see
generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994);
Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of a Decade of Statutory Interpretation Scholarship on
Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 53 SMU L. REV. 9 (2000) (reviewing increased
law review scholarship during 1988-1997); Thomas William Mayo, Foreword. Symposium
on Statutory Interpretation, 53 SMU L. REv. 3 (2000) (describing generally the articles
presented in the symposium).
20. For a textualist, context would include at most the surrounding text. See infra
notes 53-56 (discussing Justice Scalia's approach to context). For others, whether
intentionalists or dynamic interpreters, context could variably include the legislative
history of the enacting legislature or the current socio-political context. See infra notes 68,
73 (discussing dynamic interpretation's hierarchy of concerns).
21. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE & PHILIP FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988) (describing the
various theories of statutory interpretation). While a desire for historical precision and
accuracy might suggest that a detailed analysis is necessary for every theory of statutory
interpretation, with each variant separately described, most can be fairly accurately
classified as a variant of one of these three.
22. See infra notes 42-46 (describing formalism and its variant defimitions); infra notes
47-56 (describing textualism). Although textualism and formalism need not necessarily be
defined as coterminous, for many the value of formalism, providing as it does definitive
rules leaving little room for judicial interpretation, requires a textualist method of
interpretation. Less constrained methods of interpretation would necessarily undercut the
definitive nature of legal formalism.
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contrast, both purposivism and dynamic methods of interpretation,
while recognizing the importance of arriving at principled decisions in
difficult cases, offer little systematic methodology, prompting
formalist criticisms that each of these methods fails to produce
bounded, consistent results.23 In short, all of these methods suffer
from problems of reliability and validity, producing, as their critics
have amply demonstrated, neither consistent nor necessarily correct
results.24
Despite significant scholarly and judicial attention,25  no
universally accepted approach to statutory interpretation has
23. See infra notes 35-38, 71-75 (discussing the limitations inherent in current
formulations of purposivism or dynamic interpretation).
24. By "correct results," I advocate no position about legal positivism's tenets. See,
e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, in LAW
AND INTERPRETATION 203, 274-75 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (discussing generally
differing views of liberalism and critical legal studies' views on law's determinacy and
objectivity and discussing specifically Dworkin's commitment to legal positivism); Brian
Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism: Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 1138, 1141-42 (1999) (book review) (describing positivist theories as
distinguished by their commitment to social thesis-law fundamentally related to social
fact-and separability thesis-that law is distinct from what law ought to be). Rather, by
"necessarily correct" I mean to signify only that, based on the stated premises and
assumptions of any given interpreter, the results proposed by that interpreter necessarily
follow. Although their origin is from logic and proof, the terminology of reliability and
validity, as used here, are more familiar to legal readers from discussions of the standards
by which we judge scientific evidence. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993) (reliability and validity are overarching subject of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 (discussing admissibility of scientific evidence)); Bert Black, A Unified
Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 600 (1988) (stating that "valid
reasoning and reliable conclusions" are focal points of legal analysis of scientific
evidence); id. at 607 (explaining that the law of evidence incorporates validity and
reliability into relevancy: validity of reasoning links facts to conclusions and to reliability
of conclusions); Recent Development, Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific
Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1481, 1532-34 (1995) (differentiating functions of reliability
and validity as measures of scientific evidence). Absent reliability and validity between
assumptions, methods of reasoning and outcome, the legitimacy of the outcome is subject
to attack. See, e.g., infra note 28 (discussing hard cases and the difficulty of establishing
"plain meaning" when Justices split 5-4 over "plain" meaning). For discussions of the
need for and importance of reliability and validity in proof, logic, and argumentation, see,
for example, THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 948 (Robert Audi ed., 2d
ed. 1999) ("valid" argument if true under every admissible reinterpretation of non-logical
symbols); id. at 66 ("axiom of consistency" for formal language and system where no
derivable contradiction); id. at 177 (in Aristotelian and modem logic, statements called
consistent with respect to certain logical calculus); id at 750-51 (proof theory).
25. Justice Scalia justifies his essay on interpretation as an "attempt to explain the
current neglected state of the science of construing legal texts." ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 3 (1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETATION]. The
literature attempting to explicate theories of statutory interpretation is, however,
voluminous. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 19, at 1 (discussing renewed interest in statutory
interpretation); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
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emerged in America.26  The main theories of interpretation-
textualism, purposivism, and dynamic (practical) interpretation-can
be reduced further by considering whether the statutory text is the
only valid text27 for consideration and by evaluating how successfully
each method allows for consistent resolution of hard cases.
28
PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpreation]
(reviewing various methods of interpretation and noting their deficiencies in support of his
dynamic method); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory
Interpretation, 66 U. CH. L. REV. 671 (1999) [hereinafter Eskridge, Norms, Empiricism,
and Canons] (same); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship
and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prr. L. REV. 691 (1987) (endorsing
more attention to legislation as a discipline); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the
Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992)
[hereinafter Frickey, From the Big Sleep] (describing the revival of interest in theories of
statutory interpretation); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Public Choice Revisited, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1715 (1998) [hereinafter Faber & Frickey, Public Choice Revisited]
(reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND
COMMENTARY (1997)) (discussing public choice literature within the context of statutory
interpretation).
26. It may be that no one theory is possible or even desirable. See, e.g., Eskridge &
Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 7, at 321-22 (contrasting "foundational"
approach of law professors who seek one "grand theory" of statutory interpretation with
practitioners who employ an eclectic mode of analysis in trying to advise clients on the
meaning of statutes and ultimately advocating the more eclectic "practical reasoning"
approach). However, to the extent that no systematic methodology is offered, practical
reasoning will remain subject to formalist objections. For some examples of formalist
critiques of practical reasoning, see Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100
YALE L.J. 409 (1990) (arguing that pragmatism provides no satisfactory theory); David E.
Van Zandt, An Alternative Theory of Practical Reason in Judicial Decisions, 65 TUL. L.
REv. 775 (1991) (same).
27. The answer to whether the text of the statute alone is primary might seem
obvious: as the only legally valid document, the text alone must control all issues of
statutory interpretation. Yet as Eskridge notes, the interpretation of any statute presents
an "analytical conundrum." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 621 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New Textualism]. Eskridge describes the
conundrum of text and context:
The statute's text is the most important consideration in statutory interpretation,
and a clear text ought to be given effect. Yet the meaning of a text critically
depends upon its surrounding context. Sometimes that context will suggest a
meaning at war with the apparent acontextual meaning suggested by the statute's
language. How should the judge proceed?
Id. at 621.
28. Hard cases, commentators agree, are those presenting difficult issues of
interpretation. See, e.g., infra note 55 (discussing a case where Justices split 5-4 on the
"plain meaning"). Difficult issues of interpretation that occasion different conclusions
about the meaning of the law may result because of word ambiguity or because of the
application of words to the facts at hand. See DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 39 (stating that
"hard cases" explicable because rules for using words are not precise); SOLAN, supra note
17, at 10-11 (asserting that language used without an awareness of operative processes
produces difficult cases); Cunningham et al., supra note 17, at 1561 (noting the paradox of
the plain meaning method of analysis applied to hard cases). Ultimately, whether we
agree that there are "hard cases" of contested meaning rests on how we answer the
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Given the common law tradition of case-by-case application of
legal authorities,29 it is not surprising that initially interpretive
techniques that began with the text of the statute employed what has
been called a "soft" plain meaning approach, emphasizing the
statute's purpose and surrounding policy, a method rather closer to
the common law method of adjudication than to "hard" plain
meaning's focus on the statutory text alone. According to this
approach, the statute's "plain meaning" can be trumped by
contradictory legislative history because the sole task of any judge
interpreting a given statute is simply to give effect to the legislature's
intent in enacting the statute." The leading case cited31 both for and
question whether any text has an objective and determinate meaning. See also RONALD
DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 116 (1977) (stating that "hard cases," in which no
settled rule dictates a decision, urge development of principles).
On the issue of whether the text has an objective, determinate meaning separate
and apart from its interpreter, compare Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Legislative
Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 457 (1988) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey,
Legislative Intent] ("[O]ne fundamental flaw in the Scalia-Easterbrook conception is its
assumption that statutes have a legal meaning that exists before the process of statutory
interpretation."), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 67 (1994) (arguing for a "relatively
unimaginative, mechanical process of interpretation"). Easterbrook concedes that the
distinction between interpretation and application is a difficult one. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 535 (1983) [hereinafter
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains] ("The distinction between application and interpretation
is a line worth drawing-however difficult to maintain because of the malleability of
words.").
29. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REv.
1509, 1548 (1998) [hereinafter Eskridge, Unknown Ideal] (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)) (describing
the "common law method" as an incremental process, "a case-by-case judgment [that]
work[s] by analogy from authorities and precedents to unanticipated facts"); see also
Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule
of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 535 (1992) [hereinafter Farber, Inevitability ] (describing
common law and decision making).
30. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 27, at 626 (describing the role of the
Supreme Court in interpreting a statute as being the "honest agent" of Congress). The use
of legislative history is then justified as a "check" on the court's reading of even plain
statutory language. See id. at 627 ("In almost all of the leading plain meaning cases of the
Warren and Burger Courts, the Court checked the legislative history to be certain that its
confidence in the clear text did not misread the legislature's intent.").
31. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 19, at, 208-09 (discussing Holy Trinity and
reaction to the decision); SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 18-21 (arguing that
legislative intent is often a "handy cover" for judicial law making); Carol Chomsky,
Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory
Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 907 (2000) (approving the result in Holy Trinity);
Daniel A. Farber, The Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory Interpretation in Comparative
Perspective, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 513, 514 (1996) [hereinafter Farber, Hermeneutic
Tourist] (reviewing INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE SUMMARY (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991)) (noting that the "absurdity" rule, first
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against this approach is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,"
in which the Supreme Court relied on the spirit, rather than the letter,
of the law.
A. Intentionalism
The "intentionalist," or "archaeological," approach to statutory
interpretation allows, and even encourages, courts to determine the
"intent" of the enacting legislature by referring to the legislative
history of the statute in question. As such, intentionalism was a
natural first theory of statutory interpretation in an era where
common law adjudication, that naturally focused on the laws'
purpose, was the norm. By focusing on the enacting legislature, such
an approach elevates historical above contemporary concerns.33
Given the wide range of materials included in legislative history,'
from committee reports of enacted statutes to rejected proposals and
even legislative silence, courts' variable use of available material
articulated in Holy Trinity, is a "staple" of statutory interpretation throughout the
countries encountered in MacCormick and Summers' comparative study).
32. 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892) (holding that a statute prohibiting anyone from aiding
foreigners' transport to the United States in order to perform "labor or service of any
kind" did not apply to a church hiring and paying for transportation of English
clergyman). Holy Trinity also stated that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers." Id at 459. This problem of how to reconcile "plain meaning" with absurd
consequences is not unique to American statutory interpretation. See Farber,
Hermeneutic Tourist, supra note 31, at 514.
33. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 27, at 625 (emphasizing that the intent
of the enacting legislature elevates the importance of an historical perspective-what
Eskridge terms "vertical coherence"-of statutory meaning at the expense of
contemporary legal and social issues-what Eskridge terms "horizontal coherence"). For
views attaching greater importance to horizontal coherence and suggesting the
impossibility of reconstructing the text's history because of the interpreter's own
assumptions, see id. at 644-45. See also GADAMER, supra note 4 (describing philosophical
hermeneutics and dialectic between the text and the interpreter necessarily resulting from
interpretation of text itself lacking objective meaning); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990) (applying Gadamer's
hermeneutical method to statutory interpretation).
34. What materials from the entire range of materials denominated as "legislative
history" may legitimately be consulted raises serious questions. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald,
Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68
IOWA L. REV. 195 (1983) (describing the problematic nature of legislative material
actually available for consultation). For an attempt to create a hierarchy of materials, see
ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 21, at 569-639 (describing a descending hierarchy of
sources as a mini-funnel that begins with the most reliable material (committee reports
and sponsor statements), moves to material of more uncertain import (rejected proposals,
floor and hearing colloquies, testimony of nonlegislative drafters and sponsors), and
ultimately to material too ambiguous to provide a firm basis for conclusion (legislative
silence and subsequent history)); Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 27, at 636.
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results in significant problems.' For instance, is the court, by
examining the legislative history, simply "looking over a crowd and
picking out [its] friends" to find support for its interpretation? 36
Apart from issues of the appropriateness of particular materials, the
very idea of legislative "intent" is problematic, according to the
realists-who argue against the possibility of collective intent37-and
the proponents of public choice theory-who de-couple the process
of legislative decision making from any resulting statutes. 8 Empirical
35. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 27, at 641. While these critics noted the
problems with the use of legislative history, they did not necessarily reject the notion of
intentionalism. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUrES 155-56 (1975). Criticism of intentionalism intensified during the 1980s, in part
due to objections offered by realists, historicists, and formalists. Until Justice Scalia,
however, criticism of the Supreme Court's use of legislative history operated at the
margins, with general acceptance of the assumption that the Court's proper role was "to
divine" legislative intent and that the use of legislative history posed no particular
constitutional problems. Eskridge, supra note 27, at 624.
36. Wald, supra note 34, at 214 (describing a conversation with Judge Levanthal).
Justice Scalia offers a variant of this comment. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Judge Leventhal's criticism could be applied equally to the
new textualists' selection of dictionaries when trying to choose the "plain meaning" of a
term. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of Judge
Leventhal's criticism to textualists' use of dictionaries and canons of construction). Farber
and Frickey describe the "assault" on the use of legislative history as self-serving and
linked to the cynical notion that "legislative history is the product of legislators at their
worst-promoting private interest deals, strategically posturing to mislead judges, or
abdicating all responsibility to their unelected staffs (who presumably either have their
own political agendas or randomly run amok)." Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent,
supra note 28, at 437-38.
37. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 27, at 642. The difficulty with identifying a
legislature's intent was stated initially and forcefully by Max Radin. Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870-72 (1930) (articulating the realist position that
to speak of "collective legislative intent" is incoherent because no "intent" can be
attributed to the individuals collectively involved in the legislative process, because they
do not comprise any unified whole); see also William R. Bishin, The Law Finders: An
Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 16-17, 29 (1965) (criticizing judicial
use of legislative history in place of reason and judgment to "find" nonexistent legislative
intent).
38. Applying economic and game theory to the legislative process, public choice
theory undermines the likelihood of ascertaining legislative "intent" by denying its
coherence. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 27, at 642-43 (describing the outcome
of the legislative process as highly dependent on a variety of issues both related and
unrelated to the specific statute-including who controls the agenda-with the result that
legislative history is at best inconclusive and at worst suspect, given the potentially
strategic nature of the legislative process). For other discussions of the problematic nature
of legislative intent based on public choice theory, see Easterbrook, Statutes Domains,
supra note 28, at 547-48 (applying the public choice view to reject judicial interpretation
that seeks legislative intent); and Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an
Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REv. 761, 774 (1987) (citing social
choice theory as one reason for questioning the ability to reconstruct legislative intent).
But see Farber & Frickey, Public Choice Revisited, supra note 25, at 1735 (discussing the
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work, based on sophisticated formal models, has demonstrated a
greater level of institutional stability than suggested by public choice
theory,39 but does not restore intentionalism to its previous dominant
position.40
Another, more cogent objection to a potentially unbounded
search for the statute's meaning comes from the formalists, who echo
Justice Holmes's aphorism that "[w]e do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."' 41 Formalism,
varying utility of the diverse body of "public choice" theory, the application of various
modes of economic reasoning to political institutions, and concluding that, while offering
insights, it fails to provide a unified model of political institutions or acts).
39. Public choice theory applies economic theory and mathematical techniques to
issues of group decision making, whether exercised through elected representatives or
directly, to analyze a range of problems from unpredictable or arbitrary outcomes in the
legislative process to the strengthening or weakening of special interest groups as a result
of that process. See Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent, supra note 28, at 432 (noting
"[v]arious institutional features of [the] legislature" that actually "promote stability and
coherence"). Farber and Frickey acknowledge skepticism toward legislative integrity and
the incoherent possibility of majority voting based on Arrow's Paradox-majority voting
leads to cycling majorities that cannot choose among three or more mutually exclusive
alternatives-or the chaos result theorem, given a large number of voters and issues,
cycling is inevitable and will include almost every possible outcome. Id. at 425-27. Farber
and Frickey, however, conclude that there are a relatively small number of possible
outcomes, based on empirical results of sophisticated formal models. Id. at 435 ("In short,
we have very strong reasons, both empirical and theoretical, for believing that actual
legislatures do not suffer from the instability and incoherence some public choice theories
have predicted."). For discussions of the theories applied to decision making, see
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 96-100 (1963) (stating
general possibility theorem (paradox) that conditions of methodological fairness and
logical conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously for voting or individual choices
generally); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 1-2 (2d ed. 1982)
(explaining that though the individual voters may have a coherent set of values, the
majority rule necessitates a collectively incoherent intent); Ronald A. Cass, Looking with
One Eye Closed: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1986 DUKE L.J. 238, 244-45 (noting
lack of consensus on principles of public decision making and problematic result described
by Arrow's "impossibility theorem" that democratic decisions are not derivable free from
arbitrary constraints on social choice).
40. See supra note 35 (describing intentionalism's persistence); see also infra notes 49-
54 (describing formalist objections to intentionalism).
41. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV.
417, 419 (1899). Although Holmes's statement is frequently cited by those advancing
formalism, they fail to mention Holmes's willing use of legislative history to resolve the
meaning of language. For examples of those citing Holmes's statement, see SCALIA,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 22-23 (citing Felix Frankurter, Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538 (1947)); Bishin, supra note 37, at 3.
But see Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (Justice
Holmes, writing for the majority, stated, "It is said that when the meaning of language is
plain we are not to resort to [extrinsic] evidence in order to raise doubts. This is rather an
axiom of experience than a rule of law and does not preclude consideration of persuasive
evidence if it exists.").
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a term without any single definition and subject to its own
interpretative dilemmas,42  nevertheless argues for "tightly
constrained" statutory interpretation based only on the text: judicial
freedom to make law is contrary to the democratic nature of the
American legislative process, and violates the Constitution's
authorization of Congress as the sole body capable of enacting
legislation.43 When judges perform a function that could be described
as legislative, they violate the constitutionally prescribed separation
of powers." Formalists also make efficiency arguments for relying on
42. Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin": Formalism in Law and Morality,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 544 (1999) (describing formalism as a system of "formal rules"
that provide a "posited norm that settles all questions about what ought to be done that
fall within its scope"). Definitions of "formalism" are plentiful and conflicting. See Daniel
A. Farber, Legal Formalism and the Red-Hot Knife, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 597, 599 (1999)
[hereinafter Farber, Legal Formalism] (questioning the truth of whether "law is
'essentially formalistic'--only truly law-like to the extent it is made up of rules rather than
standards"); Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 99-
101 (1995) (distinguishing formalist psychology and methodology); Frank I. Michelman, A
Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative Rule-Formalism, 66 U. CM. L. REV. 934, 934 (1999)
(distinguishing "sundry formalisms"); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CI.
L. REv. 607, 607-17 (1999) (describing three rather distinct modem modes of formalism:
classical legal formalism, rule formalism, and nonconsequentialist formalism); Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 542 (1988) (seminal article describing types of
formalism and identifying the appeal of formalism with its stabilizing influence); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L. J. 949, 953-
57 (1988) [hereinafter Weinrib, Legal Formalism] (describing formalism as the belief that
specific norms are immanent in their forms).
43. "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 1. The Constitution prescribes that law is created only when it has passed both houses of
Congress-the bicameralism requirement-and approved by the President-the
presentment requirement. Id at § 7; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-58 (1983)
(invalidating legislative vetoes as violative of these legislative requirements).
44. The separation of powers argument relies on the Constitution's division of
government among the three branches-Article I for Congress's legislative competence,
Article II for implementation by the Executive branch, and Article HI for judicial
competence. ESKRIDGE, supra note 19, at 118. Separation of power between the
legislature (charged with enacting statutes) and the judiciary (charged with applying those
statutes to particular facts), it is argued, requires giving meaning to the words only as
codified. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 27, at 648. Some criticize
intentionalism and the use of legislative history as anti-democratic because it represents
judicial "usurpation" of legislative power. Id. For examples of judicial expressions of
discomfort with judicial legislation, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53
(Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that "[j]udges interpret, not replace the law with
legislative intent"); Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1190 n. 19 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(noting that democratic theory supports judicial caution in going beyond the plain
language of the statute).
Alternatively, legislative control of judicial process through legislative history can
also be seen to violate the separation of powers. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, USING AND
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the text's "plain meaning."'45 Formalism, for all its high-minded
justifications, is ultimately plagued by its own problems-coherence,
morality and effectiveness.'
MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 34 (1989) ("Intended meaning
is a form of extra-statutory legislative interpretation of a statute, and judicial reliance upon
it allows the legislature to exercise essentially judicial power.").
45. Formalism's efficiency gains are frequently cited as one of its justifications. See,
e.g., Alexander, supra note 42, at 536 (describing as efficient the authoritative settlement
of a legal rule); infra notes 154-66 (discussing the efficiency argument within tax rules).
The argument for formalism based on efficiency cuts both ways: to the extent that a
statute represents an efficient compromise, it is inefficient to apply it beyond its terms.
See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 28, at 540 (discussing gap filling as
inefficient when legislation imposes regulation up to the limit of benefits). To the extent
that courts force Congress to revisit and to specify every detail to which a statute could
possibly apply, judicial and legislative resources are misallocated. As Justice Stevens
noted:
In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master. It obviously
has the power to correct our mistakes, but we do the country a disservice when
we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Congress' actual purpose and
require it 'to take the time to revisit the matter' and to restate its purpose in
more precise English whenever its work product suffers from an omission or
inadvertent error.
W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 110-13 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For
an example of possible misallocation of judicial resources due to vast litigation and judicial
reliance on broad dictionary definitions with significant potential for insufficient guidance
in place of consideration of Congressional intent, see Pegram v. Herdich, 120 S. Ct. 2143,
2158 (2000) (preemption is not presumed absent clear Congressional intent, especially in
traditional areas of state regulation); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1995) ("relate to" should be defined
relative to the statute's objectives); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 n.16
(1983) ("relate to" includes any connection).
46. Because formalism places a premium on the benefits derived from its rule-based
system, and on the theoretical moral gains derived from anti-consequentialist enforcement
of those rules (thereby eliminating the need for difficult individualized determinations in
order to arrive at the most just results), formalism's benefits are undercut by the morally
problematic consequences of rules being both over- and under-inclusive. Punishment of
all rule violations will necessarily result in both just and unjust rule violations being
punished equally. Yet punishing the morally innocent is problematic from a deontological
perspective. Similarly, because formalism will encourage narrow compliance with rules,
the morally problematic anti-consequentialist concerns for the effects of those rules will
only be exacerbated. Therefore, the effectiveness of any theoretical formalist gains is
called into question. Ultimately, formalism may be counterproductive of a society where
uniform rules are actually followed and applied. See Alexander, supra note 42, at 530, 548
(arguing that while formalism is absent from morality, it offers prospects of moral gains
through its posited norms but noting that the gap between its results and goals calls into
question the "very possibility of law itself"); Farber, Legal Formalism, supra note 42, at
601, 605-06 (noting insufficient consideration by formalists of difficulties of formalism for
deontological ethics-by doing injustice today so that we may attain future beneficial
consequences-and consequences for actors in exploiting path dependence-actions that
ultimately may be bad for your character); Leo Katz, Form and Substance in Law and
Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 566, 569-79 (1999) (arguing that everyday morality is highly
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B. Textualism
Textualism, a method that seeks to limit judicial discretion,
rejects theories of statutory interpretation that aim to discover the
intent of the legislature and focuses instead only on the "plain
meaning" of the text.47 Modem, or "new," textualism48 is closely
associated with Justice Scalia, who begins with the assumption that
judge-made law is essentially undemocratic.49 Justice Scalia rejects
judicial interpretation as tyrannical if it seeks to discover unexpressed
intent. "It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver. A
government of laws, not of men. ' 50 Because it is only the enacted law
formalistic, just as law is, and that lawyers who exploit path dependence of law are acting
legitimately and morally); see also infra note 156 (discussing the use of a formalist
approach in a tax context as productive of a "rule of men" able to exploit discontinuities in
tax law).
47. Justice Scalia likens the common-law judge to someone "playing king-devising,
out of the brilliance of one's own mind, those laws that ought to govern mankind."
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 7. He describes judicial decision making by
such great judges as Holmes or Cardozo as an "unqualified good"-were it not for our
democratic government founded on the separation of powers. I& at 9. For a less cynical
view of the causes of judicial activism, see GUIDO CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR
THE AGE OF STATUTES 6-7 (1982) ("[Mjuch of the current criticism of judicial activism,
and of our judicial system generally, can be traced to the rather desperate responses of our
courts to a multitude of obsolete statutes in the face of the manifest incapacity of
legislatures to keep those statutes up to date.").
48. "New textualism" is the label coined by Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 27,
at 623 (describing Scalia's textualism as "new textualism" because its "intellectual
inspiration" derives from public choice theory).
49. How "democracy" is to be defined within the context of describing the form of
government adopted by the United States is somewhat more complicated than those
advocating new textualism suggest. See, e.g., CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND
THE CLASSICS (1994) (discussing the classical education of the founders and their
ambivalence toward pure democracy); see also supra note 44 (describing constitutional
allocation of power).
50. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 17 (comparing judicial
interpretation seeking the intent of the legislature through legislative history to the
Roman emperor Nero's reported practice of posting edicts at a height above which his
subjects could read their content). It is important to recognize that for Justice Scalia there
appears no distinction between interpretation by judges (elected or not) and the edicts of
tyrants. Id. (judging attempts to discover legislative intent to be worse than a totalitarian
regime under an irrational despot, the emperor Nero); see also infra note 294 (discussing
Aeschines's differentiation between types of government and distinguishing tyrannies
administered according to the directions of those who are in positions of authority from
states administered according to their established laws). For a more accurate description
of Nero's reign and the three readily distinguishable systems of government in Rome from
the Roman Republic, which had a truly republican government (res publica), to its
replacement by the Augustan principate through Nero, see H.H. SCULLARD, FROM THE
GRACCHI TO NERO 226 (1970) (describing Augustan principate as a monarchy despite the
attempt to create an appearance of a dyarchy with the Senate); id. at 332 (arguing that
Nero's reign was ultimately absolutist).
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which is binding, legislative intent is without force. Justice Scalia
defends his form of textualism from criticisms of "formalism" by
arguing that "[t]he rule of law is about form."'" Indeed, Justice Scalia
equates textualism and formalism with a government of laws, not
men.
52
Refusing to define his "plain meaning" approach as "strict
constructionism," Justice Scalia claims to construe a text "reasonably,
to contain all that it fairly means. '53 To construe a text reasonably,
however, Justice Scalia eschews any recourse to legislative history54
and focuses his analysis on the "plain meaning"55 of the text. For
51. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 25; see also Schauer, supra note 42,
at 510 ("[I]nsofar as formalism is frequently condemned as excessive reliance on the
language of a rule, it is the very idea of decisionmaking by rule that is being condemned,
either as a description of how decisionmaking can take place or as a prescription for how
decisionmaking should take place.").
52. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 17; see also Scalia, Rule of Law,
supra note 3, at 1182-83 (selectively quoting Aristotle, among others, to support his
position that the rule of law is ab initio a law of rules). Because predictability is the
cardinal value for Justice Scalia, any legal form that requires interpretation of a law's
meaning is suspect. ld. at 1179 ("There are times when even a bad rule is better than no
rule at all."). Because Justice Scalia begins with this assumption, there is no other
conclusion than the one he advances: the rule of law is the law of rules. Id. at 1187; see
also supra note 3 and accompanying text. That this is tautological is problematic only for
his critics. See infra note 294 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of law passage).
53. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 23. Indeed, Justice Scalia derides
strict constructionism as "a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy
into disrepute." Id Others would disagree with Justice Scalia's assessment that he is not a
"strict constructionist." See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning". Justice
Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401,
474 (1994) (describing Justice Scalia as a strict constructionist and ultimately
characterizing his method as "an eclectic form of strict constructionism").
54. The use of legislative history-that is, going beyond the text-is for Justice Scalia,
the use of "democratically adopted texts" as "mere springboards" for "judicial
lawmaking." SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 25. The only "law" is the
"objective indication of the words" and so legislative history should not be used as an
authoritative source from which a statute's meaning can be derived. Il at 29-30.
55. "Plain meaning" is by definition something of a paradox. See Karkkainen, supra
note 53, at 433-35 (describing the development of the "plain meaning rule" in American
jurisprudence). According to Karkkainen:
[C]ontrary to Justice Scalia's view, the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation actually coincides historically with the introduction of the Plain
Meaning Rule in its modem form. The Rule itself was meant not to preclude the
use of legislative history generally, but only to prevent a court from using it when
the meaning of a statute was so plain on its face as to make a search of the
legislative history unnecessary.
Id.
"Plain" can mean "clear" or it can mean "unambiguous." See Cunningham et al.,
supra note 17, at 1564 (noting that "[o]ne of Solan's most powerful critical moves is to
analyze the seemingly embarrassing paradox in Supreme Court cases where all nine
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example, he has argued that statutory interpretation should be based
on the ordinary meaning of the statute's language, as most likely to
have been how Congress understood the statute as enacted, assuming
all the while that Congress understood the entire body of law into
which the provision must be integrated.
56
While textualists generally avoid legislative history, they freely
consult assorted dictionaries 5 7 make use of various linguistic
Justices agreed that the meaning of a provision was 'plain,' but split five to four over what
that provision meant").
56. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 27, at 679 (describing ordinary
meaning as the clearest statement of Justice Scalia's methodology). Eskridge concludes
that Justice Scalia's "benign fiction" is based on unrealistic assumptions, most notably that
"when it enacts statutes Congress is omniscient," not only about all of the currently
applicable law, but also about judicial interpretations of the law, including canons of
statutory construction that might be applied. Id. In short, Justice Scalia's "new
textualism" replaces recourse to legislative history with reliance on judge-made and judge-
changed canons of construction, characterized by a "bait-and-switch" quality. Id. at 681-
84; see also Popkin, supra note 2, at 1159-60 (summarizing Justice Scalia's assumptions
and criticizing his lack of realism as well as the rigidity of his methodology).
57. Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1437, 1437-39 (1994). While no one appears to challenge the legitimacy of using
dictionaries, those who have studied the Court's recent use of and reliance on dictionaries
have persuasively criticized its approach. See id. at 1444-45 (describing the Court as
treating dictionaries as "a sort of default source, presumptively decisive"). Dictionaries
are neither compiled nor intended to be used as such. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the
Word." Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 279 (1998)
(describing in detail the sources and limitations of how dictionaries are compiled and
concluding that dictionaries do not include every possible meaning). "They may well
exclude meanings that are quite ordinary although less common .... Dictionary
definitions are only generalizations, summaries, and approximations. Their definitions are
not right or wrong in any absolute, objective sense." Id. April advocates using dictionary
definitions as "beginning points" not "end points" in the Court's search for meaning. Id.
at 313. Above all, "[i]f the Court is serious about its quest for ordinary meaning, it should
not continue to employ dictionaries in such a chaotic fashion." Note, Looking It Up,
supra, at 1448. The Court's use of dictionaries is inconsistent with quite variable results.
See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1995)
(Justice Scalia supporting his conclusion that "modify" means only minor or moderate
change by reference to dictionary definition); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201
(1993) (denying recovery for death in Antarctica under the "foreign country exception" of
the Federal Tort Claims Act because the first dictionary definition of "country" included
"tract of land" while "political state" was second entry); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,
404-05, 410-11 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (majority discussion of possible meanings of
"representative" to include elected judges rejected by Justice Scalia on basis of one
definition as definitive of opposite result). Earlier, H.L.A. Hart noted the lack of utility of
dictionaries for authoritatively settling questions of legal meaning. See Hart, supra note
16, at 37 (noting that transformation of the question from "[w]hat is a right? to [w]hat is
the meaning of the word right?" suggests that the dictionary has greater utility than it does
and arguing that questions of legal meaning can only be settled by stating conditions under
which the statements containing legal terms are true).
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arguments without benefit of linguistic study,58 and selectively employ
canons59 of statutory interpretation in their textual analyses. The
advocates of plain meaning textualism do so without the benefit of
any principled methodology justifying these extra-statutory tools.6°
In the absence of an articulated, consistent, and principled
methodology for discovering the plain meaning of a text,61 the
textualists fail to deliver on their promise of interpretation in
58. See SOLAN, supra note 17, at 94-117 (providing a linguistic critique of Supreme
Court opinions that claim to be based on "plain meaning"). Solan is openly critical of the
way judges currently employ linguistic arguments, asserting that "judges resort to linguistic
argumentation in what appears to be an effort to find a seemingly scientific and neutral
justification for difficult decisions." Id. at 1-11. Frequently, linguistic argumentation
either fails or collapses into incoherence, masking some other agenda at the root of the
judge's opinion. See also Cunningham et al., supra note 17, at 1561 (noting the lack of a
systematic methodology in the Court's use of linguistics and suggesting that such a
methodology could assist judges in interpreting statutes "in a principled and objective
way").
59. Canons of statutory construction are "a homely collection of rules of thumb for
interpreting statutes." Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 27, at 663. Their use is not
new; Anglo-American treatises have relied heavily on the canons as an aid to statutory
interpretation. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 19, at 275. Since Karl Llewellyn demonstrated
in 1950 that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point," their utility has been
called into question. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06
(1950). For a trenchant attack on the canons, see Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 805-07
(1983) (rejecting the utility of any canon as an aid either to decipherment, common sense
guide, method of constraining judges or forcing legislatures to draft statute more
carefully). Indeed, Justice Scalia himself reveals a troubling ambivalence to the canons:
"To the honest textualist, all of these preferential rules and presumptions are a lot of
trouble." SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 28.
60. Justice Scalia acknowledges the dangers of selective reliance on the canons.
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 27-29. Although Justice Scalia appears
ready to accept their utility in spite of their indeterminacy in both selection and
applicability, Eskridge notes that the result will be as unpredictable as "the doppelganger
of the willful judge" relying on legislative intent. Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 29,
at 1545-46. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's variable and troubling approach to canons,
see Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 29, at 1542 (describing Justice Scalia's skepticism
toward but selective use of the canons as deeply problematic because of formalism's need
for a system of rules); infra note 61. Because Justice Scalia differentially accepts which
canons to use, describing them as "artificial rules" and "dice-loading rules," their use
serves only to increase both the unpredictability and arbitrariness of judicial decision
making. Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 29, at 1542. For example, some, but not all,
of the canons are considered acceptable. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 27, at
664 ("Inclusio unius [inclusio unius est exclusio altrerius] arguments have grown like weeds
in a vacant lot during the last two Terms."). Absent a coherent system for discrimination
between and use of judicially created canons of interpretation, it is hard to justify
preference for these various canons over legislative history.
61. See supra note 57 (discussing the inconsistent use of dictionaries); supra note 58
(discussing the ad hoc use of linguistic arguments); supra notes 59-60 (discussing the
selective use of canons of statutory construction).
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accordance with the text as the sole arbiter of the "rule of law." 62
Because of this absence of consistency, textualists are thus subject to
many of the same charges they level at others. As Solan notes, judges
who varyingly apply standards and tools yet pronounce the meaning
clear are "judges attempt[ing] to mask the fact that a case is hard in
the first place. ' 63 Daily evidence of our ability to communicate does
not obviate the need for judicial interpretation. 6  Few would argue
that the basic ability of competent speakers to communicate, coupled
with a desire for government by the rule of law, removes all
possibility for hard cases or the need for a methodology to deal with
such cases.6s
Critics of Justice Scalia's "new textualism" argue that this
method is subject to the same criticisms leveled by its proponents
against intentionalism: it offers no more determinate results in hard
cases than any other method and contributes little to the legitimacy of
the judicial process because of its lack of candor.66 Textualists who
62. See infra notes 66,74-75 (discussing textualism's failure to overcome the criticisms
it levels at other methods).
63. SOLAN, supra note 17, at 208 n.10. Attempts to make decisions appear both
neutral and definitive originate from concern with preserving judicial legitimacy. Solan
argues that better methods and greater candor will improve the legitimacy of judicial
decision making. IL at 170-71; see also Karkkainen, supra note 53, at 476-77 (finding
Justice Scalia's method, whether relying on originalism in constitutional adjudication or
plain meaning in statutory interpretation, "particularly troubling" because it asserts a
"false claim to objectivity" in order to limit discourse and claim that there is only one
possible result).
64. See supra note 28 (discussing hard cases); infra note 65 (discussing limitations on
the ability to communicate a single meaning). Nevertheless, this Article will show that
language complexity need not impede our ability to communicate effectively, if we
recognize it and develop an effective method of analysis. Indeed, our failure to allow for
hard cases serves only to undermine our ability to reason and argue persuasively. The
principles by which Aristotle examines and explicates language complexity will provide
such an effective method. See infra notes 182-92 and accompanying text (discussing
Aristotle's identification of homonymy and associated homonymy); infra notes 193-217
(discussing Aristotle's explication of definition); infra notes 201-05 (describing modes of
argumentation and analysis); infra notes 223-24 (discussing priority in associated
homonymy and definition).
65. For a discussion of both our general ability to communicate through language and
limitations on that ability, see SOLAN, supra note 17, at 11-13, 169. Solan quotes Justice
Cardozo who described as unattainable a legal code "so minute, as to supply in advance
for every conceivable situation the just and fitting rule. But life is too complex to bring the
attainment of this ideal within the compass of human powers." Id. at 13 (quoting
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OFTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS 143 (1921)).
66. See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L.
REv. 277, 306-07 (1990). Judge Wald argues that:
To disregard committee reports as indicators of congressional understanding
because we are suspicious that nefarious staffers have planted certain
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argue for "plain meaning" interpretation lose their claim to greater
objectivity when they wage in a battle of the dictionaries,
opportunistically engage in structural or linguistic arguments, and
selectively rely on canons of statutory interpretation.67
C. Dynamic-Pragmatic Interpretation
While rejecting neither textualism's concern with the text nor
intentionalism's concern with statutory purpose (current or past),
some scholars, most notably Professors Eskridge, Frickey, and
Farber, have argued for a more dynamic, more practical, and less
foundational approach to statutory interpretation. This approach
begins with the text, addresses concerns that are both historical (the
purpose of the enacting legislature) and evolutive (current factual
situations perhaps unanticipated by the original legislature along with
the interpreter's own perspective shaped by current social and legal
norms).68 This mode of analysis is rooted in practical reason,
information for some undisclosed reason, is to second-guess Congress' chosen
form of organization and delegation of authority, and to doubt its ability to
oversee its own constitutional functions effectively. It comes perilously close...
to impugning the way a coordinate branch conducts its operation and, in that
sense, runs the risk of violating the spirit if not the letter of the separation of
powers principle.
Id. For a complete discussion of the flaws of Justice Scalia's constitutionally based
arguments necessitating "new textualism," see, inter alia, Eskridge, New Textualism,
supra note 27, at 670 (criticizing constitutionally based arguments offered by Justice
Scalia to support his approach); Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 29, at 1548-52
(same); Karkkainen, supra note 53, at 475-76 (same).
67. See Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 29, at 1546 (describing the
"phenomenon of shopping the canons-picking out the friendly ones and ignoring or
explaining away the rest"); see also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 861-71 (1992) (responding to legislative
history's critics that no strong theoretical argument exists against use of legislative history
and questioning the benefits of either traditional or newly-developed canons in its place);
Karkkainen, supra note 53, at 449-50 (describing as "aggressive" Justice Scalia's use of
canons to rule out possible interpretations and use of grammatical and structural
arguments to arrive at a result "far from any plain meaning or ordinary usage" understood
by either an ordinary reader or a legislator voting on the statute, and concluding that
"[o]ne must question the application of the Plain Meaning Rule when it renders the
meaning of a statute plain only to a single Justice of the Supreme Court"); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualisnw An Invitation to Cacophony and
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 749, 749-52 (1995) (describing
the resulting incoherence for the administrative state of textualism's extreme reliance on
dictionaries, rules of grammar, and canons of construction in place of intentionalism's
reliance on legislative purpose and history); Popkin, supra note 2, at 1140-42 (discussing
Justice Scalia's use of ordinary meaning, canons, and dictionaries); id at 1142-48
(discussing Justice Scalia's assumptions of proper grammar and style).
68. See, e.g., Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 25 passim
(describing benefits of and how the model of dynamic statutory interpretation works);
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described by its proponents as a "structured problem-solving
process."69  Practical reason proposes a model of statutory
interpretation that "mediates between the general standard and the
specific case," taking its inspiration from what its proponents describe
as Aristotelian practical reasoning (phronesis).0 Practical reason
recognizes the problems inherent in discovering meaning in statutes.
Whether because of lapse of time or because the problem at issue was
not one explicitly addressed by the enacting legislature, the judiciary
must confront problems of interpretation. Practical reasoning seeks
to contribute to the legitimacy of our republican constitutional
framework by expressly recognizing the judiciary's constitutional
responsibility for interpreting the statutes that the legislature crafts.
Practical reason does not present a single unified theory of how
to approach statutory interpretation,71 but instead urges a concrete
Eskridge, Norms, Empiricism, and Canons, supra note 25 passim (urging empirical testing
of textualism's claims of superiority over other methods, including dynamic, of statutory
interpretation); Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 29, at 1556-60 (proposing practical
reason as a model for statutory interpretation); Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 27,
at 690-91 (describing textualism's contribution in support of dynamic statutory
interpretation); Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 7, at 321 (urging
practical reason as the most satisfactory method of statutory interpretation); Farber,
Hermeneutic Tourist, supra note 31, at 516-18 (drawing on comparative material to
support use of practical reason as a method of statutory interpretation); Farber & Frickey,
Legislative Intent, supra note 28, at 461-65 (proposing practical reason as a superior model
of interpretation); Farber & Frickey, Public Choice Revisited, supra note 25, at 1736-37
(using public choice theory to argue for practical resaon as a method of statutory
interpretation); Frickey, From the Big Sleep, supra note 25, at 262-67 (using the link
between scholarship and pedagogy to urge a more practical method of interpretation).
But see Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 28, at 544-51 (describing reasons
against gap-filling methods of statutory interpretation).
69. Farber, Inevitability, supra note 29, at 536 (describing judicial process as involving
common sense, respect for precedent, and appreciation of society's needs).
70. ML at 538 (quoting Frank Michelman's definition of "practical reason"); Eskridge
& Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 7, at 323 (discussing Aristotle's theory of
practical reasoning-phronesis-as inspiration for their model). Phronesis is perhaps best
defined as "practical wisdom." HENRY G. LIDDELL ET AL., A GREEK-ENGLISH
LEXICON (1969); see also GADAMER, supra note 4, at 280 (emphasizing the practical
nature of phronesis in distinction to episteme-theroretical knowledge).
71. See Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 7, at 323 (arguing that
"concrete situatedness of the interpretive enterprise ... militates against overarching
theories"); Farber, Inevitability, supra note 29, at 539 (describing diverse proponents of
practical reason as united in their "rejection of foundationalism"). It is unclear whether
Aristotle would agree with proponents of practical reason's rejection of the need for
theory. Aristotle reasons, in language, argumentation, and dialectic, by working from the
particular to the general and from the general to the particular. For Aristotle this provides
no substitute for first principles; indeed, it is a method predicated on the need for arriving
at first principles. See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text. Nowhere does Aristotle
reject the need for a theory or set of first principles. Aristotle's theories of definition,
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approach to each case, by applying either Llewellyn's five factors72 or
Eskridge and Frickey's similar "funnel of abstraction. ' 73 The absence
of either a unified theory or more specific guidance for the
application of their factors, however, leaves proponents of practical
reasoning open to charges of proposing an ad hoc method
unsatisfactory to a government by the rule of law.74
Despite arguments advanced by all sides, the question remains:
Which method of interpretation is most compatible with the rule of
law? Adherents of purposivism whose focus is the intent behind the
statute, adherents of textualism with their focus on plain meaning,
and dynamic or practical reasoning adherents who rely on some
combination of elements of both textualism and purposivism have all
amply demonstrated the inadequacies of opposing viewpoints without
delivering a decisive blowy5 Even if we prefer a presumption in favor
logic, and priority provide at least some first principles that permit articulation of a more
unified theory allowing reasoned statutory interpretation generally.
72. Farber, Inevitability, supra note 29, at 536-37 (describing Llewellyn's proposed
"structured problem-solving process" as similar to the current practical reason method).
A judge would decide a case within the common law by a combination of common sense,
respect for precedent, and cognizance of current societal needs. Llewellyn proposed a
parallel system for construing statutes that evaluated five factors: 1) the court's sense of
the situation, 2) overall coherence of the legal system, 3) presumed statutory purpose, 4)
legislative history of recent statutes, and, most importantly, 5) statutory language. Id. at
535-36.
73. Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 7, at 353-62 (describing the
funnel of abstraction). Eskridge and Frickey propose that an interpreter look at a range of
evidence, including the text, the historical evidence, and the text's evolution. While
evaluating the evidence, an interpreter will be guided by the hierarchy of sources filtered
through general practical and hermeneutical principles. Id.
74. See Farber, Inevitability, supra note 29, at 538-39, for a cogent defense of practical
reason against these charges, replying to the formalists that "[flormalist methods of
statutory interpretation neither eliminate the need for practical reason nor ease
communication between legislatures and citizens." I& at 534. Despite obvious problems,
the appeal of plain meaning and formalism lies with the linking of such an approach to
democracy and the notice function it serves. Id at 549. Farber is, nonetheless, correct in
pointing out the fallacy of this function, and the possibility of a contrary result when this is
assumed for most statutes. See infra note 126 (discussing the technical nature of tax
statutes). "Formalism may merely confuse ordinary citizens by forcing legislators to resort
to more specific but also more numerous and complex rules." Farber, Inevitability, supra
note 29, at 552. For a discussion of this very result in tax law, see infra notes 157-64 and
accompanying text.
75. On the one hand, formalism is flawed because of its "excessive confidence in the
power of 'the word' and excessive distrust of the ability of judges to exercise good
judgment." Farber, Inevitability, supra note 29, at 559. On the other hand, practical
reason's ad hoc approach may impart too much "informality" to statutory interpretation
thereby giving "short shrift to statutory language and leav[ing] too much to the unguided
discretion of judges." Id. at 559; see also id. at 541 (citing Nancy Levit, Practically
Unreasonable: A Critique of Practical Reason, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 494 (1991), and David
E. Van Zandt, An Alternative Theory of Practical Reason in Judicial Decisions, 65 TUL. L.
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of plain meaning, what rules exist to help decide those difficult cases
of contested meaning? Alternatively, how can we be assured that the
rule of law will not be compromised by the application of general
principles of practical reason?
This Article will show that Aristotle through his theories of
language and logic, especially his interpretation of words "spoken in
many ways," will provide a principled method of analysis superior to
these methods. Before considering Aristotle, it will be helpful to
consider Gregory v. Helvering and the business purpose doctrine
articulated there. Gregory's judicial opinions explicating the statute
and their articulation of the business purpose doctrine will serve as
our exemplar for applying the Aristotelian theories of homonymy,
priority, and levels of definition to statutory interpretation.
II. TAX STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GREGORY V. HELVERJNG
AND BusINEsS PURPOSE
Gregory v. Helvering76 seems at first glance to provide a simple
case, requiring nothing more than application of the "plain meaning"
of statutory provisions to the facts in order to arrive at the correct
result. Instead, Gregory provides us with an opportunity to consider
the fundamental question of whether a statutory provision governing
a commercial transaction must be evaluated in light of the overriding
purpose of the entire Code. As such it can serve as a paradigm for
considering the appropriate methods of interpreting a statute situated
within a larger, presumably coherent Code. Thus, the lower court,
satisfied that the steps of the transaction were actually undertaken,
interpreted the facts as companying with the statute. This decision
was overturned by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and sustained
by the Supreme Court. These courts developed the business purpose
doctrine by looking to the larger issue of whether benefits were to be
conferred by mere literal compliance with the statutory requirements
or whether the function of the statutory provisions were integral to
their consideration. Interpretation of the statute by the three courts
REV. 775 (1991), as examples of the scholarly criticism of the practical reason approach).
In particular, adherents of plain meaning formalism argue that practical reasoning is anti-
intellectual, ad hoc and ultimately "incoherent, subjective and unpredictable." Farber,
Inevitability, supra note 29, at 534, 541. While adherents of practical reasoning reject the
legal formalism of plain meaning, they deny that an inexorable legal result can be deduced
from a "pre-existing set of rules." Id. at 539 (citing Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian
Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 232-33 and
Llewellyn, supra note 59, at 399).
76. 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), rev'd 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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thus not only illustrates how the result under the "plain meaning" and
purposive approaches differs, but also introduces us to the business
purpose doctrine. First articulated in Gregory, the business purpose
doctrine extends far beyond these reorganization provisions.77
Indeed, the business purpose doctrine's validity can serve as a
paradigm for analysis of the appropriateness of considering the extent
to which the function of associated statutory provisions must be given
effect in any interpretation. The result of this analysis will necessarily
affect not only the central issue of statutory complexity but,
concomitantly, how the co-ordinate branches of our government will
function and interact, determining to what extent courts should
require a clear statement from the legislature within each narrow
statutory provision.78 A discussion of the Gregory opinions will be
followed by an assessment of the case by adherents of the different
methods of interpretation. An Aristotelian approach will then be
used to reach a more principled, determinate result.
A. Gregory v. Helvering
Mrs. Gregory, as the sole shareholder of the United Corporation,
wanted to sell Monitor shares, stock of a subsidiary corporation held
as an asset by United.7 9 However, a distribution directly to her as
shareholder by the United Corporation of the Monitor stock would
be taxed at its fair market value as a dividend.s° Mrs. Gregory
77. Gregory and the business purpose doctrine loom large in most tax discussions of
statutory interpretation. Gregory has had an almost unparalleled vitality in the case law.
The business purpose doctrine and now in its permutation, the "economic substance
doctrine," are seminal to the United States Department of Treasury's efforts to curb
corporate tax shelters. See TREASURY, WHITE PAPER, supra note 13, at viii (describing
Gregory as the origin of various judicial doctrines).
78. See supra notes 43-44 (discussing constitutional and separation of powers issues
implicated by methods of statutory interpretation); infra notes 157-66 (discussing
statutory complexity and concomitant negative implications for the rule of law with
increasing complexity of formalist requirements).
79. A "sale" generally constitutes a taxable event. I.R.C. § 1001 (1994). For
discussions of the realization doctrine, see David J. Shakow, Taxation without Realization:
A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986) (urging accrual
taxation); Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules
under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1 (1992) (asserting that the realization
requirement promotes efficiency in the tax system); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing,
Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1627 (1999) [hereinafter
Weisbach, Line Drawing] (urging efficiency as a better measure).
80. Reorganization provisions at issue in Gregory, added in 1918, provide an
exception to the general rule of taxing corporate distributions as dividends. See
Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176, 184 (1921) (holding a pre-1918 Gregory-type
transaction taxable as dividend); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 175 (1921) (same);
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consequently chose a different structure for her transaction.81
Complying with the literal language of the "reorganization"
provisions of the 1928 Revenue Act, she relied on provisions allowing
for tax-free receipt of corporate stock acquired as part of a corporate
reorganization.8 If respected, this transactional form would allow
Mrs. Gregory to avoid dividend treatment of the full value of the
stock received, and ultimately pay a lower total tax on the transaction
due to preferential capital gains rates.8 The statutory language upon
which Mrs. Gregory relied stated the following: "The term
'reorganization' means ... a transfer by a corporation of all or a part
of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer
Shaviro, supra note 79, at 20 (describing the rationale for the exception from taxation
represented by reorganization provisions).
81. Mrs. Gregory wished to sell her shares of Monitor to an unrelated third party
paying the least tax. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467. She structured the transaction as follows.
As the sole shareholder of United, the actual owner of the Monitor Securities shares, she
caused United to form a new corporation (Averill) by transferring the Monitor Securities
to it in exchange for its stock. Id. Averill Corporation then transferred its Monitor shares
to Mrs. Gregory, its sole shareholder, and immediately dissolved. Id Mrs. Gregory sold
the shares and calculated her gain on sale by the amount received less the basis in the
Monitor shares (the portion of her United basis allocable to the Monitor shares), taxable
at capital gains rates. Id. at 468. Assuming that the entire transaction qualified as a
"reorganization," the transfer of the Averill shares to Mrs. Gregory was tax-deferred by
virtue of the corporate reorganization provisions-sections 1 12(g) and (i)(B) of the
Revenue Act of 1928. Id at 468-69.
82. Beginning with the 1918 Act, Congress sought, because of changing economic
conditions following the First World War, to facilitate "necessary business adjustments"
while preventing tax avoidance by describing the forms in which reorganizations could
occur tax-deferred. For example, Congress wrestled in 1918, 1921, and 1924 with language
equal to the task of permitting the various business transactions considered
"reorganizations" to occur tax-deferred. See, eg., H.R. REP. No. 67-350 (1921), reprinted
in J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW
1861-1938, at 790 (1938); S. REP. No. 67-275 (1921), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra, at 791.
Throughout, the impetus for these provisions was clearly understood: to avoid impeding
transactions necessitated by business needs when the taxpayer's investment remained
"substantially the same." Homer Hendricks, Developments in the Taxation of
Reorganizations, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 1198, 1209 (1934). For a discussion of congressional
concerns about using the provisions for tax avoidance, see Comment, Corporate
Reorganization To Avoid Payment of Income Tax, 45 YALE L.J. 134 (1935).
83. Mrs. Gregory argued that the transfer to the new corporation of the Monitor
shares (part of the assets of United) qualified as a "reorganization" so that the receipt of
shares of the new corporation would be tax-free. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 468-69. The
Revenue Act of 1928 allowed tax-free receipt of stock received in a "reorganization":
If there is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a shareholder
in a corporation a party to the reorganization, stock or securities in such
corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization, without the
surrender by such shareholder of stock or securities in such corporation, no gain
to the distributee from the receipt of such stock or securities shall be recognized.
Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. 70-562, § 112(g), 45 Stat. 791, 818.
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the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the
corporation to which the assets are transferred."'
The Commissioner assessed a deficiency in tax paid, arguing that
the intermediate steps of Mrs. Gregory's transaction, United's
transfer of the Monitor shares to a newly formed corporation, which
immediately distributed those shares in liquidation, were a sham and
"without substance." As a result, the Commissioner argued that the
transaction should be re-characterized, and taxed, as a dividend.
85
Although the Board of Tax Appeals initially ruled in favor of Mrs.
Gregory, the Second Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Learned
Hand, reversed. Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed, but not
because the transaction was merely a sham (i.e., not having been
carried out in fact). If the steps undertaken were respected, the issue
thus raised becomes instead what, beyond mere compliance with the
steps of the transaction, was required.
Finding literal compliance with the statutory provision (there had
been an actual transfer of assets and a receipt of stock), the Board of
Tax Appeals concluded that "[a] statute so meticulously drafted must
be interpreted as a literal expression of the taxing policy, and
leav[ing] only the small interstices for judicial consideration. '86  On
appeal, Judge Hand disagreed. While agreeing that the more
84. Id at § 112(i)(1).
85. Disregarding the reorganization provisions and the creation of the Averill
Corporation, the Commissioner viewed the distribution of the Monitor shares as a
dividend with no basis thus allocable to it and fully taxable in the amount of its fair market
value at ordinary income rates. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467.
For a discussion of how basic principles of corporate taxation result in their
corresponding avoidance techniques, see Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of
Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 97-130
(1977) (identifying first, separate taxation of corporate entity; second, taxation of
shareholder only upon distribution of corporate earnings; third, preferential tax rate for
capital assets; fourth, taxation of dividends at ordinary income rates; fifth, taxation of
corporate stock dispositions as capital assets; sixth, nonrecognition provisions; and
seventh, General Utilities doctrine, all as fundamental corporate principles from which all
tensions in corporate tax arise, and proposing alteration of some principles to resolve
corporate tax discontinuities). Clark identifies the tension created by combination of
principles one through five leading inexorably to the Gregory-type bail-out. Id. at 120-23.
A "bail-out" is generally defined to include extraction at capital gains rates of a
corporation's profits that would otherwise be taxed at ordinary income rates. BORIS I.
BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 11.06[1] (7th ed. 2000).
86. Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932). For a discussion of related but
distinct issues of specificity and complexity in the area of tax-deferred corporate
reorganizations, see BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 85, at 12.01[4] (stating that "[t]he
reorganization provisions are extraordinarily complex, even for the Code"); Lawrence
Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C.
L. REV. 623,660 (1986) (noting the distinction between complexity and specificity).
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articulated the statute, the less room available for interpretation,
Judge Hand reasoned, nevertheless, that something more than literal
compliance with each separate statutory term was required.
Analogizing the reorganization provisions to a melody, Judge Hand
remarked that "the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of
the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree
of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all
appear, and which all collectively create."'s As a result, although
"[a]ny one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as
possible,"' s Judge Hand concluded that "it does not follow that
Congress meant to cover such a transaction, not even though the facts
answer the dictionary definitions of each term used in the statutory
definition. ' 89
Though unstated, it was clear to Judge Hand that the
transactions to which the reorganization sections were to apply must
be prompted by a business purpose:9°
87. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934). For a discussion of
Hand's musical analogy, see Frank, Words and Music, supra note 7, at 1267 (comparing
the interpretation of statutes by judges with the interpretation of musical scores by
performers and noting that Hand's pronouncement echoes Gestalt psychology). For a
recent review of Frank's theory of statutory interpretation, see Kent Greenawalt,
Variations on Some Themes of a "Disporting Gazelle" and His Friend- Statutory
Interpretation as Seen by Jerome Frank and Felix Frankfurter, 100 COLM. L. Rlv. 176
(2000); compare Llewellyn, supra note 59, at 399 (analogizing the role of courts to finding
the music of the statute as written by the legislature and playing it in harmony with other
music of the legal system).
88. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810. For the interpretation of this statement by Hand as
encouraging tax avoidance, see Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the
Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 441 (1968); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in
the Tax Law, 66 U. CHi. L. REV. 860, 869-70, n.25 (1999) [hereinafter Weisbach,
Formalism]. An important distinction is lost here. That someone is entitled to arrange
business affairs to choose among better tax results simply means that a taxpayer capable of
satisfying all requirements for a transaction to qualify for nonrecognition is not forced to
effect a similar transaction with far worse tax consequences simply because it would yield
more revenue for the Treasury. However, the converse is not true; because there are two
ways of effecting a transaction, a taxpayer may not elect the better form when
substantively all necessary requirements cannot be satisfied.
89. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810. Importantly, Judge Hand did not agree with the
Commissioner's position that the intermediate steps should be disregarded as a sham,
since in fact they were carried out. Id. at 811 (declining to agree with Commissioner that
the steps taken were inoperative).
90. The business purpose doctrine has not always been narrowly interpreted or
applied only to the reorganization provisions. It has been implied generally as a
requirement in tax provisions governing commercial transactions. See, e.g., Loewi v.
Ryan, 229 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that tax statutes should be interpreted
against their own background so "it is proper to exclude those that had no other result
than to evade taxation"); Comm'r v. Transp. Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570 (2d
Cir. 1949) (construing a tax statute governing commercial or industrial transactions "to
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The purpose of the section is plain enough; men engaged in
enterprises-industrial, commercial, financial, or other-
might wish to consolidate, or divide, to add to, or subtract
from, their holdings. Such transactions were not be
considered as "realizing" any profit, because the collective
interests still remained in solution. But the underlying
presupposition is plain that the readjustment shall be
undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of the
venture in hand, not as an ephemeral incident, egregious to
its prosecution. To dodge the shareholders' taxes is not one
of the transactions contemplated as corporate
"reorganizations."'
Justice Sutherland, writing for the Supreme Court, agreed.92 The
Court concluded that the transaction was "[s]imply an operation
having no business or corporate purpose," a "mere device." 93 The
understand them to refer to transactions entered upon for commercial or industrial
purposes and not to include transactions entered upon for no other motive but to escape
taxation"); see also Robert Thornton Smith, Business Purpose: The Assault Upon the
Citadel, 53 TAX LAW. 1 (1999) (indicating that the underlying justification of business
purpose is found in avoiding "self-defeating" interpretations of the Code).
91. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 811; see infra note 101 (discussing tax avoidance and taxpayer
motive).
92. Justice Sutherland similarly related the business purpose of a reorganization to the
business or businesses being reorganized. Specifically, the Court found that a transfer of
assets made by one corporation to another must, for purposes of section 112(g), be made
"in pursuance of a plan of reorganization," not "in pursuance of a plan having no relation
to the business of either." Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
93. Id. The Court regarded the transaction as a "mere device" to disguise in
corporate reorganization form what was essentially a sale. Id. The Board of Tax Appeals
had based its decision in large part on the need to respect the corporate form of the
transaction. Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932). The Supreme Court rejected
this position because the new corporation was formed only for the transfer of the shares
and ceased to exist once it had performed that function. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465, 469-70 (1935). The "device" language ultimately is codified as a requirement for tax-
free spin-offs in the 1954 Code. I.R.C. § 355 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Characterizing the
transaction as a "device," the Court refused to disregard it as a sham. Gregory, 293 U.S. at
469-70. The "device" language here can be seen as describing a transaction undertaken
for purely tax reasons and lacking a business purpose. A discussion of the evidence that
the "device" language codified the business purpose doctrine or, conversely as some have
argued, specifically made it inapplicable in the context of divisive reorganizations is
beyond the scope of this Article. See John F. Bales, The Business Purpose of Corporate
Separations, 56 VA. L. REv. 1242, 1262 n. 104, 1266 (1970) (arguing that the "device"
language and the "active trade or business" requirement were preferable to and indeed
pre-empted Gregory's business purpose language).
For a discussion of Gregory as merely a different formulation of the "sham
transaction" doctrine and urging its limitation to sham transactions, see Harvey M. Spear,
"Corporate Business Purpose" in Reorganization, 3 TAX L. REV. 225, 234-235 (1947).
While a common assessment, it is also inaccurate: Judge Hand recognized the validity of
the steps in Gregory but disagreed that they resulted in a reorganization. See Gregory v.
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Court further concluded that "[tlo hold otherwise would be to exalt
artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in
question of all serious purpose." 94  Because there was no
reorganization (i.e., no continued business) but simply a distribution
followed by a sale of the shares, Mrs. Gregory had not satisfied the
statute's requirements. 95
Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 811-12 (1932) (disagreeing with the Commissioner that steps
should be disregarded), aff'd 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
The business purpose doctrine has been cited as the origin of and used as the
equivalent of most other important interpretive doctrines, most notably substance over
form (was the substance of the transaction consistent with its chosen form), economic
substance (is there economic purpose or risk to the transaction apart from its tax benefits),
and sham transaction (did the transaction occur as described for tax purposes). Gregory is
thus regarded as the bedrock of tax statutory interpretation, limiting taxpayers' ability to
benefit from Code provisions. For a recent articulation of the economic substance
doctrine, see ACM v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2214-29 (1997) ("The doctrine of
economic substance becomes applicable, and a judicial remedy is warranted, where a
taxpayer seeks to claim tax benefits, unintended by Congress, by means of transactions
that serve no economic purpose other than tax savings."). This statement of the doctrine,
of course, does not specify the requisite quantum of economic substance. On the
equivalence of business purpose with the substance over form doctrine, see Chisholm v.
Comm'r, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935) (citing Gregory and stating that central question is
whether the substance was consistent with the form of the transaction). "Had they [the
incorporators] really meant to conduct a business by means of the two reorganized
companies, they would have escaped whatever other aim they might have had, whether to
avoid taxes, or to regenerate the world." Id. For a discussion of the substance over form
doctrine generally, see Ronald Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free Incorporations
and Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11 VA. TAX REV. 349 (1991).
However, the very malleability of the business purpose doctrine and its
permutations have prompted the Treasury to urge its abandonment in favor of a more
mechanical comparison of the present value of a transaction's pre- and post-tax benefits.
See TREASURY, WHITE PAPER, supra note 13, at viii-ix (rejecting the utility of these
judicial doctrines because of their uncertain application, in definition and use, and
proposing instead a codification of the economic substance doctrine that compares the
present value of expected pre-tax profit and expected tax benefits). On the
appropriateness of just such a seemingly mechanical test and its ability to accomplish its
stated goals, see David A. Weisbach, Implications of Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L. REv. 373
(1999).
94. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470.
95. Id. at 469-70. The business purpose doctrine and continuity of interest doctrines
are thus intertwined, as both Justice Sutherland and Learned Hand's opinions indicate.
Citing Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933) and Cortland
Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932), Judge Hand noted that literal
compliance was not sufficient in either case. Both cases could have been decided on
narrower grounds (short-term notes were not securities for purposes of "reorganization");
however in both cases the transactions failed for lack of continuity of interest. Gregory v.
Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934). For examples of commentators equating
business purpose with the continuity of interest requirement, see Allan F. Ayers, Jr., How
to Insure Recognition of a Corporation Formed to Fit a Tax-Free Reorganization Pattern, 8
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 165, 166 (1949) (business purpose is satisfied if there is
continuity of business enterprise and shareholder interest); Spear, supra note 93, at 234
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The three opinions aptly illustrate the different methods of
statutory interpretation. The Board of Tax Appeals, employing a
plain meaning approach, interpreted the statutory definition of
"reorganization" as including all conditions both necessary and
sufficient for its benefits.96  Literal compliance with the statutory
language was, however, insufficient for both the court of appeals and
the Supreme Court. Interpreting the statute's language within the
context of related provisions to give effect to its purpose, Learned
Hand understood the term "reorganization" to require a
"readjustment undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of the
venture in hand."" The Supreme Court agreed that a
"reorganization" required the reorganization of all or part of a
business. 8  These decisions were based on the reorganization
provisions' purpose, as articulated in prior judicial interpretations
(requiring continuity of interest) 99 and the statute's legislative history
(emphasizing that such provisions would facilitate necessary business
purposes).10° As a result, the taxpayer could not be granted the
benefits of the provisions because "the transaction upon its face lies
outside the plain intent of the statute," not because of any tax
avoidance motive.10 1
(explaining Gregory by the continuance of business requirement); see also infra notes 278-
84 and accompanying text (discussing business purpose and continuity of interest as
characteristics of the genus of tax-deferred reorganizations).
96. Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 223,224-25 (1932).
97. Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (1932).
98. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469.
99. For a discussion of the overlap between the business purpose and continuity of
interest doctrines, see supra note 95.
100. Citing both the 1924 House Report, H.R. REP. No. 68-179 (1924), and Senate
Report, S. REP. 68-398 (1924), Judge Hand noted that the reorganization provisions were
added to "exempt 'from tax the gain from exchanges made in connection with a
reorganization in order that ordinary business transactions will not be prevented.'"
Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (1932) (citation omitted). The congressional
reports state that the justification for the reorganization provisions receiving such
favorable tax treatment was based on their characteristic as "purely a paper affair. It is the
exchange of the stock of different corporations for business purposes." SEIDMAN, supra
note 82, at 795 (statement of Rep. Watson) (emphasis added).
101. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470 (emphasizing that no "ulterior purpose" (i.e., tax
avoidance) was important for the decision). Justice Sutherland reaffirmed this by stating
that "the legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his
taxes ... by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted." l at 469 (citing, inter
alia, United States v. Isham, 68 U.S. (17 Wall.) 496, 506 (1873) (early statement of
taxpayer's right to avoid taxes by legal means)). Judge Hand added, "there is not even a
patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (1932).
Nevertheless, the business purpose doctrine is routinely criticized for introducing
the taxpayer's motive into judicial decision making and thereby turning an analysis of the
objective characteristics of the transaction into a subjective analysis. See, e.g., RANDOLPH
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A brief review of Gregory reveals how tax commentators have
viewed its approach to statutory interpretation and, in turn, allows
Gregory to serve as a paradigm for an Aristotelian re-examination. 1°2
B. Reaction to Gregory
Before considering Gregory v. Helvering generally, it may be
helpful to note that the literal reading of the statute approving of Mrs.
Gregory's transaction-that no business purpose was required for a
tax-deferred reorganization'O---prompted an immediate expression of
congressional dissatisfaction: the provision upon which Mrs. Gregory
attempted to rely was repealed."° Given Congress's response,
E. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 152 (1937) (stating that Gregory "imported
into the statutory provision, a meaning which made relevant the [taxpayer's] motive").
However, the need to inquire into a taxpayer's state of mind is much less than the rhetoric
suggests, given that an assessment of the relative weight of tax and non-tax goals can
readily be made. See Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent and Purpose in Federal Income
Taxation, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 485,543-44 (1967) (noting limitations of motive analyses and
commenting that because purpose can be equated with function "it is possible largely to
ignore state of mind considerations and to rely almost entirely on external factors"). Blum
observes that, for purposes of identifying tax avoidance, difficulties in measuring motive
are avoided by assessing the relative weights of non-tax and tax goals. Id, at 516. "All in
all, the role of any state of mind inquiry is very much smaller than the rhetoric might seem
to suggest." Id. at 523-24; see also Edwin S. Cohen, Tax Avoidance Purpose as a Statutory
Text in Tax Legislation, in NINTH ANNUAL TULANE TAX INSTITUTE 229, 257 (1960)
(distinguishing business purpose from test for taxpayer motive and urging adoption of the
former as the standard for taxability).
102. For example, business purpose has been castigated and praised because of its
vagueness. Compare BrITKER & EUSTICE, supra note 85, 11.01[2] (benefits of in
terrorem effect), and Boris I. Bittker, What is "Business Purpose" in Reorganizations?, 8
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TA'N 134, 134 (1949) (Noting, with specific reference to Gregory,
that literal compliance is insufficient and stating that "[t]hose who hope that the courts can
be induced to ignore the spirit of the Code for its letter are doomed to disappointment.
Courts are not what they used to be-and probably never were."), with Spear, supra note
93, at 246 (arguing that it is a vague doctrine operating only for the benefit of the
Commissioner).
103. The business purpose doctrine appears as a requirement in the regulations for
both acquisitive and divisive reorganizations. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.368-1(b) (as amended
in 2000) (acquisitive), 1.355-2(b) (as amended in 1989) (divisive). The nature of the
requirement is much more vigorous within the context of divisive reorganizations.
104. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, 48 Stat. 680; Ways and Means
Committee, H. Rep. of Dec. 4, 1933, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. (1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN,
supra note 82, at 332-38 (three of eight scenarios representing tax avoidance transactions
resembled Gregory, which was cited by name in the seventh scenario and offered as the
basis for urging repeal of all provisions providing tax-deferred treatment for
reorganizations). Dissatisfaction with the decision was significant enough to lead to the
repeal of only that provision, even after the lower court was reversed. See H. REP. No. 73-
704 (1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 82, at 338. Although repeal of the entire
"reorganization" provision was urged, the remaining provisions survived. See id.
(describing legislative efforts to prescribe permitted reorganization forms in detail but
noting with displeasure the result and stating that "astute lawyers frequently attempted,
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Gregory's importance could be limited if viewed narrowly as part of a
tradition of nonliteral interpretations of the reorganization
provisions." Or, of slightly broader but still limited utility, if read to
apply to statutes which must be fitted within the Code's unique
structure.1' 6 Tax statutes are thus seen as distinct or at the extreme
end of the continuum,' °7 requiring a particular methodology of
statutory interpretation with limited utility. °8 More interestingly,
however, Gregory invites a re-consideration generally of statutory
interpretation. Any text, whether part of a constitution or code,
poses the same problem: by what method is the language of the text
to be understood and interpreted; into what context must this text be
read and integrated? This will become clear after a review of tax
statutory interpretation of Gregory.
A code' °9 (including the Internal Revenue Code) arguably
requires a purposive interpretation cognizant of the it's overall
especially during the prosperous years, to take advantage of these provisions by arranging
in the technical form of a reorganization, within the statutory definition, what were really
sales").
The Supreme Court decisions in the reorganization cases, see e.g., Pinellas Ice &
Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 287 U.S. 462 (1933) (establishing continuity of interest and
business purpose); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932) (same),
were cited with approval. H. REP. No. 73-704 (1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note
82, at 338-39.
105. Bittker, supra note 102 (noting that it is commonly known that literal compliance
with the reorganization provisions is insufficient).
106. See Zelenak, supra note 86, at 638-66 (advancing the theory that nonliteral
interpretations may be permissible for the Internal Revenue Code because of tax statutory
complexity, necessity of preserving underlying structure of the Code and fact that
intended audience is comprised of specialists).
107. Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, "Purposivism," and the Interpretation of
Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677, 679 (1996) [hereinafter Livingston, Practical Reason]
(describing tax as one end of a continuum because it is "a detailed and programmatic legal
code" but denying unique nature of tax).
108. Arguments for treating tax differently have been advanced by both courts and
commentators. For example, on the sheer volume of the Code, see Deborah A. Geier,
Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492, 511 (1995)
[hereinafter Geier, Purpose]. On the Code as a code, see Zelenak, supra note 86, at 638
(noting that the meaning of a" 'single section of a statute in a setting as complex as that of
the revenue acts, however precise its language, cannot be ascertained ... apart from
related sections, or if the mind be isolated from the history of the income tax legislation of
which it is an integral part'" (quoting Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126
(1934)). On the issue of factual complexity, see Frankfurter, supra note 41, at 528 ("The
imagination which can draw an income tax statute to cover the myriad transactions of a
society like ours, capable of producing the necessary revenue without producing a flood of
litigation, has not yet revealed itself.").
109. Given the increasing importance of codes-the Uniform Commercial Code,
Bankruptcy Code, the Internal Revenue Code, etc.-it could be argued that any
improvement in their interpretation would be beneficial. See Bruce Frier, Interpreting
Codes, 89 MicH. L. REv. 2201 (1991) (discussing interpretive methods for the UCC and
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structure precisely because of the interaction of specific provisions
within the code of which they are necessarily only a part. Interaction
of specific provisions within the larger code perhaps could justify a
more structural or collaborative approach (precisely as a result of the
need to respect the code's structure), whether because a creative
judicial role in statutory interpretation is seen as normatively
desirable, or because an approach based on practical reasoning that
evaluates the text along with the code's overall purpose, is seen as
justifying such an approach. The theoretical basis for the difference
in these modes of interpretation lies not primarily in their use or non-
use of extrinsic materials," 0 but in their view that the function or the
"structure of the code" may suggest its own mode of analysis.
Professors Geier"' and Zelenak" 2 are among those arguing
eloquently for a more structural approach; Professors Livingston"
3
and Popkin'14  argue respectively for practical reason or a
collaborative approach. Despite raising the very important question
of how to interpret statutes that are part of a code, ultimately these
proposals are in their own way raising the basic question of statutory
interpretation already discussed: How should we interpret a text? If
methods of textual interpretation raise issues of legitimacy, then what
distinguishing between types of codes, those that seek systematic structure of law
distinguished from simple regroupings of existing statutes). Frier notes the impact of
codes on "fundamental issues of interpretation." 1d. at 2210. According to German jurist
Rudolph Sohm, an important method of working out a "rule of law" is by developing the
wider principles, which the rule presupposes. Id. Once the rule's major premises are
ascertained, the logical consequences of these premises provide an additional series of
other legal rules not directly contained in the source of the rule itself. Id. This Article
proposes a method of interpretation that will also develop wider principles that work
equally well for statutes whether or not part of a code.
110. Tax scholars align themselves along a continuum of methods of statutory
interpretation. It should be noted at the outset, however, that these methodologies
uniformly do not reject the use of legislative history or external sources. Tax statutes are
at once more complex and detailed than other statutes or a Constitution, yet tax scholars
uniformly embrace extra-textual materials. Tax provisions thus provide a useful place to
re-examine the assumption, frequently unstated, that language alone through greater
detail can solve any problems of its inherent imprecision.
111. Geier, Purpose, supra note 108, at 492; Deborah A. Geier, Commentary:
Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445 (1993).
112. Zelenak, supra note 86, at 623.
113. Livingston, Practical Reason, supra note 107, at 677; Michael Livingston,
Congress, The Courts, and The Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax
Statutes, 69 TEx. L. REV. 819 (1991).
114. William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 541 (1988); see also Popkin, supra note 2, at 1133 (critiquing Scalia's "plain
meaning" methodology).
612 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79
method we use will ultimately determine whether we really are a
government by rule of law.
Geier proposes no simple choice between textualism and
purposivism. 115  Although she articulates a purposive approach, it
must be distinguished from traditional intentionalism or
purposivism. 116 Geier aims not simply to identify the purpose of a
single statutory provision, but essentially interprets individual tax
provisions so as not to damage the "fundamental structure underlying
the income tax." By focusing on the larger structure, this structural
purposivism echoes those who propose fitting any statute into the
larger fabric of the law, in an almost common-law approach.11 7
Disagreement about the nature of what constitutes the Code's
essential characteristics is ultimately problematic."8 Nonetheless,
Geier argues that this structure, despite not being immediately
transparent, is both determinate and determinable." 9 For example,
115. See Livingston, Practical Reason, supra note 107, at 684 (describing Geier's
articulation as the "most sophisticated statement of the purposive argument"). Thus,
Geier advocates no "one size fits all" approach to statutory interpretation, no "simplistic
reduction" to a dichotomy between textualism and a purposive approach. Geier, Purpose,
supra note 108, at 496. Giving effect to the statute's purpose may require various and
alternative approaches, in Geier's view, including: 1) a textualist approach, 2) a nonliteral
approach, 3) informing the express language of the statute with knowledge of its purpose,
and 4) application of the common law principles (such as substance over form) where a
literal interpretation does not yield results consistent with the provision's purpose. ML at
496-97.
116. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (describing intentionalism as
purposivism in statutory interpretation).
117. See Geier, Purpose, supra note 108, at 497-502; see also supra note 72 (discussing
Llewellyn's five factors).
118. See Geier, Purpose, supra note 108, at 497. Geier explains that the "fundamental
structure" is the "theoretical construct that overarches the sum of the entire Internal
Revenue Code and is intended to be captured by it." Id This includes the distinction
necessitated by our choice of an income, not a consumption, tax system; such distinctions
as that between ordinary and capital income; and the realization requirement. Id
Because, for example, these distinctions are not necessarily understood or
accepted by all as part of the "structure" of the Code, the limitation to this approach
becomes apparent-it falters in the absence of agreement by all parties affected by the
Code. Geier herself notes the problem. Id at 510-11. Nor does this method adequately
address formalist concerns. See supra notes 41-45; infra notes 141-42.
119. On the one hand, by arguing that language is determinable, Geier distinguishes
herself from deconstructionists who insist that definitive meaning is impossible while at
the same time agreeing with the impossibility of an interpreter's ability to find only one
meaning. On the other hand, by agreeing that language is determinate, Geier asserts only
that there are a limited range of meanings for words in tax statutes, not that there is no
possibility of ambiguity. Geier, Textualism, supra note 111, at 449 (rejecting Justice
Scalia's ability to find language determinate and thus find clarity where others find
ambiguity); id. at 488 (noting disadvantages of both "hard- core deconstruction" and
"hard-core textualism"). Grier also contends that "[h]ard-core deconstruction insists upon
a chaotic lack of definitive meaning, often in spite of the text. Hard-core textualism insists
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Geier views the Gregory decision as correct because it comports with
the fundamental structure of the Code, an income based system with
a realization requirement that distinguishes between dividends and
stock sales. Based on these structural features, the Gregory
transaction should simply be re-characterized, and taxed, as a
dividend. Thus, Geier argues that the decision in Gregory could be
more convincingly explained as required by the Code's structure
rather than through the articulation of the business purpose
doctrine. 120
Zelenak generally allows a nonliteral approach to tax statutory
interpretation because "[t]he Internal Revenue Code has a way of
saying one thing while seeming to mean something else.''2 His
interpretive method recognizes tax interpretation not as distinct from
statutory interpretation generally but requiring recognition that the
complexity of the Code makes it more than "just another statute."''
Zelenak describes the approach sanctioned by Gregory, and generally
applied in the reorganization area, as one asking whether the literal
language of the statutory provision comports with the structures and
upon a single meaning arrived at by a sterile parsing of the statutory words often in spite
of the factual and statutory context." Id
120. Geier, Purpose, supra note 108, at 500-01 (citing Gregory approvingly). Geier
argues that "[b]y providing one set of rules for dividends and another for corporate
reorganizations, Congress implied in the statutory structure that there is a substantive
difference between these two types of transactions." Id Therefore, any "transaction that
is in substance a dividend should be taxed as such." Id Geier questions, however, the
utility of the business purpose doctrine because "it is easy to come up with a business
purpose when it is convenient to do so." Id. Ultimately, Geier argues that most common
law doctrines are thus supportable by the structure rationale. Id.
121. Zelenak, supra note 86, at 624. Because of the contextual nature of interpreting
provisions within a code, Zelenak concludes that "[s]ufficiently strong evidence can justify
a contextual interpretation, even when that interpretation is irreconcilable with the
statutory language," but cautions that "the greater the conflict between a proposed
contextual interpretation and the literal language of the statute, the stronger the evidence
for the contextual interpretation must be." Id at 675. Ultimately, Zelenak argues for no
"absolute rule" but greater candor, describing as "chaos" the current approach to
statutory interpretation because of a lack of general "principles" for applying literal or
contextual interpretation. d2 at 675-76; see also id. at 661-62 (noting the difficulty in
discerning when underlying policies "permit or require nonliteral interpretation"); id. at
640-41 (cautioning that the flexibility of words may lead judges to reject reconcilable
contextual interpretations).
122. Zelenak, supra note 86, at 630. Zelenak also distinguishes between complexity
and the Code's direction at specific fact patterns. Id at 675. This additional distinction
seems especially important in tax. As Zelenak notes, "[j]udges who rely on statutory
complexity as a reason for strictly adhering to the literal terms of a statute may be
confusing statutory complexity with the question whether Congress considered and
addressed a particular fact pattern in enacting the statute." Id. at 660.
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policies of related provisions. 3 Such a structural approach has merit
where the policies and structure are obvious. His discussion of
Gregory, however, suggests his concerns with the limitation of, and
corresponding ambivalence toward, a nonliteral, structural
approach-because such an approach may lead to unrestrained
"progovernment bias.""24
Despite Geier's and Zelenak's call for recognition of tax statutes
presence as part of the Code, other tax commentators object to any
such structural approach. Livingston rejects as "radical purposivism"
methods of "inductive reasoning that use[] the provisions of the code
to derive general principles and policies that then may be applied to
the resolution of specific legal problems."'2 The inductive reasoning
method's elevation of scholars and experts to a status equivalent to
the legislature is unacceptable. Because Livingston rejects tax's
uniqueness, what might otherwise be termed "tax essentialism," 126
123. Id. at 668-70.
124. I at 667-68. Zelenak cites Gregory as "the most influential case in the
development of the progovernment interpretive bias" and notes that "[t]he spirit of
Gregory has infused the entire law of the tax treatment of corporate reorganizations." Id.
Zelenak specifically attributes the courts' willingness to require nonliteral interpretations
within the reorganization area to Gregory. ldM at 668. Finding this appropriate within the
context of reorganizations, Zelenak nevertheless articulates the frequent complaint that a
nonliteral approach tends to favor the government over individual taxpayers. Id. at 669-
70.
125. Livingston, Practical Reason, supra note 107, at 688. Livingston objects to the use
of inductive reasoning by "tax cognoscenti" working from the code's principles to trump
plain statutory language in what he describes as "radical purposivism." hi. at 709. In
addition to questioning the validity of a purposive approach, Livingston questions the
legitimacy of any approach that seems to confer legislative authority on scholars and
experts. He describes the limits of purposivism generally as including three problems: 1)
descriptive (does it adequately describe the results of tax cases), 2) practical (does it yield
positive long-term results), and 3) theoretical (questioning tax cognoscenti interpreting
underlying principles to trump plain meaning). Id. at 701-12.
126. If tax can make no claim to special status, the importance of the Code as justifying
a structural or inductive method of interpretation is undercut. Livingston's current
rejection of tax's special nature stands in stark contrast to his earlier detailed exposition of
the tax legislative process as making a very persuasive case for why tax is different. Id. at
679. Citing Gregory, Livingston described it as the classic case of contextual
interpretation, an approach to tax statutory interpretation that was not only proper but the
dominant one because "[flew if any tax terms have a plain meaning that can be divorced
from the statutory and decisional context in which the terms arise." Livingston, supra note
113, at 830-31. He then identified the following distinguishing characteristics of tax: first,
its "complex and constantly changing character;" second, the necessarily "contextual style
of tax interpretation" needed to account for Treasury regulations, prior judicial opinions,
and "the broader structure" of the statute; finally, the "conceptual nature" of the tax
legislative process because "members of Congress set only general guidelines for both the
statute and legislative history." Id. at 822. No literal or plain meaning approach to
interpretation would result in either the individual case or the statutory provision being fit
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openly rejecting his earlier assessment based on the special nature of
the tax legislative process, he argues that Eskridge and Frickey's
method of "practical reason" is all the more attractive as a realistic
method that recognizes tax's competing concerns. 27 He distinguishes
a "practical reason"-based method from purposivism because of
practical reason's refusal to elevate any one interpretive perspective,
including the Code's structure.12  Although recognizing strong
similarities between the two, Livingston offers practical reasoning as a
"more realistic (if less exalted) version" preferable to any structural
approach, precisely because it openly acknowledges that tax law is a
product of practical compromises. 29
Popkin offers a model of interpretation that is structured and
above all normatively collaborative, based on the contingent process
of interpretation, but one that recognizes the necessarily creative role
of judges who operate based on a community of principle.30 Popkin
thus represents a distinct voice in statutory interpretation based on
the contributions of those critics (whether deconstructionists or
philosophical hermeneutics)'' challenging the determinacy of
language and others, especially Dworkin, who propose as a solution
for problems of interpretation the development of a community of
principle. 2 Popkin thus places statutes firmly within the common
law.1 33 Popkin approves of Gregory, especially Judge Hand's analogy
of statutory interpretation to music, regarding it as the "classic
criticism of literalism," despite objections that contextual readings
into the entire matrix that is "tax law" (regulations, judicial and administrative decisions
and legislative history). IM.
127. Livingston, Practical Reason, supra note 107, at 720-24; see Eskridge & Frickey,
Practical Reasoning, supra note 7, at 332-39; supra notes 68-74 (discussing practical
reason).
128. Livingston defines practical reason in the context of interpreting tax as allowing
courts to consider a variety of interpretive factors, including the age of the Code (thereby
allowing greater weight for an evolutive perspective), the existence of a "unified tax code"
(not simply a series of distinct statutes), and the revenue effects associated with decisions.
Livingston, Practical Reason, supra note 107, at 720-21.
129. ld. at 723.
130. Popkin, supra note 114, at 543.
131. See supra note 4 (discussing the postmodern critics challenge to the determinacy
of language).
132. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 195-215; DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 28, at 81-84.
133. Popkin, supra note 114, at 580 (proposing an approach that combines aspects of
critical legal study's contingency of meaning with Dworkin's community of principle).
Popkin's approach is controversial not because he recognizes that judges import their own
values, but because he views this as normatively desirable. Id at 590.
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upset "reliance" concerns (what we might term formalist concerns by
another name).'4
Whether considered through the lens of contextual, structural, or
practical reasoning interpretation,135 the result in Gregory is likely to
be the same. Those who disapprove of the result in Gregory-who
might be loosely described as "textualists"'136-are, however, in
agreement about Gregory's limitations. Describing Gregory as a
landmark case that has been frequently used by courts to justify
"antitextual" readings of the Code,1 37 Coverdale utters a plea for
textualism. Beginning from the statutory language at issue in
134. Id. at 592; see also id. at 592 n.213 (distinguishing literalism, which "wrenches a
word completely out of context," from plain meaning, which requires examination of
context, both internal and external). Because background considerations-including
consideration of purpose-may unsettle statutory plain meaning, reliance interests argue
for adhering to the statute's literal meaning. Popkin argues against weighting "reliance
interests"--the importance of "certainty of legal rules"--to defeat a contextual reading
since such interests are weaker when tax avoidance is a serious concern (as today). ld. at
599-600. In tax discussions generally, formalist concerns are voiced in language based on
a taxpayer's right to rely on the literal language of the statute. See Weisbach, Formalism,
supra note 88, at 875 (discounting the importance of reliance concerns in tax).
135. Earlier, Livingston argued for a contextual mode of interpretation in tax.
Livingston, supra note 113, at 830 n.49 (citing Gregory as the classic nonliteral
interpretation). In Practical Reason he does not discuss Gregory, but an application of his
factors to be considered in interpretation does not suggest a different result. See supra
notes 125-26.
136. "Textualist," as used here, is a term of convenience that describes a presumed
attitude of deference to the statutory text. Certainly, while Coverdale, Isenbergh, and
Hariton may place greater emphasis on the text than their contextualist counterparts, they
do not seem to share Justice Scalia's abhorrence of legislative history. See infra notes 142-
43 (discussing Coverdale's definition of modern textualism); infra notes 144-52 (discussing
Isenbergh).
137. John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax Code,
71 TUL. L. REv. 1501, 1502 (1997) ("For more than sixty years courts have cited Gregory
v. Helvering to justify reading the tax laws in ways their texts simply will not bear."); id. at
1503 (noting that Gregory is used as justification for reading provisions in the Code in
ways that "fall outside the range of meanings that their text, taken in context, has in
ordinary speech or in other provisions of the Code"); id. at 1507-08 (indicating that
analysis of Gregory "reveals significant reasons for questioning whether the decisions
could be said to reflect even probable congressional intent or purpose"); id. at 1529
(indicating that Gregory and its progeny "exemplify the pernicious tendency of courts
interpreting the Code to ignore Congress's commands to achieve the results they consider
desirable"). Coverdale is not troubled by the use of extrinsic material, including material
outside of the legislative process, to buttress his claim. See id. at 1533-35 (explaining that
statutory changes enacted between 1921 and 1924 prompted by congressional desire to
impart clarity and certainty to this area of the law). At least based on the materials
deemed acceptable, Coverdale would seem to be a textualist of quite a different stripe
than Justice Scalia.
138. Id. at 1501. He distinguishes his "rule against antitextual interpretations" from
"naive plain-meaning," that presupposes no interpretation. Id. at 1513. Describing naive
plain-meaning as "an impoverished view of interpretation that fails to recognize that all
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Gregory, Coverdale asserts that by defining "reorganization" with the
word "means," Congress provided therein all the necessary and
sufficient elements of that provision. For Coverdale, Congress could
hardly have indicated more clearly that all conditions, both necessary
and sufficient, were expressly set forth. 39  As a result, Coverdale
concludes that "[tihe Gregory court's reliance on arguments about
'underlying presuppositions' to justify reading a business purpose
requirement into a definition that includes no such requirement is a
case of a court taking a pencil to the statute to correct what it
considers to be Congress's mistake."" ° Accordingly, Coverdale urges
the adoption of a "rule against antitextual interpretations."
Coverdale's justifications for textualism are the same as those offered
generally by textualists. First, as the enacted text, the statutory
language has unique claims to legitimacy.' 41  Second, statutes,
including the Code, that appear generally in the form of rules should
not be interpreted as standards. 42 Finally, there is no need for courts
to go beyond the statutory text given the frequency of post-enactment
legislation, which provides Congress with opportunity to correct any
errors.
143
interpretation involves a dynamic interaction of reader and text with both objective and
subjective aspects," he thus describes himself in terms similar to those used by Justice
Scalia. ld. at 1514; supra notes 53-56.
139. Coverdale, supra note 137, at 1532. Coverdale offers no support for his
assumption that Congress intended to indicate a shift to all necessary and sufficient
conditions by substituting the word "means" for "includes" in the 1924 changes. Id
Cunningham notes that to qualify as a definition, a statement must include the
necessary and sufficient conditions. Cunningham, supra note 17, at 1590. But see infra
notes 268-72 and accompanying text (explaining that as homonyms, the necessary and
sufficient conditions of "reorganization" cannot be limited to the express language of the
statute).
140. Coverdale, supra note 137, at 1533.
141. Id. at 1515-21. Textualism's justification based on legitimacy arguments and
constitutional requirements are similar to those advanced by Justice Scalia. See supra
notes 37-38, 41-44. For a discussion of the limitations inherent in these arguments, see
supra notes 66-67.
142. Coverdale, supra note 137, at 1522-25. Placing great emphasis on the "rule-like"
nature of the Code, Coverdale argues that the "highly formal rules" result in economically
equivalent transactions being treated quite differently by reason of their form. ld. at 1522.
While recognizing that judges "simply free to do justice" might arrive at different results,
Coverdale argues that the decision to adopt rules mandates respect of those rules. l at
1523. The importance of both notice and predictability argue against courts relying on
purpose, intent, or policy in reading the enacted language in a way that "the words will not
bear." Id. at 1510, 1524-25. Repeatedly stating this as the standard, or rule, for statutory
interpretation, Coverdale unfortunately provides little guidance on how to discern the
difference within the context of the Code. See, e.g., id. at 1503-04.
143. Id at 1525-28 (noting the frequency of major tax bills in recent years). Although
he acknowledges the difficulty of passing legislation, Coverdale rejects this as an argument
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Isenbergh, musing on the doctrine of substance over form and
not proposing a general theory of statutory interpretation,
144
distinguishes between statutes by asking whether statutory terms
draw their meaning from the statute itself or the real world: if from
the statute itself, statutory terms of art define both form and
substance. 4 Because there is no "natural law of reverse triangular
mergers,"'46 Isenbergh initially classifies the reorganization statutes as
creatures without real-world antecedents. 47 Because the statute
draws from itself and not from the real world, enlarging the statutory
language by the addition of the business purpose requirement is
therefore inappropriate. Isenbergh frames the question in this way:
Is the 1928 statute self-contained?' 48 If yes, Gregory should win. If
the term "reorganization" is "bounded to some extent by its
antecedents in the world," the government should win.149 By
concluding that it is a close call, Isenbergh ultimately retreats from his
characterization of the reorganization provisions as self-contained,
without any real world antecedents, thereby calling into question the
utility of his initial classification. 5 ° In the end, what is most troubling
for broader interpretation. Id. at 1527; see supra notes 37-44 (discussing legitimacy
issues).
144. Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 859 (1982) (reviewing BORIS I. BITKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS (1981)) (noting origin of substance over form doctrine, that form of
transaction will not be allowed to defeat its substance, as deriving from general agreement
among both tax lawyers and theorists that the tax revenues should not be "defeated by
certain entirely artificial maneuvers" and identifying as the more difficult question how to
discern whether the substance of any particular transaction is consistent with its form).
145. Id at 879 (stating "[t]he most important inquiry at the threshold is whether a
statutory provision draws its meaning from the terms of the statute itself or (and to what
extent) from outside"); see also id. at 864-65 (distinguishing terms imported into the Code
from the real world from those that are "creatures of art"). Unfortunately, nowhere does
Isenbergh offer any rules or standards for determining whether a statute is self-contained
or bounded by real-world antecedents.
146. Id. at 879.
147. Surely Isenbergh does not mean that Congress created random, apurposive rules
to define those transactions to which it granted preferred tax treatment. For a more
complete discussion of some of the real world concerns motivating the evolution of the
statute governing reorganizations, see Steven A. Bank, Federalizing the Tax-Free Merger:
Toward an End to the Anachronistic Reliance on State Corporation Laws, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1307 (1999) (describing the competing concerns motivating the statutory changes,
including the broader range of business transactions covered by these provisions as well as
the desire to limit their benefits, including their inappropriate uses in triggering loss
recognition).
148. Isenbergh, supra note 144, at 868.
149. l.a
150. Isenbergh concedes it is a close call. Id. at 868. Nevertheless, on the basis of the
means/includes distinction, Isenbergh seems to prefer an apurposive rule:
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to Isenbergh is the introduction of tax avoidance or taxpayer motive
generally in such cases and the resulting license afforded to judges by
non-textual interpretations. 5' Indeed, Gregory epitomizes for
Isenbergh not only the generally sorry state of statutory
interpretation, but also the failure of the judiciary to respect its
appropriate sphere.52
The logical extension of Isenbergh's identification of self-
contained statutes allowing no reference beyond their four corners is
a method of statutory interpretation that satisfies formalist concerns,
whether motivated by efficiency, anticonsequentialist, or apurposive
concerns.15 3 Such pure formalism might appear attractive, if the rule
As an abstract proposition, it is not immediately obvious why a division of
corporate assets would have to be germane to the conduct of the remaining
business or even what it means to be germane ... what is meant by germane [is]
that the end of a reorganization as such cannot be tax avoidance. This also is far
from self-evident, however, for the whole point of the reorganization provisions
in the Code is to make certain transactions tax-free.
Id. at 869; see also Steven M. Surdell, The Emerging Role of Business Purpose in
Corporate Tax-Motivated Transactions, 431 PLI/TAX 1133, 1144 (1998) ("It is significant
to note, however, that by enacting provisions such as the reorganization provisions,
Congress could be seen to have granted those transactions special status so that tax
avoidance motives are less relevant.").
Isenbergh's analysis seems to ignore the historical context of the reorganization
provisions. Even prior to Gregory, Congress wrestled with the process of successfully
writing a statute to govern tax-deferred divisive reorganizations so as to permit necessary
business reorganizations while not allowing their use for transactions that do not meet a
"business exigency" standard. See supra note 82.
151. Isenbergh, supra note 144, at 863. Isenbergh is most troubled by the business
purpose doctrine as providing an anti-tax avoidance doctrine. See also id. at 870 (decrying
subsequent decisions using Gregory to "attack perceived 'bad' features of transactions").
152. On the matter of judicial license, see id. at 880 (rejecting gap-filling by the courts
to preserve fise as justification for "extrastatutory or remedial forays"). See also iL at 882
(describing judicial aspirations); id. at 883 (describing Gregory as nothing less than the
reason for the sorry state of current statutory interpretation and judicial excess).
153. See Pildes, supra note 42, at 607 (describing divergent views of formalists as
making it implausible to see "any unified, coherent vision of modern legal formalism").
Pildes identifies three modes of formalism: (1) formalism as anticonsequential morality in
law, (2) formalism as apurposive rule-following, and (3) formalism as a regulatory tool for
producing "optimally efficient mixes of law and norms." ld. Pildes notes that preference
for formalism, as well as for rule-following, makes sense in "conditions of distrust." lId at
614. This is certainly the case within tax. Tax textualists might be better denominated as
tax formalists since as a group they share a greater distrust of the judiciary than of
legislative history or extrinsic sources. See also David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle
of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235 passim (1999) (analyzing the economic
substance doctrine in light of ACM v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d. 231 passim (3d Cir. 1998)).
Hariton alternatively seems to identify apurposive and anticonsequentialist concerns. A
commitment to a "relatively objective system" militates against overturning "technical"
results. Hariton states:
[t]he taxpayer, we believe, is entitled to rely on the rules and the answers to
which those rules give rise. She should not be denied beneficial tax results which
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of law did not depend on the effectiveness of the law. Instead, the
failure of this pure "rule-oriented approach" in tax, forcefully stated
by Weisbach 54 and Levmore, 155 calls into question the validity of such
a formalist approach. Indeed, failed formalism creates only a rule of
men where those capable of manipulating the rules do so for their
own narrow advantage.'56
Describing tax as the "paradigmatic system of rules," Weisbach
nonetheless concludes that a "purely rule-oriented approach" has
failed, whether analyzed on efficiency grounds or respect for the
law. 7  Weisbach applies an economiC58 analysis to consider the
relative efficiency of rules or standards in tax. 59 Weisbach performs a
she stumbles upon, or, even seeks out, in the course of her legitimate business
dealings, even if those results are obviously unanticipated, unintended or
downright undesirable.
Id. at 237. His description of the realization requirement suggests a more apurposive
formalism, stating that "the timing of realization is essentially formalistic, and the
proposition that taxpayers are getting away with something to which they are not properly
entitled when they use transactions to alter the timing of realization is therefore dubious."
Id. at 254.
154. Weisbach, Formalism, supra note 88, at 860.
155. Saul Levmore, Double Blind Lawmaking and Other Comments on Formalism in
the Tax Law, 66 U. CI. L. REV. 915 passim (1999).
156. Increasing statutory complexity that allows the well-advised to manipulate the
rules for their narrow advantage with the resulting loss of respect for the system's ability
to function as a whole contributes nothing at all to the rule of law. For a description of the
nature of current tax law as "niggardly, complex, and narrow of spirit," see Harition, supra
note 153, at 237; infra note 157. For the increasing disrespect accorded tax law, see
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAx 7-8 (1997)
(noting as serious the pervasive problem of disrespect when the tax system is dependent
on taxpayers' voluntary complicance).
157. Weisbach, Formalism, supra note 88, at 860 (defining failure as taxpayers' ability
to manipulate endlessly the rules to produce results not intended by the drafters). This
failure is inefficient, resulting in a loss of revenue and demoralizing others. Even Hariton,
who argues for a highly formalistic perspective in the application of tax statutes,
recognizes the difficulties of a rule-based system in an increasingly complex business world
where the consequences of our failure to maintain limits results in:
(1) an increasingly defensive set of rules-niggardly, complex and narrow of
spirit-designed with a view to potential abusers, real and imagined; (2) an
increasingly inequitable allocation of tax liabilities, with relatives benefits inuring
to bigger taxpayers that are able and willing to enter into costly tax-motivated
transactions; and (3) primarily as a result of (2), an erosion of confidence in what
is functionally a self-enforced honor system of determining tax liabilities.
Hariton, supra note 153, at 237.
158. By "economic approach," Weisbach considers whether anti-abuse rules are
welfare maximizing. Weisbach, Formalism, supra note 88, at 862. Weisbach is not
offering a theory of statutory interpretation, although he notes that the literature on anti-
abuse provisions is frequently found within statutory interpretation scholarship. Id. at 861
n.3.
159. Id at 865-72. Weisbach considers the work of Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 265 (1974)
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useful, indeed essential, service-forcing us to examine the
consequences of a choice between rules and standards in tax. A
conclusion that rules are inefficient appears somewhat
counterintuitive, even when considered in light of Kaplow's analysis
that challenges assumptions of the inherent nature of rule simplicity
and standard complexity.'" Rules should be more efficient than
standards, given the numerous transactions to which tax rules apply.
The counterintuitive result that rules are inefficient in tax arises
precisely because in tax, by their very particularity, rules must be
more complex than standards. Because of tax arbitrage, taxpayers
exploit discontinuities that result from gaps in tax rules. As a result,
tax rules must necessarily become increasingly complex because they
cannot afford to overlook the uncommon.' 61  And, as Weisbach
demonstrates, once the discontinuities in tax are identified, the
uncommon becomes common. 62
(arguing that rules reduce cost and simplify prediction); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J., 557 568-88 (1992) (arguing there is no
necessary connection between complexity and the use of either rules or standards).
Weisbach concludes that, in tax at least, rules are more complex and inefficient than
standards. Weisbach, Formalism, supra note 88, at 861-63.
160. Kaplow questions the assumption that a priori rules are simple and standards are
complex. Kaplow, supra note 159, at 588-90. Because rules may be highly complex while
standards can be quite simple, Kaplow urges that we hold constant the law's content,
including its complexity, and keep separate the choice between rules and standards. Id. at
621-23. Kaplow asserts that the only difference between rules and standards is whether
costs are incurred ex ante or ex post. Id. at 593-96. On this basis alone, rules should
always be more efficient in tax where any given rule will be applied to significant numbers
of transactions. See Weisbach, Formalism, supra note 88, at 865-66 (summarizing
Kaplow's thesis in the context of tax rules and standards). Weisbach challenges Kaplow's
distinction between content and complexity precisely because of the common versus
uncommon distinction created by rules but not by standards. Id at 866-67. Because very
complex rules must be created to avoid overlooking the uncommon and because the
government as the first-mover necessarily operates with incomplete information, rule
complexity results in significant inefficiencies in tax. Ld.
161. Weisbach uses as one example of rule complexity the partnership rules governing
"mixing bowl" transactions. I.R.C. § 721 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (establishing rules for
tax-free contributions); I.R.C. § 731 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (establishing rules for
distributions). To prevent their manipulation to achieve sale-like results, a series of
complex rules have been added to prevent sale-like transactions. I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-4 (as amended in 1997). More problematic
are positions in financial contexts where avoiding discontinuities, even with complex rules,
is extremely difficult. For example, a taxpayer's ability to obtain interest deductions by
borrowing money to purchase a financial interest with deferred interest income is very
difficult to prevent absent anti-abuse standards. For a simple example, see Knetsch v.
United States, 364 U.S. 361, 362-64 (1960) (denying a deduction for interest expense to
purchase annuity from same company that lent funds in order to generate deductions in
advance of interest income).
162. Weisbach, Formalism, supra note 88, at 869.
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In particular, Weisbach then considers the use of anti-abuse 63
rules (more properly called standards) to limit tax avoidance and
concludes that anti-abuse provisions are efficient and could even
appropriately be read into tax statutes. 164 Because rules, even where
they are complex and detailed, create discontinuities in tax and
discontinuities are exploited by taxpayers, "uncommon transactions"
become common.' 5 Standards, including anti-abuse provisions, are
"fuzzy at the borders." As a result, they not only decrease tax
arbitrage but are more efficient since they reduce complexity within
the law. 66 Thus, the problems with a complex, detailed rule-based
system provide a salutary reminder of the consequences generally of
our choice of methods of statutory interpretation. Unwieldy
complexity may yield only increased disrespect for the rule of law.
Given the failure of a "purely rule-oriented" approach, a failure
conceded by some formalists, and given that those advocating a more
163. Anti-abuse rules, appearing in both Code provisions and in tax regulations, allow
the government to override the literal language of the statute or regulation if a taxpayer
uses a transaction for tax avoidance purposes contrary to the purpose of the statute or
regulation. Id. at 860.
Treasury regulations contain examples of anti-abuse provisions, the most notable
being the partnership anti-abuse regulation, the promulgation of which occasioned a great
deal of discussion about the merits of anti-abuse provisions generally. See Treas. Reg.
1.701-2 (as amended in 2000). For a discussion of anti-abuse provisions, see Sheldon I.
Banoff, The Use and Misuse of Anti-Abuse Rules, 48 TAX LAW. 827 (1995) (discussing
whether the Internal Revenue Service should use anti-abuse rules and, if so, under what
conditions); Frank V. Battle, Jr., The Appropriateness of Anti-Abuse Rules in the U.S.
Income Tax System, 48 TAX LAW. 801 (1995) (questioning the effectiveness of anti-abuse
rules which require such specificity in explication that they only lead to more abusive
transactions); Kenneth W. Gideon, Use, Abuse, and Anti-Abuse: Policy Considerations
Affecting the Nature of Regulatory Guidance, TAXES, Dec. 1995, at 637 (arguing that anti-
abuse rules are a second-best solution but may be necessary); Daniel Halperin, Are Anti-
Abuse Rules Appropriate?, 48 TAX LAW. 807 (1995) (discussing the literalism versus
purposivism debate in the context of anti-abuse rules as inseparable from a discussion of
methods of statutory interpretation); William F. Nelson, The Limits of Literalism: The
Effect of Substance over Form, Clear Reflection and Business Purpose Considerations on
the Proper Interpretation of Subchapter K, TAXES, Dec. 1995, at 641 (arguing that
partnership anti-abuse provisions are inappropriate and supplant current law); Pamela
Olson, Some Thoughts on Anti-Abuse Rules, 48 TAX LAW. 817 (1995) (exploring the
history, significance, and effect of anti-abuse rules).
164. Weisbach, Formalism, supra note 88, at 884. Weisbach does not necessarily
suggest the wholesale judicial application of anti-abuse provisions. Because anti-abuse
provisions are not always appropriate, courts might not accurately apply them in all cases.
165. Id. at 869-71.
166. For a discussion of the evolution of the law from standards to rules to standards
within the context of a discussion of the organic development of Subchapter C of the
Internal Revenue Code, see Clark, supra note 85; see also Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis
and the Law of Conservation of Ambiguity: Thoughts on Section 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9, 11
(1982) (defining problem with hyperlexis [elaboration]: efforts to eliminate ambiguity
through the use of detail only create more ambiguity and are thus doomed to failure).
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contextual approach have failed to articulate a method of statutory
interpretation that is sufficiently determinate and bounded on a
theoretical, as well as practical, basis to satisfy formalist concerns,
what is the next step? A re-consideration of the reorganization
provision at issue in Gregory through an Aristotelian lens will yield
an alternative means of analysis that has much to offer statutory
interpretation generally.
III. ARISTOTELIAN ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
The utility of Aristotle and Aristotelian writings to current issues
of statutory interpretation has not gone unnoticed. 67 Aristotle's
importance should not be surprising given his attention to theories of
language and proof, which were critical to the system of logic he
developed. Dialectic, argumentation and reasoning based on
accepted premises, is a natural way to proceed in a forensic or legal
setting. 6' Aristotle's careful attention to sophistic fallacies and
philosophical errors relating to linguistic ambiguity'6 9 are as helpful
today for the judge parsing statutory language as they were for the
rhetorician of fifth and fourth century Athens. 70 In short, Aristotle
167. See supra note 7 (discussing Aristotle's importance for different methods of
statutory interpretation and quoting Frank for his view that modem work in the area is
but a restatement of what Aristotle said).
168. See supra note 10 (discussing Aristotle's importance in the area of logic); infra
notes 169-70,204 (discussing dialectic).
169. Philosophical errors often originate from equivocity. See infra note 174
(discussing modem terminology: ambiguity and vagueness). Anyone recognizing such
errors has obvious advantages over his opponents. Aristotle places much emphasis on
clarity in logic and language as a necessary precondition for successful reasoning and
debate. In this he follows in a well-established tradition that includes Plato and the
Sophists. For example, Aristotle begins the Topics as follows: "The purpose of the
present treatise is to discover a method by which we shall be able to reason from generally
accepted opinions about any problem set before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining an
argument, avoid saying anything self-contradictory." ARISTOTLE, TOPICS I.100a18-21
(E.S. Forster ed. & trans., Harvard University Press 1997) (1960). On the sophists and the
tradition leading up to Aristotle, see W.K.C. GUTHRIE, THE SOPHISTS (1971) (including a
discussion of the sophists that may well remind modem scholars of the deconstructionists'
rejection of determinacy of meaning).
170. See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1354a14-15 (John Henry Freese trans., Harvard
University Press 1982) (1926) (describing dialectic argumentation as main body of
rhetorical persuasion); Smith, supra note 10, at 59-60; see also THOMAS COLE, THE
ORIGINS OF RHETORIC IN ANCIENT GREECE 10 (1991) (describing rhetoric as
compounded out of skills that require ability to produce premises and inferences that a
deliberative or judicial body is likely to accept). The active law courts of ancient Greece
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represents a tradition closely linked with our own legal, logical, and
philosophical tradition and as such has much to offer.171
Despite Aristotle's recognized contribution to logic and language
generally and the importance of these contributions specifically to the
legal academy, there has been a dearth of scholarship covering
Aristotle's extensive discussion of "words spoken in many ways."
Only recently72 have commentators adequately addressed Aristotle's
extensive discussion'73 regarding both the importance of and methods
for distinguishing "multivocal"'74 words-words we might describe as
"equivocal" or "ambiguous," because they do not admit of one single
meaning. Aristotle's important contribution to the understanding of
all uses of language on the one hand and statutory language on the
other hand, is to identify a middle ground-termed associated
homonyms-between univocity and equivocity. This middle ground,
associated homonyms, exists between discrete homonyms (whose
definitions are distinct) and synonyms that require univocity.
Aristotle thus offers a welcome voice in modem discussions of
statutory interpretation, which have not yet recognized associated
homonyms. Absent Aristotle's contribution in identifying a class of
homonyms that offer the possibility of resolving ambiguity through
required skill in questions of argument, evidence, confirmation, and refutation-precisely
the training provided by dialectic and rhetoric.
171. See supra note 18 (discussing familiarity of philosophical modes of thought in legal
discourse).
172. Until recently, there was limited discussion of "words spoken in many ways," a
topic that pervades much of Aristotle's corpus. Now thanks to Christopher Shields, who
has systematically considered the topic throughout Aristotle's corpus, it is possible to
apply a unified analysis of Aristotelian homonymy beyond Aristotle. CHRISTOPHER
SHIELDS, ORDER IN MULTIPLICITY: HOMONYMY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE
(1999). Much of the following analysis relies heavily on Shields's work. Important earlier
discussions of homonymy can be found chiefly in Terence Irwin, Homonymy in Aristotle,
34 REv. METAPHYSICS 523 (1981), and in the seminal work of G.E.L. Owens, Logic and
Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle, in ARISTOTLE AND PLATO IN MID-
FOURTH CENTURY 163-90 (I. During et al. eds., 1957), reprinted in LOGIC, SCIENCE, AND
DIALECTIC (Martha Nussbaum ed., 1986).
173. On the importance of homonymy in Aristotle's entire corpus and the
development of his metaphysics, a topic beyond the scope of this Article, see, for example,
SHIELDS, supra note 172, passim.
174. Multivocal, because they are without a single meaning, is an easier term for what
Aristotle frequently describes as "words spoken of in many ways" (pollakis legomenon).
Modem commentators prefer "vague" or "ambiguous." For examples of cases using
"vague" or "ambiguous" to describe language, see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984) (stating "we know full well this language is not
dispositive"); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 217 (1979) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Often we have difficulty interpreting statutes because of imprecise drafting
or because legislative compromises have produced genuine ambiguities."). See also
Karkkainen, supra note 53 (discussing "ambiguity" and the use of legislative history).
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their association, the discussion of how to resolve issues of
interpretation remains at a stalemate between those who assert
univocity and others who maintain that such assumptions are
unrealistic.' 5 Aristotle provides us with analytical tools for more
complex linguistic and philosophical understanding.
Homonyms present a class of equivocal words. An example of a
common, discrete homonym that is easily recognized, easily resolved
and thus generally dismissed as unhelpful, is the word "bank" (as in,
"river bank" and "savings bank")-the name given is common but
the account of being that corresponds to the name (i.e., river bank or
savings bank) differs. 76 Aristotle's important contribution is the
identification within homonymy generally of a class of homonyms
(associated homonyms) that can help us rethink issues of equivocity
and ambiguity and, in the process, refine our ability to understand
language. In modem discussions of statutory interpretation, discrete
homonyms are recognized as creating, by their ambiguity, the
possibility of confusion, but generally capable of easy resolution or, if
not, of little utility. H.L.A. Hart provides the fullest account, but
does not appreciate the associated nature of some homonyms, seeing
no middle ground between discrete homonyms and synonyms.
177
175. See supra note 28 (discussing hard cases).
176. Aristotle discusses homonymy early and develops his theory of homonymy
throughout his work. Aristotle's important contribution is the identification of both
discrete (unrelated) and core-dependent (associated) homonyms. For example, in the
Categories (generally considered an early work), Aristotle distinguishes homonymy and
synonymy: "Those things are called homonymous of which the name alone is common,
but the account of being corresponding to the name is different .... Those things are
called synonymous of which the name is common, and the account of being corresponding
to the name is the same." SHELDS, supra note 172, at 11 (translating and discussing
ARISTOTLE, CATEGORIES Ial-4); see infra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing
"healthy" as an incorrect example of synonymy, as defined by Aristotle).
177. Hart, for example, provides the fullest account but does not distinguish a middle
ground (tertium quid) between "mere homonyms" (discrete homonyms that are easily
identifiable) and what Aristotle would describe as a synonym, thereby demonstrating a
mistaken notion of univocity. Hart, supra note 16, at 38 n.1. Hart describes the
alternative use of the homonymy of important legal concepts as:
the mistaken belief (false not only of complex legal and political expressions like
"law," "state," and "nation," but of humbler ones like "a game") that if a word is
not a mere homonym then all the instances to which it is applied must possess
either a single quality or a single set of qualities in common.
IM Hart's description here acknowledges only discrete homonymy and synonymy (and no
tertium quid) and thus helps us realize our failure to recognize Aristotle's contribution:
establishing a definition of homonymy that recognizes it as more than mere homonymy
and thus establishing the importance of not only the non-univocity but also the
associatedness of key words. See infra notes 219-26 (discussing associated and core-
dependent homonymy and recognizing its importance as distinct from either mere
homonymy or synonymy).
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Consideration of Aristotle's extensive discussion of homonymy, and
above all his important contribution in recognizing associated
homonymy, will thus be a useful starting point.
A discussion of why Aristotle's recognition of both discrete
(unrelated) and associated homonymy is important will also be
considered.17 8  This will lead to a consideration of Aristotle's
approach to methods and levels of definition:79 understanding levels
and functions of definition will in turn help clarify how we should
approach issues of definition, including priority within definitions and
among homonyms 80 Ultimately, combining aspects of Aristotle's
theories of language and signification, definition and priority will
allow us to reconsider the statutory term "reorganization.' '81
B. Homonymy
Aristotle clearly distinguishes homonyms from synonyms .'8
What is initially unclear is how Aristotle defines homonyms and why
Current discussions of homonymy recognize only the less interesting and less
helpful discrete homonyms. See SCALiA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 26
(discussing an example of discrete homonyms within his discussion of the canon of
statutory construction known as noscitur a sociis (a word is known by its companions)).
Scalia argues, "If you tell me, 'I took the boat out of the bay,' I understand 'bay' to mean
one thing; if you tell me, 'I put the saddle on the bay,' I understand it to mean something
else." Id.; see also Cunningham, supra note 17, at 1610 (discussing empirical research on
"enterprise" and noting that disagreement among respondents about its meaning is not
"result of speakers choosing between two meanings which all speakers use, as is the case
of homonym pairs like bank as the land edge next to a river and bank as a financial
institution"). This "homonym pair" (river bank and savings bank) is frequently used by
Shields, but only as a discrete homonym, not the more interesting associated homonyms of
importance to Aristotle. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 172, at 11, 30, 44; see infra notes
218-27 (discussing core-dependent homonyms).
178. See infra notes 182-92,218-27.
179. See infra notes 193-217.
180. See infra notes 218-56.
181. See infra notes 260-84.
182. ARISTOTLE, CATEGORIES Ial-4 (Harold P. Cooke ed. & trans., Harvard
University 1996) (1938); see also supra note 176 (quoting Aristotle defining homonyms as
having a common name but with the account corresponding to the name differing while
synonyms have both name and account in common); SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 11
(describing Aristotle's account of synonymy as straightforward: "x and y are
synonymously F iff [if but only if] (i) both are F and (ii) the definitions corresponding to
'F' in 'x is F' and 'y is F' are the same"). What is initially unclear is whether there is a
middle ground, tertium quid, between homonyms and synonyms. Hart, see supra note 177,
and others do not recognize any middle ground. Hart, supra note 16, at 38 n.1. Perhaps
Hart and others have been influenced by Plato's emphasis on univocity, as expressed in his
Forms. See id. (stating view that much confusion comes from the belief that a word that is
not a "mere homonym" must possess "a single quality or set of qualities" in common);
infra note 247 (discussing Platonic Forms); infra notes 248-49 (discussing Aristotle's
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homonyms constitute an important category. The difficulty is that as
multivocal words, homonyms permit different definitions for the
same words, hence there is not a single, simple definition. The
complexity of defining homonyms becomes obvious when the
examples by which Aristotle illustrates homonymy are examined.
While such equivocity or ambiguity might at first appear problematic
or unhelpful, upon closer examination, we begin to understand how
homonymy provides a source of philosophical and philological
interest for Aristotle.18 If we return to our first example of a
homonym, "bank," we see that river bank and savings bank suggest
that homonyms are "discrete" 1 4 (i.e., non-overlapping) in their
definitions. Non-overlapping homonyms do not seem to offer much
for the philosopher; although presenting some possibility of
ambiguity, their distinct nature makes it unlikely that they will
confuse competent speakers.
Not all homonyms, however, are so discrete or obvious, as
illustrated by Aristotle's favorite example, "healthy," from which we
rejection of such univocity); cf Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 79, at 1644 (discussing
"platonic essentialism"); infra note 206 (discussing Aristotle's use of "essence").
183. See infra notes 248-49 (discussing centrality of homonymy to Aristotle's
Metaphysics). Words with subtly overlapping meaning interest Aristotle because of their
potential philosophical significance. See Shields, supra note 172, at 36. For example,
"justice" and "good" are prime examples of homonyms of philosophical import. Consider
Aristotle's discussion of "justice" as a homonym.
Justice and injustice seem to be spoken of in many ways, although this escapes
our notice because of the extreme closeness of their homonymy. These cases are
unlike cases where <the homonymy> is far apart (for here the difference in form
is great), as for example <it is clear> that the collar bones of animals and that
with which we open doors are homonymously called "keys."
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICs 1129a26-31 (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill
Co. 1962) (author's translation).
184. Shields defines discrete homonymy in the following terms: "x and y are
homonymously F iff [if but only if] (i) they have their name in common, but (ii) their
definitions have nothing in common and so do not overlap in any way." SHIELDS, supra
note 172, at 11. Discrete homonyms, also called "homonyms by chance" (apo tyches), are
accidents of language and thus easily identifiable. As a result, discrete homonyms are
frequently found in jokes. See also ARISTOTLE, TOPIcs, supra note 169, at 106a23-25
(noting that identical terms are sometimes obviously distinct, as "clear" when used of
sounds and colors); ARISTOTLE, SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 182b33 (E.S. Forster trans.,
Harvard University Press 1992) (1955) (discussing comparative difficulties in detecting
misleading arguments and noting that homonyms by chance are generally regarded as the
most obvious and silliest fallacies); supra note 177 (discussing the homonymous "bay"
noted by Justice Scalia).
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can begin to understand the actual complexity of homonyms.
Consider the following four sentences:18 5
(1) Socrates is healthy.
(2) Socrates's complexion is healthy.
(3) Socrates's regimen is healthy.
(4) Socrates's salary is healthy.
Without closer examination, the competent speaker might conclude
that "healthy" appears synonymously here: the predicates are all the
same word with the same account. 86 However, the predicate "is
healthy" differs in each of the four sentences, appearing more closely
related in the first three sentences. Its appearance in the fourth is
somewhat more distinct.Y If we examine the use of "healthy" in each
sentence, we see that they are far from being synonyms; they are
instead both distinct and irreducible: "Socrates is healthy" indicates a
state of well-being for Socrates; a "healthy" complexion indicates a
complexion that may reflect not only its own healthy state but
Socrates's healthy state; a "healthy" regimen contributes to and is
perhaps causally related to Socrates's generally healthy condition. In
short, we see that these terms are not synonyms (having both
common names and accounts), but homonyms: their name is
common but their accounts differ.
As Aristotle describes the term in the first three sentences, "the
term 'healthy' always relates to health (either as preserving it or as
producing it or as indicating it or as receptive of it)."'M In this
example, a "healthy complexion" is indicative of Socrates's state of
health; his "healthy regimen" is contributory to his state of health.
Because "healthy" as it is used in these sentences is not univocal
185. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 1003a34-b6 (Hugh Tredennick trans., Harvard
University Press 1996) (1933) (illustrating the homonynous nature of "being" by the term
"healthy" and noting its use in various senses always with reference to one central idea);
SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 37; infra note 220.
186. See supra notes 176, 182 (discussing synonymy).
187. The nonreducibility of the sentences is as follows: "Socrates is healthy" signifies
that Socrates is in a state of being free of disease and functioning well. "Socrates's
complexion is healthy" indicates that Socrates's outward appearance is reflective of that
state described by the sentence "Socrates is in a state of being free of disease and
functioning well." "Socrates's regimen is healthy" signifies that Socrates's regimen creates
circumstances that allow the sentence "Socrates is in a state of being free of disease and
functioning well." Therefore, as Shields explains, the accounts of the second two
sentences are not "reducible to the account of the predicate in the initial sentence nor
independent of it. Rather, they must appeal to it in order to be correct and complete; but
since they mean more than the predicate of [the first sentence] taken alone, such an appeal
is insufficient by itself." SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 38.
188. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, supra note 185, at 1003a34-b6.
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(synonymous),'89 but neither is it simply discrete (unrelated), we have
identified a word exhibiting more than ambiguity (mere
"equivocity"). 19° Because "healthy" in these associated examples is
neither reducible to nor independent of our core example, "Socrates
is healthy," we have identified a word displaying "genuine and
ineliminable multiplicity."' 9' In other words, homonyms such as
"healthy" differ from other, discrete (merely ambiguous) homonyms
(such as "bank"), demonstrating that some homonyms require a more
complex explanation: while not synonyms, these homonyms are
related and can be defined as common words with definitions that do
not completely overlap. 192 It is in their relationship, demonstrating an
overlap but an incomplete overlap, that homonyms offer their
greatest interest to the philosopher, logician, or rhetorician.
C. Definitions
Before examining the significance of and manner in which
homonyms are related, it will be helpful to discuss further Aristotle's
method and understanding of definition. How Aristotle understands
189. Aristotle urges careful examination of terms to avoid lack of clarity:
Homonymy often trails into the accounts themselves unnoticed, and for this
reason one needs to look into the accounts. For example should someone say
that what is indicative or productive of health is what has balance with respect to
health, one should not stand fast but must inquire further in what balance was
mentioned in each case, for example, if in the one case it means to be of a sort as
to produce health, but in the other it means to be of such a sort as to be able to
indicate what kind of state <health> is.
SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 18-19 (translating and quoting ARISTOTLE, TOPICS 107b6-
b12).
190. See infra notes 218-27 and accompanying text (discussing associated, core-
dependent homonymy).
191. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 38. Shields makes a distinction between "equivocity"
and "ambiguity" that is useful not only for his discussion of homonymy but may well help
in our statutory interpretation efforts. He uses "equivocity" to indicate a term with more
than one meaning "even when those meanings might be connected in various ways." Id at
44. He distinguishes "equivocity" from "ambiguity," which also denotes a term with more
than one meaning, but "where those meanings are not connected in any semantically
interesting ways;" in other words, they are merely equivocal. Id. at 44 n.1. For Hart's
similar distinction, see Hart, supra note 16, at 38 n.1 (describing "mere homonymy").
192. If they overlapped completely, then they would be synonyms, not homonyms. See
supra notes 176, 182. Shields defines comprehensive or associated homonymy thus: "x and
y are homonymously F iff [but only if] (i) they have their name in common, [and] (ii) their
definitions do not completely overlap." SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 11. The distinction
between comprehensive and discrete homonymy in Aristotle is critical, a distinction
carefully demonstrated by Shields. If homonymy is only discrete and not associated, then
there must be some tertium quid between homonyms and synonyms, viz., healthy. Id.
Since there is no tertium quid for Aristotle, he must subscribe to a view of comprehensive
homonymy. Md
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definitions helps us approach and answer difficult questions of
interpretation by forcing us to reconsider what we mean when we use
the word "definition." Once we reexamine the various levels at which
we use the term and what we mean by "definition," it becomes
apparent that, as competent speakers, by "definition" we mean
something that might more properly be termed "signification" (a
nominal account, that is, to denominate or name something signified
by a term), rather than a strict "definition."'193 This distinction is both
reinforced and made more obvious when we consider how to define
homonymous words. First, it will be helpful to consider Aristotle's
notion of definition alone before considering it within the context of
homonymy.
1. Identification of Genus in Complete Definition
Aristotle distinguishes not only between better (more complete)
and worse (less complete) "definitions" but also between levels of
definition. For Aristotle, a "better definition" must satisfy certain
minimum conditions. 4 More specifically, "it is necessary for the one
193. On signification as a nominal account, see ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS
93b29-37 (Hugh Tredennick ed. & trans., Harvard University Press 1997) (1960)
(describing different forms of definition including nominal accounts). See also infra notes
206-17 (discussing Aristotle's equivocal use of "definition" to indicate a nominal account
as well as an account stating the necessary conditions to describe "what it is to be
something"); ARISTOTLE, CATEGORIES, supra note 182, at 3b10-23 (discussing
signification in context of primary substances and qualities); ARISTOTLE, TOPICS, supra
note 169, at 122b16-17 (stating that differentia never indicate genus); ARISTOTLE,
CATEGORIES, supra note 182, at 16a16-18 (distinguishing between words' ability to signify
something and the reality of that which is signified by the word).
194. ARISTOTLE, TOPICS, supra note 169, at 141b25-27. A detailed discussion of
Aristotle's corpus that seeks to elaborate systems of classification by division (i.e.,
definition) is beyond the scope of this Article. For key discussion of classification in
Aristotle's corpus, see TOPICS, supra note 169, at I.v.10lb-102a (identifying four
predicates: definition, property, genus, and accident); CATEGORIES, supra note 182, at
1b25ff (listing ten divisions: 1) substance ("what it is"), 2) quantity ("how large"), 3)
quality ("what sort is it"), 4) relation ("related to what"), 5) where ("what place"), 6)
posture/position ("in what attitude"), 7) state or condition ("how circumstanced"), 8)
action ("doing what"), 9) passivity ("how passive"), and 10) affection ("what suffering")).
For a discussion of the importance of this system of classification for Aristotle's logical
works, see Smith, supra note 10, at 27-65. For a detailed commentary, see ARISTOTLE,
TopIcs, BOOKS I AND VIII (Robin Smith trans., 1997). See also SHIELDS, supra note 172,
at 21 (describing Aristotle's four types of being corresponding to four types of
predications: "some things are said-of and in other things; others are said-of and not in;
others are in but not said-of; and still others are neither said-of nor in"). Because these
predications are irreducibly distinct, no one can be identified with any other by reason of
Leibniz's law (identity of indiscernibles). See Christia Mercer & R.C. Sleigh, Metaphysics:
The Early Period to the Discourse on Metaphysics 67, 104-05 in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO LEiBNiz (Nicholas Jolley ed., 1995) (discussing development of identity
of indiscernibles throughout Leibniz's corpus). For Cunningham's statement that a
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defining well to define through genus and differentiae."'95  By
requiring identification of the genus,196 the class to which that being
defined belongs, in a true definition ("what it is to be something"),
Aristotle imposes a priority requirement because genus exists prior to
and is better known than the individual case.197
definition necessarily states all necessary and sufficient conditions, see Cunningham, supra
note 17, at 1590 (discussed supra note 139).
195. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 91 (discussing and translating ARISTOTLE, TOPICS
141b25-27). For purposes of this discussion, differentiae need not be precisely defined but
can be assumed to include characteristics of the item defined that are more specific to the
particular than the genus, of which it is necessarily a member. See supra note 194
(describing Aristotle's system of classification in Topics and Categories); see also SHIELDS,
supra note 172, at 250 n.70 (discussing various passages to decide if differentia includes
"quality").
Hart recognizes the limitations of this requirement, defining by genus and
differentia. Hart proposes instead defining by "paraphrase" as the method by which we
seek to define important legal terms. See Hart, supra note 16, at 41. In particular, Hart
sees the requirement for identifying the genus as problematic for anomalous cases. Hart's
method of paraphrase has the advantage of emphasizing the importance of context for
defining legal terms. His assertion, however, that one defines by stating the conditions
under which statements using the legal terms to be defined are true, provides no solution
for whether the necessary and sufficient conditions for tax-free "reorganizations" are met,
because it assumes the very issue in question. In other words, textualists and structuralists
would define those conditions quite differently, as the discussion has shown. See supra
notes 139-40 and accompanying text (discussing tax commentators' definition of
"reorganization"). For cases such as "reorganization" we must employ different methods,
such as those found in Aristotle.
196. Nothing can be categorized as belonging to more than one genus; therefore, no
two definitions of the same thing are possible. See ARISTOTLE, TOPICS, supra note 169, at
141b22-142a2 (describing true definition-stating the essence of that being defined
necessarily includes genus and differentia-and noting that because different things are
differently intelligible to different people "definitions" should be framed with that in
mind); id. at 144a11-15 (noting difference between definition by genus and by differentia);
id at 151a32-b2 (definitions including different contraries are not equally helpful); id at
151b15-17 (better definitions should replace less complete definitions as better laws
replace laws that are then abrogated). See also SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 91. Since
differentiae (individual characteristics) are required, things within the genus will thereby
be distinguishable.
197. Foregoing a detailed analysis, we can say that Aristotle notes the existence of
primary substances: those things that must exist or without which no other types of
"being" would exist. See ARISTOTLE, CATEGORIES, supra note 182, at xii, 14a27ff
(discussing four senses in which something may be called prior); JOHN J. CLEARY,
ARISTOTLE ON THE MANY SENSES OF PRIOR=T 65 (1988) (discussing priority of
"essence" to all other characteristics); SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 122-27 (discussing
Categories xii). Within intra-categorical instances, Aristotle seems to recognize primary
and secondary instances within categories (including substance and quantity). See
SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 21; see also ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, supra note
193, at 96b15-17 ("In making a systematic study of a whole class of objects, one should
first divide the genus into the primary [those which exhibit the properties of the genus in
their simplest form] infimae species.").
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2. Genus and the Law of Non-Contrariety
The importance of the genus serves not only to define "what it is
to be something;" the essential nature of classification by genus
illustrates one of the most fundamental logical principles: the law of
non-contrariety. Because either the assertion or the negation of a
predicate-but not both-can be true at one time, and because
nothing can be categorized as belonging to more than one genus, the
identification of the genus serves uniquely to identify that being
defined.'
3. Definitions Lacking Genus Incomplete
In fact, failure to identify-or correctly identify-the genus to
which something belongs is recognized as a fundamental error,
discrediting any proposed definition. A genuine definition requires
the statement of the substance of that being defined. More precisely,
for there to be a genuine definition, the genus must be correctly
stated because the genus indicates the fundamental substance of that
being defined. If one's opponent, therefore, has failed to specify the
genus or has specified the genus incorrectly, such a definition can be
shown to be false or insufficient.199
198. See ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYrICS, supra note 193, at 77a10-26.
The law that either the assertion or the negation of every predicate must be
true is used in demonstration by reductio ad impossible. It is not always applied
universally, but only so far as is sufficient, Le., in reference to the genus. By "in
reference to the genus," I mean, e.g., as regards the genus which is the subject of
the demonstration in question ....
Id.; cf id. at 76a42 (discussing first principles or truths relative to genus with mathematical
examples); see also infra notes 282-84 (discussing passage from Metaphysics and applying
law of non-contrariety within context of "reorganization").
199. On the priority of genus in any definition, see CLEARY, supra note 197, at 64-69
(discussing the importance Aristotle ascribes to priority and describing different ways
definitional priority allows rejection or refutation of a definition proposed by one's
opponent within the framework of a dialectical joust). Cleary argues that:
[i]n keeping with that purpose, [Aristotle] gives a number of ways in which one
might overthrow such proposed definitions: (i) One could show that the
description cannot be applied to the subject named; for instance, that the
proposed definition (horismos) of man does not apply to everything called a
man. (ii) One might also show that, although the definiendum has a genus, your
opponent has neglected to put it into any genus or has not placed it in the proper
genus (to oikeiou genos). This would destroy any proposed definition because the
definiendum must be placed in its proper genus with its appropriate differentiae if
there is to be a genuine definition, especially since the genus is generally taken to
indicate the substance of the definiendum (ten tou orizomenou ousian).
Furthermore, (iii) one could overturn a proposed definition by showing that the
description is not peculiar to the definiendum, given that this is at least a
necessary condition for a correct definition. Finally, (iv) even if your opponent
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4. Priority
Priority, although occupying an important place in Aristotle's
thought, does not immediately define itself. We must consider on
what levels of our own experience we might classify something as
"prior." For example, priority can be defined both as "what is better
known" to us through appearances, °° or "what is better known by
nature," because it corresponds to a more detailed analysis of the
nature of the object or belief in question. 2°1 These two notions of
priority need not, and frequently will not, correspond. We are,
nevertheless, able to coordinate our disparate notions of "priority"
through inquiry and analysis: as we move between the particular and
the general, 2 we strive to reconcile the contradictory results arising
has satisfied all the foregoing, he may still have failed to give a definition inasmuch
as he has not stated the essence (to ti en einai) of the definiendum.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
200. Aristotle assumes that perceptions or appearances-what is better known to us
immediately-must form the beginning of an inquiry. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 183, at 1145b2-7 (describing inquiry as beginning
from things observed and proceeding to eliminate or reconcile conflicting beliefs). It is
clear that for Aristotle appearances can include common beliefs, not simply physical
perceptions. See TERENCE IRWIN, ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PRINCIPLES 26-51 (1988)
(describing and contrasting Aristotle's methods of inquiry (empirical and dialectic) whose
aim is ultimately to arrive at first principles).
201. ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS 184a16-21, 188b32 (Philip H. Wickseed & Francis M.
Cornford trans., Harvard University Press 1980) (1929) (contrasting that known by senses
with that known by nature or intelligence); ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, supra
note 193, at 93b29-94a14 (contrasting types of definitions, i.e., a "definition" that
denominates from one that describes the essence of that named); see also SHIELDS, supra
note 172, at 93-97 (discussing what Aristotle means by "priority"). What is prior-better
known and clearer to us-is not necessarily what is naturally prior, that which is inherent
in what is being defined. In a sense, prior can mean "what is better known to us" because
we have immediate experience with the object in question; however, from a perspective of
a definition, what is prior must indicate the genus to which the thing defined belongs, since
what is naturally prior contains the essential elements that characterize what is being
defined. ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, supra, at 184a16-21; SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 93.
Nevertheless, Aristotle recognizes the necessity of starting, whether for purposes
of dialectic or scientific analysis, with what is known to us from appearance. By allowing
for development in our beliefs that may incorporate inaccuracies due to the nature of
perception, Aristotle ultimately must allow for different types of definitions, which reflect
varying modes of appearance. In other words, we form our initial perceptions through
properties that may or may not be accidental and thus correspond more or less well with
the essential nature of that which we perceive. Through investigation (empirical or
philosophical) we distinguish the essential from the accidental. "Accidental"
characteristics are thus to be distinguished from the "essential" because the accidental is
not inherent to that being investigated. See generally IRWIN, supra note 200, at 29-31
(discussing Aristotle's method of empirical and dialectic investigation).
202. Movement between the particular and general is also the hallmark of Aristotle's
work that inspired "practical reason" as a method of statutory interpretation. See supra
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from our two notions of "priority." The nature of the inquiry will
dictate how we proceed between particularity and generality, whether
empirically2°3 or dialectically,204 or some combination of both-to
resolve the ambiguities inherent in our understanding. Recognition
of the competing notions of priority is ultimately directed at clarifying
what is confused. Only by clarifying what is incomplete or confused
can we arrive at an understanding of what we seek to define.20 5
5. Levels of Definition
Because genus includes the essence ("what it is to be
something") 206 of that being defined, a statement of the genus is a
notes 70-71 (discussing practical reason as moving from particular to general in statutory
interpretation).
203. Empirical inquiry begins from the accumulation of particular appearances from
which it is then possible to extrapolate to generalizations. See ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 183, at 1145b2-7 (describing proper procedure in
inquiry as analysis of observed facts to determine most authoritative); ARISTOTLE, PRIOR
ANALYrICS 46a17-27 (Hugh Tredennick ed. & trans., Harvard University Press 1996)
(1938) (discussing relationship of particular knowledge and principles of each discipline).
Beginning from appearance, the empirical method runs the risk of crediting false
impressions. Through experience and inquiry we can compile a fuller and more accurate
picture, ultimately eliminating those impressions that are false. See IRWIN, supra note 200,
at 30-36 (outlining realist difficulties with Aristotle's assumption of induction-
generalization from particular to universals-but noting that through dialectic Aristotle
restores our confidence in some non-perceptual appearances); infra note 204 (describing
dialectic).
204. By "dialectic" Aristotle provides "a method from which we will be able to
syllogize from common beliefs (endoxa) about every topic proposed to us, and will say
nothing conflicting when we give an account ourselves." ARISTOTLE, TOPICS, supra note
169, at 100a18-21 (author's translation). In dialectic, in contrast to the empirical method,
we may begin with generalizations, with common beliefs. Indeed, we may be proceeding
from the universal to the particular, "since the inarticulate whole is better known to
perception." IRWIN, supra note 200, at 43 (translating TOPICS). Essentially, in dialectic
the goal is to move from the confused to the clear. Dialectic begins with a puzzle (when
there are equally cogent arguments reaching contradictory conclusions, e.g., when nine
Justices split 5-4 for two different "plain" meanings). See ARISTOTLE, TOPICS, supra note
169, at 145b17-20 (noting that we are at a loss when there are equally acceptable
judgments from which to choose).
205. See ARISTOTLE, TOPICS, supra note 169, at 159b7-30 (Aristotle describes use of
methods to arrive at what is generally accepted or rejected in argument); id. at 141b3-19
(illustrating with geometric terms mediation between what is better known (prior) by
appearance or better known (prior) by nature in order to make any subject intelligible);
see also JONATHAN LEAR, ARISTOTLE: THE DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND (1988) (giving
philosophical introduction to Aristotle and his conviction that human beings by their
nature desire to know and to understand).
206. ARISTOTLE, TOPICS, supra note 169, at 141b24-25 (author's translation). Shields
explains the critical nature of Aristotelian "essence." "Essences are for Aristotle those
properties which are not only necessary to a particular kind but are also fundamental in
the sense of explaining the existence of other properties invariably realized by members of
that kind (the propria)." SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 94. Aristotle's emphasis on
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necessary constituent of a "better" or complete definition.2W Essence
should not be understood to imply what we might understand by
"platonic essentialism," the assertion of a single unitary quality or
qualities. Essence for Aristotle is rather something closer to the core
element of "what it is to be something," or that without which
something ceases to be what the term signifies. Following Hart, we
might define essence then as that which must be included in order for
the term to be true.
Despite Aristotle's assertion that a "better definition" (a
complete definition, not simply a signification) necessarily includes
the essence of that being defined, Aristotle also recognizes that not all
"definitions" state essences.2 9 Competent speakers will concur with
"essence," indicating the nature of that being defined, must be distinguished from any
univocal "essence" we associate with the Platonic Forms. For a discussion of Aristotle's
departure from Plato and the development of his system of categorization and
classification as indicative of the importance of recognizing non-univocity, see infra notes
248-49 and accompanying text (discussing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1096a11-
17).
For a discussion of "platonic essentialism" as problematic for methods of statutory
interpretation, see Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 79, at 1644 (criticizing failure of
"platonic essentialism" as a line-drawing method). Weisbach attributes Oliver Wendell
Holmes with the misguided introduction of "platonic essentialism" as a method of
statutory interpretation. Id. at 1644 n.72 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,460 (1897)). However, an examination of Holmes reveals no
mention of Plato or essentialism, but instead highlights Holmes's thoughts on the
importance of first principles in jurisprudence-perhaps implicitly showing some
Aristotelian, rather than Platonic, influence. See Holmes, supra, at 476-77 (discussing
importance of theory); id. at 458 (aiming to set forth "some first principles").
207. The relationship between essence, genus, and priority in definition is explored in
detail by Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, TOPICS, supra note 169, at 141a24-b2.
First <one must examine> whether he has not rendered the definition through
what is prior and better known. Since ... we know not through what happens
<to be the case> but through what is prior and better known .... It is clear,
then, that the one not defining through what is prior and better known has not
defined.
I (author's translation); see also SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 91 (discussing and
translating passage).
208. Hart, supra note 16, at 55 (defining by stating conditions necessary for term to be
true). On levels of definition, see ARISTOTLE, POSTERIER ANALYrICS, supra note 193, at
93b-94a14.
209. ARISTOTLE, TOPICS, supra note 169, at 141a23-142a16 (author's translation).
Aristotle clearly recognized "better" and "worse" definitions, as well as the utility of
"worse" definitions, since the purpose for which a definition is offered will affect whether
a "worse" definition is in fact better for the particular purpose for which it is offered.
Failure to specify the essence, therefore, does not entail that a statement is a non-
definition; it simply results in a less complete definition. See SHIELDS, supra note 172, at
91-92 (discussing Aristotle's differentiation among varieties of definition).
On levels of definition, see ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYrICS, supra note 193,
at 93b29-94a14 (discussed supra note 201). According to Aristotle, incomplete definitions
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Aristotle's observation that "different definitions reflect different
degrees of scientific awareness." 10 A definition may "signify" (i.e.,
denominate or name) without necessarily describing the essential
characteristics of the thing signified. The distinction among types of
definition corresponds to Aristotle's "epistemic distinction" between
things "better known to us" and things "better known by nature,"
recalling our discussion of priority.21 Moreover, such a distinction
helps us understand the relationship that exists between a more
complete understanding of definitions and homonymy. Failing to
recognize the existence of associated homonyms results in the
fallacious assertion that varieties of definitions are synonymous-that
because definitions are not discrete homonyms, they must be
univocal.212
Levels of definition are a crucial point for homonymy. Because
not all definitions state essences, the fact that homonymy marks
definitional differences does not require that homonyms indicate
essential differences, as is the case for discrete homonyms. Similarly,
homonymy does not require univocity, as Aristotle has shown for
associated homonyms such as "healthy." By recognizing a tertium
quid, or middle ground, between synonymy and homonymy, Aristotle
demonstrates the importance of careful recognition of levels of
definition. These distinctions caution us that definition and
signification are far from "mono-dimensional."' 13
include those that state: (1) an account of what a name signifies (nominal account), (2) an
account of why something is, and (3) a deduction of what something is. Id. Because not
all definitions state essences, the fact that homonymy marks definitional differences does
not require that homonym pairs necessarily indicate essential differences. See SHIELDS,
supra note 172, at 95 (discussing types of definitions and their importance for homonymy).
210. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 95 (discussing and translating ARISTOTLE,
POSTERIOR ANALYTIcs 93b29-94a14). Aristotle uses "thunder" as his example by which
to illustrate levels of definition and scientific investigation. I follow Shields and use "dog"
as a more readily accessible example. See SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 93-95 (illustrating
with examples, including general familiarity with "dog," not necessarily indicating
familiarity with essence of dog as canine and carnivore). If general familiarity with
appearances entailed familiarity with essences, there would be no point in scientific
investigation.
211. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text (describing priority as "prior by
appearance" or "prior by nature").
212. The recognition of varying kinds of definitions is also important for another
reason-distinguishing between definitions that are the result of scientific or philosophical
investigation from those rendered by competent speakers. To assume that they are
coterminous would be an unwarranted assumption of univocity, something Aristotle warns
us against. See infra note 216 (discussing deep and shallow meaning).
213. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 96. Levels of definition alone caution against mono-
dimensional understanding. This conclusion is strengthened by Shields's demonstration
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Aristotle's description of different types of definition, arising in
part as a function of the particular inquiry (whether, for example, it is
conducted by a physicist or as part of dialectic exercise),214 suggests
that the process of definition is more than "mere linguistic
analysis." '15 This conclusion corresponds well with our understanding
that signification occurs at multiple levels.2 16 Because competent
speakers share "shallow meanings," there is no disagreement about
examples of discrete (non-overlapping) homonymy (e.g., bank in the
case of "river bank" and "savings bank;" or crane (a bird or a
machine)). Hence, we can readily converse as competent speakers of
the language. However, the more closely associated are the
homonyms (e.g., "healthy," "good," and "justice"), the more
investigation and analysis is required to determine at what level
discourse is occurring.217 Such investigation will be rewarded because
we will avoid error in these more philosophically interesting cases.
Recognizing these as homonyms will prevent a mistaken assumption
that we are dealing with a univocal account. If we fail to recognize
that for Aristotle, homonymy is more than semantic. Homonymy indicates difference in
things, not merely difference in signification. Id.
214. See ARIsTOUiE, ON THE SOUL 403a29-b3 (W.S. Hett trans., Harvard University
Press 1964) (1936) (describing the different definitions provided by physicist and
dialectician). Explicit reference to physical properties will be necessary for a physicist
since "heat" could not be explained merely by reference to linguistic meaning, while the
philosopher may offer definitions uninformed by physical properties. SHIELDS, supra note
172, at 99.
215. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 99. This is not to say that semantic differences are
irrelevant; it is simply to say that recourse only to a dictionary or to linguistic analysis may
be insufficient to solve a problem that requires a conceptual analysis. See id at 98 & n.32
(discussing distinction between concepts and properties and reasoning that Aristotle
appears to require reference to physical properties because "it would be foolish to believe
that one could settle matters of empirically discernible identities by the meanings of terms
as they have developed in natural language").
216. Shields describes meaning as shallow and deep. Id. at 100. Shallow meaning
corresponds to meaning that is shared by competent speakers of a language while deep
meaning requires some level of investigation (conceptual or empirical) that permits
discovery of the more complete definition, the one containing the essence. Id. at 99-100
(illustrating shallow and deep meaning by describing Euthyphro's "pontification" on the
subject of piety not as inept, that is, one that could not be understood by competent
speakers, but as shallow, demonstrating no real understanding of the true nature of
"piety").
217. Id at 101 (explaining that investigation moves from shallow meanings (things as
they appear to us) to deep meanings (things as signified by nature)). Competent speakers
who share shallow meanings can disagree about interesting homonyms, cases that require
analysis. For the type of investigation and analysis required, see ARISTOTLE,
METAPHYSICS, supra note 185, at 1004bl-4 (ascribing to the philosopher the function of
giving account of both "concepts and of substance" (author's translation)).
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non-univocity, there will be a resulting lack of clarity in either our
argumentation or analysis of our opponent's argument.
D. Core-Dependent Homonymy
Aristotle's identification and analysis of homonymy,
distinguishing as it does between distinct and associated homonyms, is
critically important because it establishes far more than mere non-
univocity; it also establishes a positive mechanism by which we can
understand associated homonyms and therefore avoid erroneous
assumptions of univocity.218  By examining the relationship of
associated homonyms, Aristotle demonstrates that this association is
meaningful because the associated homonyms are related around a
"core. ' 'z 9 Returning to the earlier example of "healthy," we can
understand that this associated homonym is more appropriately
called core-dependent, because "its various occurrences coalesce
around a core notion." 20  As Aristotle noted in the previous
218. Aristotle demonstrates that the association shared by these homonyms is not a
mere undifferentiated association but is association around a "core," which is an essential
characteristic. Hence, associated homonymy is more properly termed core-dependent
homonymy. See infra notes 219-27 and accompanying text. If Aristotle only established
non-univocity, the result would largely be negative, a precursor to deconstructionism that
questions our ability to arrive at any one known meaning. It is precisely because Aristotle
provides a positive methodology, a way to find order in multiplicity that may have special
value for hard cases in statutory interpretation.
219. "Core-dependent" is Shields's term. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 104. Previously,
these cases of associated homonyms were referred to as examples of "focal meaning"
based on Aristotle's statement in the Metaphysics that "we shall discover other things said
in ways similar to these-so too is being said in many ways, but always relative to some
one source (pros mian archen)"). ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, supra note 185, at
1003a34-b6.
G.E.L. Owen first discussed this passage using the phrase "focal meaning." See
Owen, supra note 172 at 169. In contrast, Irwin proposed "focal connection" to emphasize
that the association was not only semantic or linguistic. Irwin, Homonymy, supra note
172, at 523-44. Irwin explained his change to "focal connection" from Owen's "focal
meaning" as an effort to avoid the "misleading suggestion that Aristotle means to indicate
a relation between senses of a word.., rather than between the things the word applies to."
Id. at 531 n.12 (emphasis added); see also SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 12 n.7 (describing
debate concern applicability of homonymy to word (semantic) meaning in contrast to
things signified by homonymous words). A word has focal meaning if it is used in several
ways, one of which is primary and the others derivative, the accounts of the derivative way
containing the accounts of the primary. Jonathan Barnes, Metaphysics, in COMPANION,
supra note 10, at 66,76.
220. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 105. Using the homonym "healthy," Aristotle
illustrates the notion of core-dependence as follows:
Just as everything which is healthy is related to health (pros hugieian), some by
preserving health, some by producing health, others by being indicative of health,
and others by being receptive of health; and as the medical is relative to the
medical craft (pros iatriken), for some things are called medical because they
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examples, "healthy" is always related in some manner to "health."
Healthy regimens and healthy complexions necessarily make
reference to Socrates's general state of health, but in a way that is not
reducible to that simple statement describing Socrates's general state
of well-being. As Shields describes it, a and b are homonymously F if
and only if their accounts refer asymmetrically22 to each other or
there is some c to which the accounts "a is F" and "b is F" necessarily
makes reference.m
In other words, in core-dependent homonyms, there exists a base
referentm to which each of the homonyms displays a significant form
possess the medical craft, others because they are well-constituted relative to it,
and others by being the function of the medical art-and we shall also discover
other things said in ways similar to these-so too is being said in many ways, but
always relative to some one source (pros mian archen).
Iat (translating ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 1003a34-b6); see also supra notes 185, 188 and
accompanying text (discussing "healthy" as a homonym, not a synonym).
221. The asymmetry of the relationship permits relationships to operate in any or
multiple directions without a prescribed order. This asymmetricality is not at first obvious.
If "healthy complexion" and "healthy regimen" make reference to "healthy person," it is
not at first obvious why "healthy person" can not make reference to "healthy complexion"
or "healthy regimen" to create a symmetrical relationship. Aristotle's focus on priority of
relationship supplies the reason for the asymmetricality; the complexion and regimen exist
only by reference to the individual (Socrates) to whose healthy state the associated uses
necessarily make reference. The references are not, however, reducible because they state
more than the specific statement to which they refer. See ARISTOTLE, EUDEMIAN
ETHICS 1236a7-33 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard University Press 1996) (1952) (Aristotle
illustrates the homonymous nature of "good" and "friendship" and notes that not all are
primarily so called). "The primary is that of which the definition is implicit in the
definition of all .... " Id.; see also SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 107 ("[A] core case of being
F should be core minimally in the sense that non-core cases must make reference to the
core case in their account, while the core case need not make reference to the non-core
cases in its account."). See M.T. LARKIN, LANGUAGE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ARISTOTLE 69 (1971) ("In other words, no specific relation or set of specific relations
between two things is necessary for one to be named by reference to the other.").
222. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 104; see infra note 271 and accompanying text
(discussing ARISTOTLE, TOPICS 122b and indicating that differentiae are never genus).
223. See SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 104 (describing that where c is the base referent
to which a and b necessarily make reference in "a is F" and "b is F"). Shields defines core-
dependent homonymy in a way that identifies the core as the base referent: "a and b are
homonymously F in a core-dependent way iff [if and only if]: (i) a is F; (ii) b is F; and (iiib)
there is some c such that the accounts of F-ness in 'a is F' and 'b is F' necessarily make
reference to the account of F-ness in 'c is F' in an asymmetrical way." Id.; see LARKIN,
supra note 221, at 100 ("The criterion of pros hen [focal] equivocals is that the primary
meaning is implicit in the definition of all secondary meanings because there is some
relation between the things named."). Larkin notes that the relations between the
primary and secondary meanings differ but "in virtue of any relation the primary
definition or meaning is included in the definition or meaning of the thing to which the
name is secondarily imposed." Id. at 100-01.
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of association.224 The association is also open-ended (allowing for
inclusion of new examples) and asymmetrical.22 Yet the association
does not exist at so broad a level as to render the connection
meaningless. 6  This allows us to recognize the fourth example,
"Socrates's salary is healthy," as a non-core example.2 7  The
mechanisms by which we can identify and differentiate among
associated homonyms must now be considered.
E. Methods for Identifying and Classifying Homonyms
Aristotle's functional analysis and principles of causation
provide mechanisms by which we can analyze the determinate but
224. The association is significant because the relationship offers some insight into
words or concepts that are conceptually interesting and informed by these associated
appearances. Discrete homonyms offer nothing similarly interesting. See SHIELDS, supra
note 172, at 106 n.4 (discussing philosophers', including Aquinas, attempt to understand
and explicate association); id. at 73-74 (discussing Wittgenstein's "doctrine of family
resemblance" and its similarity but ultimately distinguishing it from Aristotelian
association because the Wittgensteinean results are "often purely negative"); see infra
notes 276-77 and accompanying text (proposing that core-dependent homonymy, as
described in (iiib), applies in the case of "reorganizations"; there is a core to which all the
variant forms refer by nature of their being "reorganizations").
225. If open-ended, the possibility for new instances (both core and non-core) exists.
An example of a non-core relationship would be "healthy salary." See infra note 227.
Aristotle's method is important because identification around a core prevents profligacy
of association that would make the association less valuable for our ability to understand.
Nevertheless, Aristotle's method is open-ended to allow for new instances, without which
such a method would be less useful. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 110 (explicating
adequacy constraints (open-endedness, non-profligacy and asymmetry) of Aristotle's
understanding of core-dependent homonymy).
226. See SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 105-08 (discussing previous example ("healthy
regimen," "healthy complexion," and "healthy salary")). To include the last example
(healthy salary) among other core examples (healthy regimen, healthy complexion-both
indicative of and contributory to Socrates's health-state of well-being) would be to allow
a trivial, or profligate (Shields's term), relationship to suffice for the association.
However, as a non-core homonym, it is still understandable. Aristotle's methodology for
establishing core-dependence must be determinate yet open-ended. See id. at 100. If it is
not determinate, then we lack the positive methodology that does more than simply
establish non-univocity; if it is not open-ended, it lacks future utility.
227. The fourth example is not necessarily a core-dependent homonym because of an
absence of an obvious causal relationship to Socrates's healthy state. If by "healthy
salary" we mean that Socrates's salary is sufficient to keep him healthy by means of
adequate housing, food and medical care, then we might consider it a core example
efficiently related to his health. If, however, by "healthy salary" we mean a salary relative
to others', that is significantly higher than average, but unrelated to Socrates's state of
well-being, as the phrase would commonly be understood, then it is an example of a non-
core homonym. See infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text (discussing causal
relationships as means of identifying core examples).
228. Through the principles of causation, Aristotle answers the question "why."
ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, supra note 201, at 198a14 (describing four causes as ways to
understand "what it is" and "why it is" (author's translation)). Aristotle thinks that
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open-ended and asymmetrical relationship that exists between
homonyms and the core around which they are associated.
"Functional determination"229 is the means by which Aristotle
identifies both kind membership and individuation. Indeed, Aristotle
views function as critically important for any thing's identity. This
can be illustrated by examining a well-known passage from his
Politics. Following his famous statement in which he identifies man
as a "political animal,"" Aristotle elaborates on the relationship of
function and the true nature of that being identified:
Thus also the city-state is prior in nature to the household
and to each of us individually. For the whole must
necessarily be prior to the part; since when the whole body is
destroyed, foot or hand will not exist except in an equivocal
[homonymous] sense, like the sense in which one speaks of a
hand sculptured in stone as a hand ... all things are defined
by their function and capacity, so that when they are no
longer such as to perform their function they must not be
said to be the same things, but to bear their names in an
equivocal [homonymous] sense.231
identification of all four causes is the essential task of the natural philosopher, someone
who is trying to understand and explicate. Id. at 198a22-25; see also SHIELDS, supra note
172, at 99 (discussing passages in which Aristotle distinguishes the differing functions of
one investigating).
229. See SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 33 (defining functional determination for
Aristotle as: "An individual x will belong to a kind or class F iff [if and only if]: x can
perform the function of that kind or class"). Functional determinism specifies both
necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in kind F such that x has the function
definitive of being F. See idU "This reflects Aristotle's contentions that 'if something can
perform its function, it truly is <an F>' (the sufficiency claim) and that 'when something
cannot <perform that function> it is homonymously <F>' (the necessity claim)." IM; see
infra notes 273-81 and accompanying text (discussing genus of tax-deferred
reorganizations as "non-sales," functioning to permit exceptions to realization and
recognition requirements where necessitated by business purpose) so that various forms
permitted all serve essentially the same function). If the formal reorganization (that is,
Mrs. Gregory's transaction), however, does not serve the functional requirements of the
genus ("not-sale"), then we would have a spurious example, similar to the ceremonial axe,
to use one of Aristotle's examples.
230. ARISToTLE, POLITICS, supra note 1, at 1253a7-8.
231. Id. Aristotle's definition by function might be challenged because his general
teleological view towards the natural world has been subject to challenge. See, e.g.,
ACKERILL, supra note 10, at 41-45 (describing Aristotle's teleology, including questions
regarding its general validity). To challenge the purposive function of law generally is to
raise difficult questions about the purposive nature of human activity beyond the level of
the concerns raised regarding purposive statutory interpretation. See supra notes 42, 46
(discussing views of formalism); supra note 153 (discussing purposive interpretation within
tax context). Because of the level of generality at which purposive statutory interpretation
has operated, its legitimacy as a method has been challenged. See supra notes 35-38
(discussing theoretical difficulties with purposivism and intentionalism). In contrast, to
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Functional determination thus allows not only for identification
but also differentiation between true and spurious examples of class
membership. Indeed, ability to perform the function associated with
that being defined is a condition precedent for kind membership. For
example, if an axe were to decay to the point where it could no longer
function as an axe capable of cutting, then it no longer is an axe,
"except homonymously." 2 Similarly, a representation of an axe or
an eye is only called so homonymously.133 An eye that can no longer
see is only homonymously an "eye" because part of the true nature of
an eye is its function.' While linguistic practice may disincline us
from recognizing homonymy in these cases,1 5 there are philosophical
reasons inherent in the nature of definitions that warrant the
recognition of functionally determined classes.z 6 Once homonyms
are recognized as such, testing for true or spurious class membership
by identifying the correct genus through a functional analysis may be
helpful. 7
As our earlier examination of "healthy" demonstrates,"8
homonymy can also be understood by reference to Aristotle's
examine identified homonyms with regard to their functional, core characteristics should
not raise the same level of concerns as the less bounded, purposive approach that seeks
general legislative purpose in a much more attenuated relationship with the text than the
method proposed in this Article.
232. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 29 (translating ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA 412bl0-15).
233. Id at 35; see also id at 31-35 (discussing passages where Aristotle describes no
longer functional body parts as only homonymously so). Thus Aristotle states:
All things are defined by their function: for <in those cases where> things are
able to perform their function, each thing truly is <F>, e.g. an eye, when it can
see. But when something cannot <perform that function> it is homonymously
<F>, like a dead eye or one made of stone, just as a wooden saw is no more a saw
than one in a picture. The same, then, <holds true> of flesh.
Id. at 33 (translating ARISTOTLE, METEOROLGY 390a10-15).
234. See id; ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 1, at 1253b19-25; see also SHIELDS,
supra note 172, at 31-35 (analyzing discourse, non-accidental homonymy, and functional
determinism).
235. Language relies freely on ellipsis because of the breadth of common
understanding shared by competent speakers. As a result, linguistic practice disinclines us
from distinguishing the homonymous nature of words when we use "man" to describe
Socrates the living individual and "man" to describe a representation, for example, a
painting or sculpture, of an individual. This corresponds in some ways to the distinction
between shallow and deep meanings and is related to the degree of scientific awareness.
See supra notes 216-17.
236. See SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 31-35 (discussing the important relationship
between homonymy and functional determination).
237. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
genus identification); see also infra notes 271-76 (identifying the function of the genus of
tax-deferred reorganizations).
238. See supra notes 185-91.
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theories of causation. The four identified causal relationships help to
explain "why." 9  We can see that the various examples2 40 of
"healthy" stand in one (or more) of the four causal (efficient,
material, final, formal)24' relationships to the core example, "Socrates
is healthy." "Healthy regimen," for example, is efficiently related to
Socrates's health.2 42 The lack of any one prescribed relationship, and
thus the asymmetricality of the relationship, allows for multiple causal
relationships at any one time.243  Aristotle's recognition that
homonyms are not only associated but related to a core in an
asymmetrical relationship is also crucial for our ability to understand
the philosophically interesting homonyms that Aristotle identifies.
Although core instances need not make reference to derived
instances, all derived instances necessarily make reference to the core
239. ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, supra note 201, at 194b24-195a4, 198a14-21. The four
causes (aitia) are: (1) material (such as the bronze of a statue), (2) formal (the form or
characteristics of the generic type), (3) efficient (agent), and (4) final (aim). Cf. infra note
243 (discussing ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS 95a3-8 (stating that there are many causes of the
same thing)).
240. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text (describing "healthy regimen,"
"healthy complexion").
241. Aristotle's four causes may best be explained by example. Of a house, the bricks
and mortar are its material cause; its formal cause the design or arrangement of its
constituent parts; its efficient cause the builder; and its final cause the purpose for which it
is built-to provide a structure for habitation. Monique Canto-Sperber, Quatrieme Partie:
Aristotle, in PHILOSOPHIE GRECQUE 337 (Monique Canto-Sperber et al. eds., 1997). As
this example shows, Aristotle seeks to describe through his four causes the four ways in
which the question "why" can be answered about that which we know: "the question of
fact, the question of reason or cause, the question of existence, and the question of
essence." ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, supra note 193, at 89b23-27.
For an interesting discussion of the "formal" relationship of the law to its content,
see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 583 (1993); Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 42 at 949, 953-57.
242. See SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 110-22 (discussing various examples of four
causal relationships). It is not necessary that homonyms exhibit only one of the four
causal relationships or that there be a predetermined, uni-directional relationship between
the asymmetrical examples and the core around which they are associated. For example,
Socrates's health and healthy regimen stand in an efficient causal relationship. It is not
necessary that the regimen alone is sufficient to produce Socrates's healthy. There is a
similar causal relationship between the healthy complexion that is reflective of Socrates's
health and healthy regimen. Id. at 113-14.
243. Although identifying four causes, Aristotle recognizes the relationship of the
other three within "efficient cause." ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, supra note 201, at 195a3-8
(author's translation) (noting that the four causes jointly produce one effect); see also
IRWIN, supra note 200, at 105 (discussing four causal structure and arguing that all-
material, formal, and final-causation are types of efficient causation).
643
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instance.244 As a result, there is among core-dependent homonyms
definitional asymmetry that assumes priority of the core instance 45
Aristotle provides a means by which he establishes non-univocity
and thereby distinguishes in an important way his philosophy from his
predecessor's through the identification of homonyms, especially
philosophically interesting ones such as "healthy," "good," and
"justice." 46 Plato's "Forms '247 assume participation by anything that
is described as "good" in the Form of the "Good." As a result, the
Forms are based on unwarranted assumptions of univocity, in
Aristotle's view," because these are homonyms associated around a
244. See supra notes 219-23 (describing the relationship of core and genus). But see
infra note 271 (distinguishing the relationship of differentiae to genus).
245. In the Categories, Aristotle identifies different types of priority, including (1)
temporal, (2) "priority as regards implications of existence," (3) priority in order (e.g., in
presentation), and (4) priority in value (e.g., family over friends). ARISTOTLE,
CATEGORIES, supra note 182, at 14a26-b8 (author's translation); see SHIELDS, supra note
172, at 122-26. Aristotle adds a fifth type of priority in the Categories: "reasonably prior
by nature" to describe the relationship whereby "two things which reciprocate as regards
implication of existence, one may nevertheless 'in some way be the cause of the existence
of the other.' " ARISTOTLE, CATEGORIES, supra note 182, at 14b12-13; see also SHIELDS,
supra note 172, at 123 (discussing Aristotle's addition of a fifth type of priority in
Categories). For example, Socrates's being white and the true proposition that Socrates is
white reciprocate: Socrates being white is true because Socrates is white; the truth of the
proposition ("Socrates is white") is not responsible for Socrates's being white. See id.
246. For an example of assumptions of univocity, see supra note 177 (discussing Hart).
247. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 183, at 1096a11-17
(translating and discussing Aristotle's views of Plato's Forms). Aristotle describes the
Forms thus:
For the Good is most truly defined in terms of the Form of the Good (since all
other goods are good <only> in terms of participating in it or resembling it), and
it is the first of the goods: for if that in which things participate were to be
destroyed, the things participating in the Form would also be destroyed, viz., the
things which derive their definition from their participation in the Form. Now,
this is the relation existing between the first and the latter <members of a series>.
Hence the Good itself is the Form of the Good, for it exists separate from the
things which participate in it just as the other Forms do.
Id- at 10 n.18 (translating ARISTOTLE, EUDEMIAN ETHICS 1217b2-16 and discussing
Aristotle's views of Plato's Forms).
The standard philosophy dictionary describes Platonic Forms thus:
The unchanged and incorporeal Form is the sort of object that is presupposed by
Socratic inquiry; what every pious act has in common with every other is that it
bears a certain relationship--called 'participation'--to one and the same thing,
the Form of Piety. In this sense, what makes a pious act pious and a pair of equal
sticks equal are the Forms Piety and Equality.
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 710 (2ded. 1999).
248. Much of Aristotle's work can be seen as a response to Plato and the Platonic
Forms and we can find specific statements to that effect. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS, supra note 183, at 1096a11-17 ("But perhaps we had better examine the universal
good and face the problem of its meaning, although such an inquiry is repugnant, since
those who have introduced the doctrine of Forms are dear to us."); see also SHIELDS,
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core, not synonyms. Recognition of Aristotle's crucial contribution,
that non-univocity does not preclude significant association but
significant association does not require univocity, is essential if we are
to understand what his distinctions allow us to achieve in other areas.
Moreover, it requires that we distinguish his contribution and not
erroneously conflate his theories with Plato's. Equally important to
the recognition of Aristotle's contribution by identifying non-
univocity is his identification of core-dependent homonymy through
which he provides a positive mechanism for scientific treatment of
core philosophical ideas.249 Hence the appeal of homonymy is
obvious, not only for Aristotle but for us, providing as it does a
method, based on definitional priority and causal relationships, for
careful analysis of texts that require analysis beyond that of the
competent speaker.
F. Identification of Homonyms-Signification
If equivocity or ambiguity left unclarified inhibits the possibility
of meaningful discourse, then homonymy, recognized and accounted
for through its association around a core, may actually prove useful.
Words that are equivocal but associated because they relate to a core
are useful by highlighting their similarity marked by difference. This
association marked by difference helps us understand language
complexity and refine our understanding of both words and entities.
Because Aristotle's methodology-avoiding unwarranted
assumptions of univocity while defining a mechanism whereby
associated terms can be better understood as associated around a
supra note 172, at 20-21 (noting much of the Categories as anti-Platonic and explaining
Aristotle's unexplained introduction of homonymy as consistent with Aristotle's goal of
introducing both "inter- and intra-categorial non-univocity").
249. The importance of Aristotle's achievement for philosophy is significant. Owens,
supra note 172, at 189 ("The concept of a word as having many senses pointing in many
ways to a central sense is a major philosophical achievement; but its scope and power are
to be understood by use and not by definition."); see also SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 70-
72 (discussing Aristotle's criteria for "scientific" investigation). Because Aristotle
maintains that a "science" requires a unified subject matter (i.e., a class of entities
realizing a "single, unified universal"), and that there is a single unified subject only if
there is an univocal account, it would seem that denying univocity to "goodness,"
"justice," etc. would preclude the possibility of scientific inquiry. Id- The development of
comprehensive, or core-dependent, homonymy, rather than making scientific inquiry
impossible, provides the very mechanism for scientific study unhampered by unwarranted
assumptions of univocity.
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core-is appealing, then further consideration of how to identify
homonyms will be helpful." °
Although it is often easy to identify discrete homonyms,21 those
providing interesting cases, because they are associated, will often
escape our attention. The question then becomes how to identify
such cases, and in particular how to define them while not re-asserting
some form of univocity. Aristotle provides a variety of indicators that
include difference in signification, tests for forms and existence of
contrariety,22 and tests based on differentiae of genera or species.23
One important indicator of homonymy is difference in
signification.254 If the predicates signified by a name are not the same
250. It should be noted that this method is not a mechanical one, but rather a series of
tests that increase the determinate nature of our understanding of language complexity.
As such it provides a more principled method of analysis than other methods of statutory
interpretation because it operates within fairly bounded constraints based on the text,
word and logic-based interpretive rules.
251. See SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 29 & n.31 (discussing Aristotle's description of
discrete homonyms with terms like "obvious" or "silly" and noting that discrete
homonyms are mistaken only by the dim-witted).
252. See supra note 198 (discussing law of non-contrariety as it relates to identification
of genus).
253. Aristotle discusses at least twelve indicators of non-univocity and homonymy in
Topics. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 51-53. The indicators include: (i) tests for forms of
contrariety (for example, "sharp" applied to music is "flat"; applied to "intelligent" is
"dull") (106a9-21); (ii) tests for the existence of contraries in variant uses (love (signifying
emotion) and hate (physical love lacks contrary)) (106a24-35); (iii) test for intermediates
(black and white issues contrast with colors black and white as opposites with host of
intermediates) (106a35-b12); (iv) difference in contradictory opposites (for example,
failing to perceive contrasted on the one hand by sensing and distinguished on the other
from grasping the point) (106b14-20); (v) test based on inflections and paronomy
(judicious as applied to judge or to billiard player is homonymous) (106b29-107al); (vi)
signification ("clear" applied to sheets of glass signifies transparency while "clear" applied
to consciences signifies "free of guilt") (107a3-18); (vii) sameness of genus (cranes can
refer to different genera, specifying both animals and machines) (107a3-18); (viii) test
based on definition and abstraction (bright for girl signifies "intelligent" while bright for
light signifies "shining"; if abstracted indicates that "bright" is not univocal) (107a36-b5);
(ix) comparability (for example, while knives and professors are both sharp, they are not
comparable since one can not be sharper than the other) (107b13-18); (x) a test based on
the differentiae of genera which are not subordinate or superordinate to one another
("flat" differentiates one kind of sound from another and also one kind of terrain from
one another; since sounds and terrains are not genera related by subordination or
superordination, "flat" is non-univocal) (107b19-26); (xi) test based on distinctness of
differentia (flowing symphonies versus flowing rivers do not describe same differentia)
(107b26-31); (xii) test to see if one term is used as differentia on the one hand and as a
species on the other demonstrates non-univocity since species is never also a differentia)
(107b32-6). See id at 51-53 (discussing these passages and noting that any one of the tests
is sufficient for establishing homonymy).
254. See supra note 209 (discussing signification within context of definitions). On the
importance of "signification" (signifying that for Aristotle homonyms are a semantic
phenomenon and a metaphysical principle), see SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 54-56.
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in all cases (i.e., if a common word signifies different accounts) this
alone is sufficient to establish homonymy for Aristotle. 5 Because
non-univocity represents more than a semantic distinction for
Aristotle, difference in signification represents more than mere
ambiguity; difference in signification represents homonymous
entities. Hence the importance of defining well, in order to
comprehend the nature of the homonyms identified. Because a true
definition must contain both the genus and differentiae of that being
defined, difference in signification may indicate not only that the
words are homonymous but also that the account of each is
incomplete as a definition. Without a complete definition, specifying
the genera of the homonyms in question, it will not be possible to
understand or speak clearly. Unrecognized homonyms, including
homonyms that demonstrate absence of either the genus or the
essence specified in the core will, therefore, result not only in lack of
precise communication among speakers but in the possibility of
speakers mistaking a spurious for a real example.z 6
Similarly through the law of non-contrariety, stating that no
predicate can be asserted and denied simultaneously, 7 Aristotle has
shown that at its most elemental application, something cannot be
classified as belonging to two genera simultaneously. Genus
represents the core characteristic of that being identified. Because of
the relationship of the genus to the correct identification of that being
defined, difference in genus will serve as an important indicator of
homonymyY1 If homonymous words indicate that their contraries
255. As Shields explains, if "F" in "a is F" and "b is F" signify different things, than "F-
ness" is homonymous. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 54-55. That difference in signification
is sufficient to establish homonymy for Aristotle is clear: "It is necessary also to consider
the types of predicates <signified> by the name, <to determine> whether it is the same in
all cases. For if it is not the same, it is clear that what is said is homonymous." SHIELDS,
supra note 172, at 54 (discussing and translating ARISTOTLE, TOPICS 107a3-12).
256. SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 55 ("When an F has lost what is definitive of being an
F, it is no longer an F as such."). The significance of homonymy and definitional priority is
critical for "reorganizations." See infra notes 263-71 and accompanying text (explaining
that reorganization as defined in statute clearly homonymous and refers to genus of "non-
sale"). Reorganizations that meet differentia of one of the forms without also making
reference to non-sale characteristics of genus (including business purpose and continuity
of interest) are only homonymously reorganizations and thus spurious ones.
257. See supra note 198.
258. See supra note 253 (listing tests i, ii, iv, vii, and x as set forth in the Topics: (i) tests
for forms of contrariety (for example, "sharp" applied to music is "flat"; applied to
"intelligent" is "dull") (106a9-21); (ii) tests for the existence of contraries in variant uses
(love (signifying emotion) and hate (physical love lacks contrary)) (106a24-35); (iv)
difference in contradictory opposites (for example, failing to perceive contrasted on the
one hand by sensing and distinguished on the other from grasping the point) (106b14-20);
(vii) sameness of genus (cranes can refer to different genera, specifying both animals and
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belong to different genera, then the homonyms too will not belong to
the same genus 5 9 The conjunction of the rule of non-contrariety
with the genus requirement for a more complete definition results in
a helpful mechanism for homonymy recognition and understanding.
By combining Aristotle's theories of homonymy (common words
signifying different predicates), definition (levels of definitions with
"better," more complete, definitions specifying genus), logical
principles regarding genus classification and the law of non-
contrariety, and priority (what is known by nature is prior; associated
homonyms refer to a core that is prior), we have discovered a method
for approaching interesting problems of statutory interpretation that
allows for greater clarity in the use and understanding of language.
With these principles in mind, we can now return to a consideration
of "reorganization."
IV. EXAMPLE OF HOMONYMY: "REORGANIZATION"
Looking again at the statutory provision at issue in Gregory, we
can consider the utility of Aristotelian analysis. The applicable
statutory provision states:
The term "reorganization" means (A) a merger or
consolidation (including the acquisition by one corporation
of at least a majority of the voting stock and at least a
majority of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock of another corporation, or substantially all the
properties of another corporation), or (B) a transfer by a
corporation of all or part of its assets to another corporation
if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its
stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to
which the assets are transferred, or (C) a recapitalization, or
(D) a mere change in identity, form, or place of
organization, however effected.2'
Textualists who rely on the plain meaning of the statutory text
have interpreted this passage to indicate that "reorganization" as
stated in each one of these alternative forms individually contains all
machines) (107a3-18); (x) a test based on the differentiae of genera which are not
subordinate or superordinate to one another ("flat" differentiates one kind of sound from
another and also one kind of terrain from one another; since sounds and terrains are not
genera related by subordination or superordination, "flat" is non-univocal) (107b19-26).
259. See supra note 196 (discussing the impossibility of something belonging to two
genera at the same time).
260. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 112(g), 45 Stat. 791, 818
(1928); see supra notes 76-102 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory
development and its interpretation by the courts in Gregory).
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conditions both necessary and sufficient to satisfy the requirements
for tax-deferral. Thus, for a textualist, a "reorganization" occurring
in the form of a "merger" or "a transfer of assets to another
corporation" satisfies completely all the necessary and sufficient
requirements for the benefits of tax-deferral.U 1 Our examination of
Aristotle has demonstrated, however, that the occurrence of a
common word signifying different things cannot each signify a
univocal account 62
A. Difference in Signification Establishes Homonymy
Indeed, "reorganization" as a common word used to signify four
alternative accounts can be identified as a homonym according to
Aristotle because difference in signification is sufficient to establish
homonymy.263 In other words, "reorganization" is a common name
applied here to four alternative transactions. A "reorganization" that
is a "merger" does not signify a transaction synonymous with a
"recapitalization" or "mere change in place of organization."
Because their accounts differ, yet each is termed a "reorganization,"
we can conclude based on our analysis that the inference that each
provides a complete, univocal account264 is suspect. In other words,
because "reorganization" signifies different, alternative, and non-
univocal accounts, we can identify "reorganization" as a homonym.
Once identified as a homonym, the next question is whether
"reorganization" is an example of a discrete (unrelated) homonym or
is better understood as an example of an associated or core-
dependent homonym: a homonym where the accounts partially, but
do not completely, overlap.265 Because each of the alternative
reorganization transactions2 confers beneficial tax treatment
through tax-deferral, their grouping suggests that they are not
discrete homonyms, but are rather examples of associated homonyms.
261. See supra notes 139-40.
262. See supra notes 189,255.
263. See supra note 255. Aristotle argues that "[i]t is necessary also to consider the
types of predicates <signified> by the name, <to determine> whether it is the same in all
cases. For if it is not the same, it is clear that what is said is homonymous." SHIELDS,
supra note 172, at 54 (translating and discussing ARISTOTLE, TOPICS 107a 3-4).
264. See supra notes 176, 182 (definitions of synonym and homonym); supra notes 206-
11 (complete definition requires specification of genus).
265. See supra note 184 (identifying discrete homonyms (a and b) as homonymously F
if and only if their names are common but their accounts have nothing in common); supra
note 192 (defining associated homonyms (a and b) as homonymously F if their name is
common and their definitions do not completely overlap).
266. See infra note 271 (discussing these alternative forms as specifying only the
differentiae and not specifying the genus).
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It does not seem a reasonable conclusion to infer that
"reorganization" simply constitutes an ad hoe grouping of randomly,
apurposively selected 67 transactions to which an exception to the
realization and recognition requirement is granted. Further
investigation of the nature of these homonyms will be helpful in
resolving this question.
B. "Reorganization" as Definition
Aristotle's levels of definition will also be instructive in resolving
the homonymous nature of "reorganization."2' In fact, Aristotle
cautions us that even the word "definition" is homonymous.269 Thus,
when we see a homonym, such as "reorganization," we need to
inquire whether we have a "definition" that is really a denomination
of something accurately called a "reorganization" or a "definition"
offering a more complete account, including its genus. For example,
as competent speakers we may be said to "define" a four-legged,
furry creature by denominating it as a "dog." Our understanding of
the object (dog) is based on our immediate knowledge and
perception. Our designation ("definition") of "dog" need in no way
include a statement of the particular nature of "what it is to be" a
dog, as canine and carnivore. Similarly, we can generally understand
a "reorganization" without understanding the precise nature or
essence of "reorganization." However, in order to state "what it is to
be" a dog, in the form of a "better" or more complete definition, we
must include both the genus and the differentiae (characteristics) of
that which we so define. We have seen that genus (canine, animal) is
necessarily prior to the differentiae (individual characteristics, e.g.,
four-legged, furry); when we state the genus, we state the "essence"
or definitive character of "what it means to be something."2 0
If we consider again "reorganization" as it appears in the statute,
we see that not only is "reorganization" a homonym but the different
267. As problematic as purposive interpretation may be, to begin from the premise that
law is initially apurposive seems deeply troubling and unwarranted. See supra note 231
(discussing same).
268. See supra notes 194-99 (discussing Aristotle's assertion that one who defines well
must include both genus and differentia); supra notes 209-11 (discussing Aristotle's
recognition of levels of definition corresponding to the level of inquiry).
269. See supra notes 206-13 (discussing levels of definition and noting that "definition"
is equivocal). By "definition" we can "signify," i.e., denominate something corresponding
to that term; we can also "define" by stating the essential characteristics (including its
genus) of that so denominated. See supra notes 209-10.
270. See supra note 199 (quoting Cleary on priority of genus in definition); supra notes
206-08 (discussing meaning of "essence" for Aristotle).
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accounts, the terms specifying the permissible forms (e.g., merger,
recapitalization) state only the particulars (differentiae) applicable to
each type. Aristotle tells us that differentiae cannot function as the
genus. 71 As such, the textualists who interpret "reorganization" to
define all necessary and sufficient conditions are stating an
incomplete definition because they state only the differentiae and do
not state the genus to which they belong, viz., a group of transactions
for which an exception to the realization/recognition requirement has
been granted. As competent speakers, we can understand generally
what is meant by a "reorganization" describing mergers and other
forms of business adjustments. However, for a more sophisticated
definition, the genus to which "reorganization" belongs must be
specified. Here "reorganization" states a series of associated
homonyms with only their differentiae and with no genus expressly
stated. To define well or completely, we must state in any account
the genus to which that being defined belongs. Because
"reorganization" is an associated (a core-dependent) homonym,
however, it will be possible to determine its genus.272
C. "Reorganization". A Complete Definition of Genus "Not-Sale"
Although no genus is expressly stated in the reorganization
statute, it may be possible to infer the genus by virtue of the core
around which these associated homonyms coalesce (i.e.,
characteristics consistent with the tax consequences applicable to the
alternative transactions, deferral of immediate recognition of any
gain). We do not merely assume the genus by reason of the tax
consequences. Rather, we begin from a consideration of the
characteristics of these transactions that justify their tax treatment
(deferral) and investigate whether, in fact, characteristics of the genus
correspond to characteristics associated with the tax consequences.
1. "Reorganization" as Incomplete Definition
The default characterization for all changes in ownership,
whether termed "sale," "disposition," or "transfer of interest" is a
271. See ARISTOTLE, Topics, supra note 169, at 128a30 (differentia must be
distinguished from genus); id at 128a20-29 (differentia always indicates a quality of the
genus and cannot be substituted for the genus because genus is predicated more widely
than differentia). Aristotle illustrates by saying that he who describes a "man" as an
"animal" indicates his essence better than he who describes him as a "pedestrian." Id.
(author's translation).
272. See supra notes 223-24 (defining core-dependent homonyms that make reference
to the core, the base referent implicit in each).
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"sale." Any sale, transfer or other disposition of one's interest in a
corporation, for whatever reason and for whatever type of
consideration (e.g., cash), results in a taxable event requiring
immediate recognition of any gain or loss 73 If any change in
ownership can be termed a "sale," then for convenience, we may
refer to these four "reorganizations" to which deferral is granted as
"not-sale." By "not-sale" we mean here a group of reorganizations
that are accorded tax-deferral, thereby postponing the moment of
taxation in spite of changes that would otherwise trigger a taxable
event within a realization-based system. Because genera do not
overlap,274 we may assume that "reorganizations" that qualify for tax-
deferral must constitute a genus ("not-sale") that is distinct from that
of a "sale."
It is not the form (differentiae) described by the alternative
transactions that of itself characterizes a distinct genus excepted from
immediate tax. A "sale" or other realization event would include an
alteration of one's ownership interest occurring in any one of the
forms specified here (mergers, reorganizations or the like). We can,
therefore, infer that a taxable reorganization would require
recognition of gain or loss upon its occurrence. If the forms alone do
not result in beneficial tax deferral, and indeed cannot constitute the
genus to which they belong for purposes of a more complete
definition, we may infer that characteristics of the genus constitute
what it is to be "not-sale." Indeed, it is the genus to which these core-
dependent homonyms ("reorganizations") belong that confers the
benefit of non-recognition because its characteristics allow it to be
characterized as a "not-sale." The two genera, 75 "sale" and "not-
sale," two genera that do not and cannot overlap, provide the basis
then for distinguishing between reorganizations that require
immediate realization and recognition of gain and those to which tax-
deferral is granted. The characteristics that distinguish the genus
"not-sale," particularly its essence or its core characteristic, merit
further examination.
2. Characteristics of Genus "Not-Sale": Business Purpose
Its essential nature, those characteristics that merit no immediate
tax recognition, includes continuity of interest, because continuity
273. Within a realization based income tax system, the time for measuring gain or loss
ends at the moment of disposition. I.R.C. § 1001 (1994); see also supra note 79.
274. See supra notes 196,259.
275. See supra note 198 (noting that the law of non-contrariety operates to prevent
assigning anything to two genera simultaneously).
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itself allows for postponement until a later date for the measurement
of any gain or loss inherent upon final disposition of one's ownership
interest. But this is not sufficient. If one has continued one's
ownership interest unchanged, no exception to realization is required,
because there has been no "sale." In other words, there would be one
genus, not two distinct genera. To require continued ownership of a
business itself does not, however, take account of the nature of
business and economic conditions. The need to make changes in
business structure, ownership or combinations occurs independently
of the willingness to recognize gain or loss and the attendant tax
consequences. If continuity is required to avoid realization and
recognition, there is no genus distinct from "sale." A tax system that
does not, however, acknowledge business exigency creates a
significant impediment to the conduct of business and the healthy
functioning of an economy unimpeded by the system itself. What
distinguishes the genus "not-sale" is not therefore unchanged
ownership, that would be a not "sale," but the nature of the
transactions that are prompted by business purpose, coupled with
some level of continuity. Transactions prompted by business purpose
are distinguishable from a disposition of an ownership interest for any
reason or no reason because their very purpose is inherent in the
nature of the business to be continued but in a somewhat altered
form. Transactions prompted by business exigency despite
incomplete continuity constitute members of the genus "not-sale."
The combined characteristics of business purpose (a business
justification for a transaction) plus some level of continuity that is less
than complete but that is consistent with the business purpose
(alteration in form or combination) constitute characteristics of the
genus "not-sale."
A "not-sale" then can be characterized as a change in ownership
and in a form that would otherwise require realization of gain but
which is excepted from such realization and recognition because of
both continuity of ownership and business purpose. What
distinguishes then a "reorganization" to which tax-deferral is granted
from those which require immediate tax consequences are those
characteristics of a "not-sale," namely business purpose, whose origin
is inherent in the very nature of its business and some level of
continuity of interest. In short, a tax-deferred "reorganization" is
within the genus "not-sale" because of the characteristics of
significant, but less than complete, continuity of ownership interest;
but a reorganization that is "not-sale" is one whose very
incompleteness of continuity originates in and is prompted by
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business purpose-those very characteristics identified by the judicial
doctrines of business purpose and continuity (including continuity of
enterprise and shareholder interest). We will see that these
characteristics constitute the "core" principles defining "not-sales"
around which these homonyms are associated and to which they must
refer.276
3. Priority of Genus, Base Referent: Business Purpose
As stated, or "defined," in the statute, tax-deferred
"reorganization" specifies only the differentiae and not the genus.277
We can infer that each reorganization must make reference to and
implicitly contain the essential characteristics of the genus, the base
referent upon which tax-deferral is predicated: business purpose
coupled with some level of continuity. While their forms27
(differentiae) are included in the definitions as stated within the
statute's provisions (and as such constitute "definitions" that we as
competent speakers commonly understand as "reorganizations"), as
core-dependent homonyms to which tax-deferral is granted, these
provisions alone cannot be understood as complete definitions or
what Aristotle called "better definitions." The statutory "definition"
must therefore be understood to be incomplete. To provide a
complete definition, we must understand the genus and that each
form of "reorganization" relates efficiently to the core provisions that
constitute its essential nature.
"Reorganization" as used in the statute is an example of a core-
dependent homonym, associated around a core specified by the
genus, because genus is prior to the differentiae specified and is
related to the tax consequences accorded to these transactions. In
defining associated, core-dependent homonyms, we have seen that
they can be related in two ways. First, as in the example "healthy,"
we saw that a "healthy complexion" was indicative of Socrates's state
of healthiness while "Socrates's healthy regimen" was contributory to
276. See supra notes 221-23 (describing core-dependent homonymy as where a and b
are homonymously F if there is some c such that the accounts of F-ness in "a is F" and "b
is F" necessarily make reference to the account of F-ness in "c is F" in an asymmetrical
way).
277. See supra note 271 (noting that differentia can not function as genus).
278. The particular form that the transaction takes could be termed either its material,
formal, or efficient cause. Identification of the exact causal relationship is not essential to
the argument here as it applies to cases of business reorganizations. Given that Irwin
argues effectively that the "efficient" causal relationship subsumes the other causes, it
could be argued that an efficient causal relationship is the most appropriate designation.
See supra note 243 (discussing the four causes and Irwin's assessment).
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that state of Socrates being "healthy." In this example, associated
homonyms relate causally and asymmetrically (since they are not
reducible to but necessarily refer to Socrates's being healthy) to the
core statement: Socrates is healthy. We can rely on what we learned
from the definition of "core-dependent homonym" to see that the
homonym "reorganization" must be defined to allow reference to
some base referent, some core, that must exist prior to and to which
reference must be made by each of the associated homonyms. 279
4. Causal and Functional Relationship
We can also compare the two classes, the two genera, of
reorganizations. These two genera of reorganizations are first, the
genus "sale" comprising those which appear in the forms specified but
without business purpose and continuity, and second, the genus "not-
sale" comprising those that appear in the forms specified that also
include both a business purpose and some level of continuity. The
genus "not-sale" permits the same forms, the same differentia as the
genus "sale." In other words, it is the genus, not the differentiae that
distinguishes the two groups. Applying Aristotle's test of "functional
determination," we can consider what function these
"reorganizations" perform. The group specified here as tax deferred
"reorganizations," "not-sales," functions to confer the benefit of tax
deferral. The reorganization provisions function as an exception to
the realization and recognition requirement to allow the benefits of
deferral of immediate tax consequences. Where prompted by
business exigency, the tax consequences otherwise resulting from
such "reorganizations" might inhibit the very changes necessitated by
that business purpose. Because the function of something is central
to its identification for Aristotle, we can discern true from spurious
examples by examining whether the function core to the identity can
be performed. A homonym that does not share the base referent,
that lacks the definitive, functional characteristics, is only
homonymously so; indeed it is spurious. 1  Absent a business
279. See supra note 187 (describing nonreducibility of statements); supra notes 222-23
(defining core-dependent homonymy, in addition to asymmetrical relations found in our
examples regarding Socrates's health as "a and b are homonymously F in a core-
dependent way iff [if and only if]: (i) a is F; (ii) b is F; and (iiib) there is some c such that
the accounts of F-ness in 'a is F' and 'b is F' necessarily make reference to the account of
F-ness in 'c is F' in an asymmetrical way," SHIELDS, supra note 172, at 104).
280. See supra note 229 (describing Aristotelian "functional determination" as where x
will belong to a kind or class of F if and only if x can perform the function of that class).
281. See supra notes 232-33 (describing when an F has lost what is definitive of being
an F, it is no longer an F as such, only homonymously so).
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purpose, transactions merely taking one of the permissible forms but
lacking characteristics of the genus, business purpose and some level
of continuity, would be inappropriately granted tax-deferral because
they are only homonymously reorganizations, lacking the function of
permitting transactions to occur prompted chiefly by business
exigency.
5. Application of Law of Non-Contrariety
We may find further support for our distinction between "sale"
and "not-sale" by reference to a fundamental logical principle, the
law of non-contrariety. s  Aristotle describes the law of non-
contrariety as the "most certain of all principles" and states this
because "it is impossible at once to be and not to be."'  In other
words, the law of non-contrariety states explicitly that it is impossible
for "contrary attributes" to belong to the same subject at the same
time. For example, Socrates as a "man" is also an "animal," thereby
correctly specifying the relative (ascending) hierarchical relationships
of the genus and species to which Socrates, the individual, belongs.
While it is possible to identify other, non-human, members of the
genus "animal," and so correctly name a dog as an animal, it will not
be true to call Socrates both an "animal" and a "not-animal":
Socrates cannot simultaneously belong and not belong to the same
genus.' By function of the law of non-contrariety, it would be false
then to state simultaneously that "Socrates is an animal" and that
"Socrates is a not-animal."
We can thereby logically infer that what is defined and classified
as a "not-sale" cannot simultaneously be a "sale." Or, what is a
"sale" cannot simultaneously be correctly assigned to the genus "not-
sale." We can infer further that a "sale" or transfer-a severing or
alteration of one's investment for no reason and with any type of
consideration--can not also be defined as a "not-sale." Within a
system predicated on the realization requirement, "not-sale" exists
282. See supra notes 198,257.
283. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, supra note 185, at 1005b35-1006a6; see also supra
note 198 (discussing ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 77a10-26). Aristotle illustrates
the law of non-contrariety with the following example:
If a man is truly called an animal, it will be true to call Callias (a man) an animal,
even if a not-Callias (e.g., a dog) is also called an animal. But it will not be true
to call Callias a not-animal. For the law of non-contrariety, the surest of all
principles, requires that a man (Callias) can not be an "animal" and be a "not-
animal" at the same time.
ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, supra note 193, at 77a10-16 (author's translation).
284. See supra notes 198,257.
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because it is predicated on business purpose in conjunction with some
requisite level of continuity of interest. To assure ourselves that
Congress's lengthy effort to craft statutory provisions that accomplish
their function (serving as an exception to the realization/recognition
requirement predicated on business purpose) is not merely
apurposive rule-making, we should consider the statute's extrinsic
evidence.
D. Extrinsic Evidence
To confirm that our process of reasoning is consistent with
congressional understanding, we need look only briefly at the
rather lengthy legislative history associated with the statute. The
reorganization provisions were first introduced in 1921,286 amended
from 19242 7 until 1954,m when they assumed a form close to the their
current one. Again amended in 1990 following codification in 1986, 289
these provisions continue to be amended, most significantly in 1997.29
As the nature of business transactions and the ingenuity of tax
lawyers evolved, Congress has revisited these provisions and will
likely continue to do so. Throughout its development, business
purpose is repeatedly discussed as the core justification for this
increasingly complex provision.29' Business purpose coupled with
concern lest the provisions be misused for tax avoidance purposes
(including loss recognition) is the most significant factor cited in the
record of congressional efforts, which yielded increasingly complex
285. See supra notes 82, 100, 104 (discussing legislative history).
286. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, Pub. L. No. 67-98,42 Stat. 227.
287. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, Pub. L. No. 68-176,43 Stat. 253.
288. I.R.C. § 355 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
289. Section 355(d) was added by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508 § 11321(a), 104 Stat. 1388-1460 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 355(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). The addition's motivation was expressed in a House
report. H.R. REP. No. 101-881, at 341 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2343
(Y1.1/8:101-881) (enacting § 335(d) to prevent taxpayers from using § 355(a) to dispose of
subsidiaries in transactions that resemble sales); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-964 (Conf.
Rep.) at 1044 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374.
290. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
34, § 1012, 111 Stat. 789, 914 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 355(e) (Supp. IV 1998)).
291. See, e.g., SEIDMAN, supra note 82, at 790 (stating that no part of the present
income-tax law produced such uncertainty and litigation or more seriously has interfered
with necessary business readjustments); id. at 791 (stating that amendments will "not only
permit business to go forward with the readjustments required by existing conditions" but
increase revenue by preventing taxpayers from taking losses in sales and other fictitious
exchanges); supra note 82 (discussing Congress's initial struggle to define "transactions"
that qualify for tax-deferred reorganization treatment).
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statutory language in an effort to make the provisions clearer.29
However much public choice theory cautions us to view legislative
history with suspicion, the mass of evidence in support of "business
purpose" as the base referent seems to argue against simply
dismissing decades of material as strategic.293
This examination of "reorganization" as a homonym where a
common name signifies different predicates allows us to recognize
"reorganization" as a definition understood by competent speakers
but one which necessarily lacks all elements necessary to provide a
"better," or more complete, definition. A "better definition" that
recognizes the priority of the genus to which these tax-deferred
reorganizations belong and to which these core-dependent
homonyms necessarily make reference, demonstrates that as a genus
distinct from "sale," a "not-sale" to which tax deferral is granted
correctly incorporates business purpose within its core, or essential,
attributes. As such, business purpose is correctly understood to be
inherent in and to apply to all tax-deferred reorganizations, in
whatever form they are structured. As homonyms, all
reorganizations necessarily incorporate their essential nature,
including business purpose.
The application of Aristotelian principles of homonymy,
association and priority among homonyms, and priority in levels of
definition, leaves many questions unanswered, including the quantum
of business purpose necessary and whether the doctrine is correctly
applied outside of the reorganization provisions. This examination
will, nonetheless, have served its purpose if it helps definitively
answer whether the Gregory decisions, articulating business purpose,
are correct. If we are closer to agreeing on that fundamental
question, it may now be possible to address these still unanswered
issues.
CONCLUSION
We must now re-address the central question of whether the
proposed method of statutory interpretation is suited to modem
American society with its stated dedication to the "rule of law." Can
application of the methods outlined be reconciled with the rule of
law? These methods begin and ultimately rely on close examination
292. See supra notes 100, 104, 291 (discussing the business exigency standard).
293. See supra notes 34-36, 44, 66 (discussing the use of legislative history as
problematic because of its strategic purpose premised on the public choice model of
legislation).
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of the text, considering first the nature of terms used, whether the
terms are homonyms, and if homonymous, then considering whether
the homonyms are associated or discrete. Once identified as
associated homonyms, the text can then be examined to see if the
base referent or the causal relationship of the homonym to a core
idea is apparent. The text itself allows consideration of the level of
definition provided, including whether a definition includes the genus,
essential information to provide a more complete rather than an
incomplete, definition and whether common principles of logic, such
as the law of non-contrariety, can assist in our textual examination.
As a text and contextually based system, the method proposed would
seem to adhere more closely to the "rule of law" than current forms
of textualism, with their ad hoe recourse to dictionaries and canons of
statutory construction, whose very formalistic nature requiring
anticonsequentialist application of increasingly complex but
necessarily incomplete rules, undermines the rule of law. The
methods advanced in this Article provide as well more determinate
principles for analysis than dynamic statutory interpretation that lacks
the structure provided by Aristotelian methods.
Aristotelian methods are probably not going to replace current
methods of statutory interpretation. But if they allow the resolution
of some common but difficult issues and provide some determinate
answers based on a principled methodology, they will contribute to
the development of ultimately more satisfying methods of statutory
interpretation.
Finally, the "rule of law" passage, when considered in its
entirety, instead of as selectively quoted by the textualists, itself
shows that the dichotomy articulated by textualists is a false one:
principled interpretation is not antithetical, but is indeed necessary to
the rule of law. Aristotle himself answers the question of how textual
interpretation and the function of those charged with both
interpreting and giving effect to the law can be reconciled with the
principle of the "rule of law":
Therefore, it is preferable for the law to rule rather than any
one of the citizens, and according to this same principle,
even if it be better for certain men to govern, they must be
appointed as guardians of the laws and in subordination to
them; ... It may be objected that any case which the law
appears to be unable to define, a human being also would be
unable to decide. But the law first specially educates the
magistrates for the purpose and then commissions them to
decide and administer the matters that it leaves over
659
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"according to the best of their judgment," and furthermore it
allows them to introduce for themselves any amendment that
experience leads them to think better than the established
code.
294
Interpretation, therefore, is inescapable as part of the application
of law to any factual situation. Principled analysis of words that are
homonymous, by following a methodology such as Aristotle suggests,
one that includes careful analysis of words, levels of definition and
priority, will allow for a reasoned approach to common and important
issues of statutory interpretation. However much we value the rule of
law, language is not, except in the simplest cases, self-evident.295 As a
result, analysis and interpretation by those committed to judge in the
294. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 1, at 1287a20-29 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). Aristotle continues: "He therefore that recommends that the law shall govern
seems to recommend that God and reason alone shall govern, but he that would have man
govern adds a wild animal also." Id Noteworthy is the context in which Aristotle makes
this statement. Aristotle is contrasting monarchy where law is dispensed by one individual
having absolute power with a more mixed, democratic government that could justifiably
be described as government by the rule of law, not the rule of man. Cf. AESCHINES,
AGAINST CrESIPHON 3.6 (describing three forms of government (tyranny, oligarchy,
democracy) and stating that "tyrannies and oligarchies are administered according to the
directions of those who are in positions of authority while democratic city-states are
administered according to their established laws." (author's translation)). See generally id.
(describing forms of government and advocating mixed government, not monarchy or
democracy because in their absolute forms they degenerate into tyranny and ochiocracy).
The expression "according to their best judgment" is formulaic, part of the oaths
taken by the dikasts at Athens. DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL
ATHENS 44 (1978). MacDowell notes that, once Athens had a written law code, jurors
were expected to judge in accordance with the laws, as demonstrated by their oath "to
judge according to the laws and decrees of Athens, and matters about which there are no
laws I will decide by the justest opinion." Id. (citing various speeches written by
Demosthenes (384-322 B.C.) who was Athens' greatest orator and whose orations, on
both private and public matters, are the source of much information about fourth century
Athens' legal system). See, e.g., DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST LEPTINES 20.118 (reminding
jurors of their duty since they have come into court "having sworn to judge according to
the laws" and who have sworn about which there are no laws, "to judge in the most just
opinion possible" (author's translation)); DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST ARISTOCRATES 23.96
("jurors have sworn to judge with the most just opinion possible" (author's translation));
DEMOSTHENES, MANTITHEUS AGAINST BOEOTuS IN REGARD TO HIS NAME 39.40
(same); DEMOSTHENES, EuxrmHEUS AGAINST EUBULIDES, AN APPEAL 57.63 (same).
Cf AESCHINES, AGAINST CTESIPHON 3.6 (noting lawgivers' recognition of importance of
laws in democratic city-states because of inclusion in jurors' oath "I will cast my vote
according to the laws" (author's translation)). MacDowell makes the important
distinction here that "no law" is most sensibly interpreted to mean not an absence of any
law, but the absence of a specific statutory provision applicable to the case at hand. He
uses an example from Plato's Euthyphron (homicide law proposed against Euthyphron's
father who left a man in a ditch absent law classifying specific activity as homicide).
MACDOWELL, supra, at 60.
295. See Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 623 (2d Cir. 1944) ("Laws neither execute
nor interpret themselves. Men must discharge those functions.").
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"best manner possible" are both required to give effect to the rule of
law and are thus essential and not contrary to it. We must begin with
the text but we must necessarily consider the full context in which the
text appears and then "judge in the best manner possible." If analysis
and interpretation is undertaken by "well-trained, honest, able men
[sic], conscientiously obeying the laws, and imbued with the spirit of
democracy," then, but only then, will we actually construe a text
"reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means. "296
Ultimately the statutory text offers much more than any method
of interpretation and specifically the methods offered by either
textualists, intentionalists, or dynamic interpreters. Despite their
assertions of devotion to the rule of law, neither textualism nor
practical and dynamic methods of interpretation respond adequately
to the multiplicity inherent in both language and the world it
describes. To deny the flexibility and richness of language by denying
the need for principled interpretation, as the textualists do, is to assert
clarity and univocity in the face of competing meanings that can
suggest only non-univocity. Such refusal to recognize language
complexity is to rob the text of its ability, in conjunction with
reasoned interpretation, to offer determinate and determinable
results satisfying rule of law concerns. In essence, by requiring
univocity as necessary for the rule of law, textualists undermine our
ability to satisfy the rule of law in the face of multiplicity. At the
same time, to abandon the text to consideration of extra-textual
materials without taking all possible structured guidance from the
text (including assessment of issues of homonymy, synonymy, priority
in homonymy and definition) fails to use the determinacy of language
to give fullest effect to rule of law concerns.
296. Iti; see also SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 23 (describing his
method of textualism as construing a text "reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means");
supra note 53 (describing critics' rejection of Scalia's description). Thus, this methodology
should allow us to better accomplish what in fact Justice Scalia claims for his goal in
interpreting statutes. Indeed this is Judge Frank's conclusion:
The phrases 'separation of powers' and 'a government of laws, and not of men,' if
properly construed, embody principles of the first importance in a democracy;
but if so construed as seriously to cripple effective government, they will lead to
democracy's downfall, for, as the Federalist tells us, an ineffective government
paves the way to anarchy and thence to depotism [sic]. Laws neither execute nor
interpret themselves. Men must discharge those functions. Above all what we
need is the selection of well-trained, honest, able men, conscientiously obeying
the laws, and imbued with the spirit of democracy, to serve as administrators and
on the bench.
Guiseppi, 144 F.2d at 623 (citations omitted).
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In short, improper consideration of the text (whether by
asserting its univocity or denying order in the face of multiplicity) is
to undercut the very rule of law on multiple fronts. Failing to
consider all that the text can offer allows judges to exercise power,
whether through ad hoc reliance on dictionaries or legislative history,
beyond that consistent with the rule of law and allows advocates to
manipulate the system for unfair individual advantage-both
activities that are more consistent with a government described as the
"rule of men." Only by applying a principled and consistent
methodology to the very necessary process of statutory interpretation
will it ultimately be possible to give effect to the rule of law, whose
very premise is that both magistrates, bound to give their best
judgment, and citizens, those who are governed, agree to be bound by
the terms of those laws.
